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Abstract: This thesis is concerned with macroeconomic and ﬁscal implications of fossil
fuel combustion. Despite an emerging focus among economic policy makers on the problem
of curbing greenhouse gas emissions, much remains to be learned about this complex issue.
Fossil fuel related pollution, for example, is likely to impose a range of societal costs 
including, potentially, on productivity, human health and household consumption patterns
 which are typically not reﬂected in economic simulations aimed at informing the climate
debate.
Analysis of a broader set of potential energy-environmental spillovers here highlights
new insights on the importance of theoretical assumptions, including in relation to savings
behaviour, welfare aggregation and potential consumption externalities for the macroe-
conomy and ﬁscal policy.
Distributional issues associated with potential energy tax reforms designed to control
externalities and raise revenues are also studied in an eﬀort to inform decision makers in
the UK on the consequential risks - and mitigating strategies - to the well-being of societal
groups, including lower income households.
A fuller summary is found at Chapter 2
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1 PROLOGUE
Climate change is not....the biggest challenge of our time, it's the biggest challenge of all
time (Sir David King, former UK Government Chief Scientist, remarks to Carbon Trust
annual dinner, 29 April 2014)
This [the problem of human induced climate change] is not science: it is mumbo-jumbo
(Lord Lawson, The Telegraph, Sept 28, 2013)
.....the impacts of climate change can cause lasting damage to capital stocks...current
models where this lasting damage is omitted are likely to be deeply misleading.(Lord
Stern (2013))
Climate change, demographics,...energy,.... these issues are all intertwined. We cannot
look at one strand in isolation... (Ban Ki-Moon, remarks to COP-17 High-Level
Ministerial Dinner, 7 December, 2011)
[The primary goals of UK energy policy are] ensuring light, power, heat and transport are
aﬀordable for households...and reducing carbon emissions in order to mitigate climate
change. (Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), 2015)
The challenge for tax design is to achieve social and economic objectives while limiting
welfare-reducing side eﬀects. (The Mirrlees Review (2011), Chapter 2)
This thesis is concerned with the economic implications of climate change and fossil
fuel dependency, together with associated ﬁscal policy responses. Stern (2007) cogently
argue that emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) constitute the greatest market failure
the world has ever seen. They conclude that, if unchecked, the overall costs of climate
change  including from declining crop yields, heightened ﬂood damages, and adverse
human health eﬀects  would be equivalent to a permanent loss of at least 5 percent of
global income.
1
While Stern's ﬁndings have been open to quantitative challenge  not least relating
to the low discount rate which the authors apply to the future economic costs, many of
which lie decades, even centuries, in the future (Dasgupta (2007), Nordhaus (2007, 2013),
Tol and Yohe (2007), Weitzman (2007))  the basic conclusion, at least, concerning the
underlying seriousness of the issue appears sound.1
The most recent scientiﬁc evidence collated as part of the IPCC Fifth Assessment
Report (2014) suggests, for example, that  were global GHG emissions to continue to
rise at a rate similar to that observed since the 1950's until now  then there is at least
a 66 percent chance that average global surface temperatures will rise by 2.6-4.8 degrees
Celsius (C).
At the upper end of this range, such increases are roughly equivalent to the change in
average temperatures from the last ice age to today (Stern (2007)).2 If realised, they would
almost certainly result in a radical shift in the physical and human geography of the globe;
and serious, albeit diﬃcult to quantify, risks of large-scale shifts in the climate system,
such as disruption to oceanic and atmospheric circulations or the irreversible melting of
Arctic and Antarctic ice sheets (raising the potential for a 10 metre (or more) rise in sea
levels).
From the perspective of an economist, the issue is fundamentally an externality prob-
lem: fossil fuel combustion adversely aﬀects future economic development; however, each
1 The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014) estimate that human activity has been the dominant cause
of observed warming since the mid-20th century with a probability of more than 95 percent. This is not to suggest complete
consensus on this issue. Esteemed physicist Freeman Dyson, for example, argues that such inference is unclear, not least
given the uncertain inﬂuence of Carbon dioxide (CO2) on cloud formation (views cited in interview with Quanta Magazine,
published 31 March, 2014). Other climate skeptics accept the basic pretext that human activity causes global warming,
but deemphasise the likely costs associated (see, for example, Lomborg (2007)).
2 Measures of average surface temperature increases, for example, belie much larger eﬀects on land, and at extreme
latitudes.
2
polluter would prefer others to bear any costs associated with their avoidance  a classic
free rider problem. The theoretical response to such issues is described by Pigou (1932):
simply set a tax equal to the marginal external cost of each unit of pollution.3
A key issue is to determine, in economic terms, how seriously to take the problem. The
answer to this question is embodied in the ongoing debate concerning the social cost of
carbon (SCC)  the economic damages associated with a small increase in CO2 emissions
(conventionally one metric ton) in a given year.4 However, determining this value is a
diﬃcult undertaking. A number of facets of the problem merit particular note at the
outset.5
First, it is a truly global public bad: a unit of CO2 is equally harmful wherever it
is emitted. Important international coordination issues notwithstanding, there is thus
considerable merit in guiding the collective action problem, particularly in terms of the
overall degree of policy ambition, within a global analytic framework.
Second, the climate problem is long term and persistent. Economic damages arise from
the stock (rather than ﬂow) of GHGs. In the case of CO2, for example  by far the most
important source of human induced GHG  emissions decay extremely slowly (roughly 1-2
percent a year on average). This means that the problem is fundamentally dynamic: an
3 This result holds in a ﬁrst best setting in which prices are otherwise undistorted, for example, by taxation or imper-
fect competition. Contributions in the public economics sphere have subsequently nuanced the policy insights under less
restrictive assumptions (see Jones et al. (2013) for a discussion).
4 Arguably any external cost is diﬃcult to assess at the margin (as opposed to an average say). Such diﬃculties have
resulted in alternative approaches which involve taking the overall policy objectives on GHGs as given, and then choosing
policies which achieves this at least cost (Baumol-Oates (1988)).
5 Estimates of the SCC vary widely given the technical complexities and divergent views surrounding the appropriate
discount rate: Tol (2007), for example, ﬁnds a median value of US$15 per tonne (t) CO2, while Stern (2007) puts the
ﬁgure at US$85 tCO2. By contrast, Nordhaus (2007) suggests a starting value of around US$5 tC02. More recently, the
United States (US) government arrived at a central value of around US $35 tCO2 (Interdepartmental Working Group (IWG)
(2013)).
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optimal response today depends on future policy and economic activity.
Third, and relatedly, most of the costs of climate change fall in the (often quite distant)
future.6 This raises questions concerning the appropriate discount rate, which critically
aﬀects the proper level and rate of increase of carbon prices (see Jones et al. (2013) for
an overview of these still somewhat controversial issues).7
Fourth, policy responses to climate change  not least ﬁscal incentives for energy con-
servation and substitution into less polluting technologies  interact, potentially funda-
mentally, with the exhaustible nature of fossil fuels (which contribute around 85 percent of
total global consumed energy).8 Sinclair (1992), for example, ﬁrst recognised that energy
taxes potentially inﬂuence the timing of production choices by proﬁt maximising resource
owners, thus emphasising the desirability of a downward sloping tax path.9
Fifth, the eﬀects of climate change are likely to be highly heterogeneous both across and
within countries. The most adverse eﬀects are expected in developing countries and the
most marginalised households (due to their greater exposure to the impacts and weaker
adaptive capacity) (Nordhaus (2013), Stern (2007)).10
6 Jaﬀe and Kerr (2015) argue that cost-beneﬁt analyses based on the aggregation of economic eﬀects fail the Kaldor-Hicks
compensation principle, since a comprehensive system of transfer payments across countries and generations is infeasible in
practice.
7 In a notable recent contribution, Giglio et al (2015) ﬁnd empirical evidence for low long term discount rates - on the
order of 2.6 percent per annum - by comparing freehold versus leasehold property values.
8 Although technological advancements have greatly expanded the recoverable stock, fossil energies remain ﬁnite to a ﬁrst
approximation given their slow replenishment rates. The literature relating to resource scarcity and economic development
 extending back to the seminal work of Hotelling (1931) and the neoclassical resource-production models of Dasgupta and
Heal (1974), Solow (1974) and Stiglitz (1974))  are thus potentially insightful. These latter studies, in particular, emphasize
that consumption over the long run depends on investment returns, the degree of impatience, and the rate of technological
progress.
9 See also Farzin and Tahvonen (1996), Hoel and Kverndokk (1996), Sinclair (1994), Ulph and Ulph (1994)).
10 Nordhaus (2013), for example, ﬁnds that, a global carbon tax could generate discounted beneﬁts of $1.3 trillion in
4
Importantly, heterogeneities also extend to the economic burden from climate change
policies. It is clear that energy intensive, resource dependent economies risk incurring sub-
stantial costs from more expensive fossil fuels.11 Within countries, considerable diﬀerences
in consumption behaviour exists: low income households, for example, are more ﬁnancially
reliant on basic commodities such as energy. Understanding this later dimension is critical
to informing policy design.
The ﬁnal important dimension concerns the pervasive uncertainty surrounding both the
nature of the climatic changes which may take place, and their economic consequences.
Such uncertainty may even be Knightian since historical climate patterns observations
are uninformative in regards to the distribution of future outcomes (Weitzman (2009)).12
However, the implications of such uncertainty, which includes the possibility of irreversible
outcomes, for policy are not yet fully established.13
developed countries over the second half of the century, compared to $3.5 trillion in avoided economic damages in developing
countries over the same period.
11 See, for example, International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2008)). These distributional eﬀects are highly sensitive, however,
to design choices, including transfer payments and the allocation of pollution rights in any future international carbon trading
system.
12 Pindyck (2013) and Stern (2013) highlight the deterministic form of most climate models (which rely on monte carlo
simulation to treat uncertainty). A recent contribution by Hambel et al. (2015), which incorporates uncertainty over both
climate and economic variables, represents a valuable contribution to the literature. The implications of potential failures
in the axiomatic underpinnings of expected utility theory for climate policy  which could potentially be due to temporary
errors in perception  is an emerging research ﬁeld. Millner et al. (2013), for example, show that the value of climate change
abatement increases, potentially substantially, in the presence of probabilistic uncertainty over outcomes where the planner
is averse to ambiguity.
13 The beneﬁts from reduced risk exposure through early action are counterbalanced by the prospect of both better
information and technologies in the future (Gollier et al. (2000)). Considerable uncertainty also exists in relation to the
costs of mitigating climate change, in part because future technological development is both unpredictable and endogenous to
policy choices (Goulder and Mathai (2000), Jaﬀe and Stavins (1995)). Moreover, the apparent existence of a large eﬃciency
gap raises questions about the true returns to investment in currently available energy technologies (Enkvist et al. (2007),
Fowlie et al. (2015), Joskow and Maron (1992)).
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This thesis seeks to inform several key aspects of this complex and multi-dimensional
problem which have hitherto received little attention in the literature; in particular, it
studies the implications of potential macro-environmental spillovers, including direct ef-
fects on labour and capital markets, and assumptions over the behaviour and preferences
of economic agents, for energy taxation and wider ﬁscal adjustments.
In this context, therefore, it is noteworthy that central analytic tools underpinning
appraisals of the economic impacts of climate change are known as integrated assessment
models (IAMs)  a name derived from the fact that this class of models attempts to
integrate the representation of GHG stock formation with the resulting eﬀects on output,
consumption, and other economic variables due to climate change.
They have two main components. First, a welfare function, typically comprising a
stream of isoelastic utility over per capita consumption at the global or regional level.
Second, a damage function which determines the eﬀect of higher temperatures on out-
put.14
These damage functions, in particular, have recently come under close scrutiny in an
eﬀort to provide better guidance on appropriate climate policy goals; Stern (2013), for
example, emphasises the need to broaden the set of environment-economy impacts which
are simulated (fossil fuel use is likely to impose multiple social costs on the economy),
including direct eﬀects on capital and labour markets.15
14 Research into the macroeconomic eﬀects of pollution extends back to the 1970's (see Forster (1973), Gruver (1976),
Keeler et al. (1972)). In contrast to the climate change literature, this literature generally assumes that externalities bear
directly on the utility function of the representative agent.
15 Pindyck (2013) argues that these lack both theoretical and empirical foundations: a common approach has been to
model reductions in output levels as a convex function of temperatures (e.g. Nordhaus (2008), Stern (2007)), and to select
coeﬃcients such that output losses in the range of 2°C to 4°C are consistent with ex ante beliefs! However, such fundamental
questions as to whether higher temperatures might aﬀect levels or rates of change in output, for example, have not yet been
fully resolved (Jones et al. (2014)). Fussell (2010) provides a helpful review of leading IAMs.
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Turning to the welfare function, and the structure of household preferences, the over-
whelming focus of recent research has been on the appropriate discount rate (see Jones
et al. (2013) for a discussion). However, several important aspects concerning the role of
preferences on economics and policy have so far been the subject of little attention.
As highlighted by Tol (2009), for example, the relevant literature typically presumes
that utility is formed over consumption per capita, rather than of a group  thereby failing
to consider important concerns from the social choice literature, for example, regarding
the implied tyranny of the individual (see, for example, Blackorby and Donaldson (1984),
Cowell et al. (2010)).16
A further almost universal tenant of the neoclassical resource literature is that the
resulting stream of utility is additively separable. As such, potentially important insights
from the wider macroeconomic literature relating to consumption habits  the idea that
historical or wider societal behaviours may aﬀect preferences  have, for the most part,
been overlooked (Kennan (1988), Fuhrer (2000), Smets and Wouters (2007)).
Turning to more detailed aspects of policy implementation  despite growing interest
in energy taxation to curb fossil fuel usage  relatively little research has been undertaken
to date on the distributional consequences of such measures (a key concern, and potential
impediment to reform, given the burden of energy costs on many low income households).
Where analysis has been undertaken in the case of the UK, for example, available
studies commonly presume that household demand is unaﬀected by energy tax reforms
and rigourous welfare analysis largely (Baiocchi et al. (2010), Dresner and Ekins (2006),
Druckman and Jackson (2008), Symons et al. (2002)). This risks over estimating the ﬁscal
base and biasing estimates of the economic costs.
A further important issue is the lack of available analysis into the welfare costs of cor-
16 Average utilitarian preferences lead to a situation, for example, in which a single person with 100 utils is ranked more
favorably than an innumerate number of citizens enjoying 99 utils.
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rective indirect energy taxes reform in the UK - arguably the key concern for governments
in assessing policy objectives, and in forming implementation choices.
Exploring these issues  which, to the best of my knowledge, are directly addressed
in just a single behavioural study for the case of motor fuel excises (Blow and Crawford
(1997))  is thus a key objective of this thesis, and presents a further opportunity for
exploring one of its central themes, in particular being the role of preferences in energy
taxation choices.
Against this broad research context relating to this important and challenging set of
economic and policy issues, let us now turn to a more detailed summary of the key research
ﬁndings and contributions.
8
2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
Chapters 3 - 5 aim to respond to the hitherto rather narrow set of societal costs and
preference forms which have been explored within the existing literature on neoclassical
growth with exhaustible resources  thereby exposing a number of new insights on the im-
plications of particular assumptions over the form of the household optimization problem
(both in terms of objective function and constraints) for the resulting macroeconomic and
policy insights.
Chapter 3 focusses speciﬁcally on the eﬀects of climate change on physical capital
markets, which have received scant attention in the literature (and are highlighted as a
priority area for model development by Stern (2013)). It is well known, for example, that
adverse weather conditions cause capital stocks to erode: stresses from heat, cold and
rainfall, for example, account for between one third and one half of road maintenance
costs (Nemry and Demirel (2012)).
However, it is likely that climate change will increase capital losses. Buildings and
infrastructure, for example, are expected to suﬀer additional damages from coastal ﬂood-
ing, more powerful wind storms, and subsidence due to more intense rainfall or melting
permafrost (Field et al. (2014)). In other regions, drought may render capital obsolete:
decreased runoﬀ rates in the Colorado river basin of up to 20 percent predicted by mid
Century, for example, may threaten the long term viability of the Las Vegas economy
(Miller et al. (2011)).17
Analysis of such eﬀects are now emerging at the research frontier: Moore and Diaz
(2015), for example, recently studied the sensitivity of growth pathways using an IAM fea-
17 The city depends on the river for 90 percent of its water and is currently suﬀering extreme water sustainability issues.
Implementation of water demand management strategies is a top priority, however opportunities to increase supply appear
limited.
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turing capital and labour inputs to production (see also Fankhauser and Tol (2005)). How-
ever, these contributions ignore potentially important interactions with the exhaustible
character of fossil fuel inputs: in particular, more rapid depreciation aﬀects the Hotelling
portfolio condition, by lowering net returns to investment.
To the best of my knowledge, only Bretschger and Valente (2011) have studied this
linkage in a resource based economy. The authors ﬁnd that spillovers aﬀecting capital
durability inﬂuence the level of output but not its growth rate.18 However, a number of
key questions remain substantively open in this context:
 First, how does savings behaviour inﬂuence the macroeconomic and policy implica-
tions of more rapid environmentally related capital depreciation? I show that the
main ﬁnding of Bretschger and Valente (2011) rests crucially on assumptions that
inter temporal consumption and savings decision making are forward looking. If sav-
ings behaviour follows a Keynesian rule of thumb, for example, such capital linkages
are shown to have negative eﬀects on the time path of output in steady state.
 Second, what is the likely magnitude of any resulting distortions? Although diﬃcult
to assess, and ultimately an empirical question, no previous analysis has sought to
rigorously appraise the possible size of this potential macro-energy eﬀect. Drawing on
a detailed analysis of the available literature, I show that such direct capital channels
have non trivial macroeconomic eﬀects, potentially resulting in a fall in output growth,
for example, on the order of 0.05 percent for the Keynesian model under plausible
parameter values.
 Third, what are the implications for corrective policy? Are any resulting distortions
18 A handful of studies postulate environmental spillovers aﬀecting capital durability within AK production frameworks,
eﬀectively simulating standard productivity eﬀects: see, for example, Bretschger and Valente (2011), model 1, Bretschger
and Suphaphiphat (2013), and Soretz (2007)).
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inﬂuenced by the existence and design of wider ﬁscal policies? The implications of
direct eﬀects on physical capital, and the potential for wider ﬁscal interactions, have
not previously been analysed. I show that spillovers aﬀecting capital durability war-
rant a less steeply declining corrective tax path; and that distortions are substantially
exacerbated by the presence of an income tax, but are unaﬀected by public ﬁnanc-
ing requirements if net investment is exempted from the tax base and revenues are
returned lump sum.
Chapter 4 focuses on the external eﬀects of resource exploitation on demographics. Energy
combustion is a major source of air pollutants which are strongly linked to human mortality
rates in both the epidemiological and social scientiﬁc literature: a recent major study, for
example, attributes around 7 percent of global disease to ambient air pollution, around
80 percent of which may be due to energy combustion (Global Energy Assessment (GEA)
(2012), Lim et al. (2013)).
Links between the climate externality and mortality rates have also been established
with some conﬁdence: more frequent and intense heat waves due to GHG emissions, for
example, are expected to increase mortality rates: extreme temperatures caused as many
as 70,000 deaths across 16 European countries in 2003 (Robine et al. (2007)). Despite this,
growth models featuring exhaustible resources have thus far tended to assume population
growth to be exogenous.19
Notable exceptions in this context include studies into the relationship between resource
scarcity, demographics and technological development (Peretto and Valente (2015), Schäfer
(2014a)).20 In the environmental economics literature, Mariani et al. (2010), Jouvet et al.
19 Endogenous growth theorists study links between growth and human fertility in models without natural resources
(Barro and Becker (1989), Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990), Erlich and Lui (1991)).
20 Peretto and Valente (2015) analyse an inﬁnite horizon Schumpeterian model, in which households have preferences over
the number of oﬀspring and ﬁnite resources enter into the production process. Their essential insight  that the coexistence
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(2010), and Schäfer (2014b) analyse the relationship between pollution, human longevity
and economic growth (or health policy).
In contrast, this chapter focuses on the macroeconomic and policy implications of mor-
tality eﬀects (including interactions with wider production externalities), and, in particu-
lar, on the role of preferences over the aggregation of welfare across households for these
insights. Speciﬁcally, it seeks to cast light on the following questions:
 First, what are the implications of potential interactions between capital market and
demographic spillovers for economic growth and tax policy? Although Fankhauser
and Tol (2005) emphasise their potential importance, these have not previously been
studied in an exhaustible resource setting. I show that spillovers aﬀecting mortality
have countervailing macroeconomic eﬀects to those arising from capital durability
studied in the previous chapter. The former dominate in an optimal growth setting,
but are parameter dependent in the Keynesian model.
 Second, how are the macroeconomic and policy implications of demographic spillovers
inﬂuenced by choices aﬀecting the aggregation of welfare? This question has not
previously been considered (see Tol (2009) for a passing reference). I show that if
the social planner places positive weight on aggregate (rather than average) felicity
levels, mortality spillovers potentially imply policy prescriptions which diverge from
the basic downward sloping paths identiﬁed in the resource tax literature.
 Third, what are the implications of ﬁnite planning horizons for the macroeconomic
inﬂuence of mortality spillovers? In the ﬁrst study, to my knowledge, to analyse such
of a stable steady state rate of growth and an asymptotically declining demographic expansion depends on the relationship
between capital and resources in the production function  extends Dasgupta and Heal (1974). Schäfer (2014a) highlights
the potential for education technologies to improve resource sustainability within a ﬁnite horizon model featuring induced
technological change and exhaustible resource inputs to the intermediates sector.
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eﬀects within an overlapping generations (OLG) model with an exhaustible resource
input, an exogenous mortality hazard is shown to unambiguously increase steady
state interest and depletion rates, but in an endogenous setting, the eﬀect in capital
markets is dependent on interactions between the resulting incentives on the young
to save and the Hotelling condition.21
Chapter 5 focusses on potential spillovers from energy use to consumption, and their
implications for policy and economic development. The contribution of the energy sector
to climate change has been widely researched. However, evidence is emerging on counter
directional eﬀects: in particular, residential heating and cooling demand is likely to be
sensitive to changing climate conditions (see Huang and Scott (2007) for a discussion). In
this context, the chapter considers the following question:
 What are the implications of spillovers between climate change and household energy
usage for economic growth and tax policy in the United Kingdom (UK)? I show
that a potential spillover aﬀecting the division of oil resources from consumption to
production has positive implications for output growth and depletion levels due to
the faster accumulation of productive capital, provided inter-temporal substitution
is suﬃciently inelastic. I also characterise previously unexplored implications for
diﬀerential taxation of resources across usages.
Extending the theme on the importance of preference forms for the transmission of environment-
21 Kemp and Long (1979) ﬁrst explored the role of exhaustible resources for inter generational savings, but assumed these
to be inessential inputs to production. Agnani et al. (2005), Babu et al. (1997), Howarth (1991), John and Peccecchino
(1994), John et al. (1995) assume exogenous survival dynamics within models in which exhaustible resources are required
for output. Jouvet et al. (2010) and Mariani et al. (2010) explore the inﬂuence of environmental spillovers on longevity and
growth, but do not consider natural resources or related production externalities.
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economy spillovers and design of appropriate policies, the second part of the chapter
analyses the the implications of externalities from fossil fuel usage in the presence of con-
sumption habits. Despite the growing popularity of non separable time preferences within
mainstream macroeconomics (Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Fuhrer (2000), Smets and
Wouters (2007)), the assumption of time separability has been almost universally main-
tained in resource economics.
Zhang (2013) studies the inﬂuence of internal habits aﬀecting consumption and renew-
able resource utilitisation. He ﬁnds that habits inﬂuence the speed of economic adjustment,
but not the steady state. By contrast, Schäfer and Valente (2011) analyse consumption
habits and bequests within an OLG model featuring exhaustible resources, highlighting
the potential for these to generate multiple steady states (see also Schäfer (2014a) for a
study of consumption habits, growth and fertility). Against this research context, this
chapter considers the following question:
 What are the economic and policy implications of a failure of the time insepara-
bility assumption for productive externalities from exhaustible resource utilization?
I show that introducing an external habit of the form adopted by Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) causes steady state depletion and interest rates to rise provided the
climate change externality is not too large. Consumption externalities are also shown
to interact with spillovers to capital durability discussed previously, inﬂuencing the
appropriate tax policy response.
The aforementioned chapters analyse macroeconomic and policy issues associated with re-
source exploitation within a highly aggregated framework, featuring a single representative
agent. Such approaches are helpful in framing this important global problem.
It is important to recognize, however, that country level policy choices, in particular
by the major emitters, will be critical to curbing the costs and risks arising from climate
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change. In this context, concern for the costs of policies at the national (and potentially
even sub-national) level are likely to be key to tax design and implementation choices.
This raises issues surrounding heterogeneity in the burden of climate and energy related
policy costs, since taxes on fossil fuels  likely to be essential to curbing utilisation and
promoting the developing of substitute technologies  may disproportionately aﬀect certain
groups (low income households may be particularly reliant on such goods, for example).
Detailed household level analysis is thus required to assess the economic and welfare
costs of more rational taxation of energy goods, and to inform policy makers on appropriate
expenditure policy adjustments in order to avoid the most series inequities. However,
available evidence on detailed distributional aspects of energy tax reforms in the UK are
surprisingly limited (Crawford et al. (2011, 1993), Johnson et al. (1990), and Symons et
al. (1994)).
Chapter 6 thus departs from dynamic considerations in tax design, formed over a single
representative agent within a general equilibrium framework, to focus, instead, on better
understanding the economic and welfare consequences of indirect energy tax reforms in
the UK, within a static and partial equilibrium framework featuring heterogeneous agents.
Central to the enquiry in this chapter are the following questions:
 What are the likely environmental and revenue eﬀects of imposing carbon taxes on
domestic fuels and standardizing their value added tax (VAT) treatment in the UK?
 What are the welfare consequences of such reforms, considering potentially divergent
behavioural responses across socioeconomic groups?
 How are these costs inﬂuenced by aggregation choices within the social welfare func-
tion (SWF)?
 How is the distribution of costs aﬀected by allocation choices over revenues, including
adjustments to social security beneﬁts?
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Two important features of the analysis presented below distinguish it from the bulk of
existing research in this area. First, I model the behavioural responses of UK households
to changes in (relative) prices and budgets. Second, I analyse the eﬀects of indirect
tax reforms capturing important substitution eﬀects between a broad set of non durable
consumption goods. These features are important to robust assessments of the economic
and welfare eﬀects of potentially non marginal policy reforms (Banks et al. (1996)).
This chapter contributes to this existing stock of research on the economic and be-
havioural eﬀects of carbon and VAT reforms using comparable framework in a number of
key regards:
 First, it is the only comprehensive behavioural study of carbon taxes to have been con-
ducted since the liberalisation of electricity and natural gas markets, and to analyse
tax scenarios which are consistent with current stated government policy guidelines.
 Second, it provides the ﬁrst money metric estimate of the welfare costs of carbon
tax incidence in the UK, and to analyse the implications of diﬀerent approaches to
aggregation within the SWF.
 Third, it is the ﬁrst analysis of potential interactions between VAT and carbon tax
reforms.
In terms of empirical ﬁndings, demographic variables are shown to inﬂuence consumption
substantially. Budget shares to electricity and gas, for example, increase with the age of
the household head, while that of gasoline displays the opposite demographic trend. There
is also some evidence for declining expenditure shares in natural gas and gasoline from the
mid 1990s and early 2000s respectively.
Budget elasticities vary by household for all commodities (emphasising the value of
highly disaggregated analysis), and are particularly widely dispersed for electricity (which
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is an inferior good for more than 25 percent of households in the sample). Among the fuels,
natural gas is on average the most price inelastic, with behavioural responses diminishing
at higher expenditure levels, particularly for petrol.
Carbon taxes have large predicted eﬀects on fossil fuel demand, reducing aggregate
natural gas and gasoline demand by 7-21 percent and 1-4 percent respectively across
scenarios. Electricity demand rises by 1-3 percent in the case of the carbon tax scenarios
(while VAT reform alone has a downward bearing across all fuels).
However, these aggregate eﬀects belie signiﬁcant heterogeneity in behaviours across
socioeconomic groups: in the case of a carbon tax, for example, the poorest households
reduce gas consumption by 5-6 times more than the richest families when expressed in
proportionate terms.
Unifying VAT treatment at the standard rate increases sample revenues by around 18
percent, equivalent to additional potential revenue of around ¿22 billion. The revenue
opportunities from carbon taxes are also shown to be quite substantial, at least in the
short term: a levy of ¿50 tCO2, for example, is projected to increase tax revenues ¿10
billion.
The welfare costs of energy tax reform are found to be material, particularly for sce-
narios involving both VAT and carbon tax reform, and in the cases of a SWF which are
either weighted by family size (highlighting the practical importance of aggregation issues
discussed previously), or feature a low degree of inequality aversion.
The detailed behavioural framework adopted has an important bearing on the mag-
nitude of assessed welfare costs, which are generally on the order of 4-18 percent lower
compared with estimates based on analysis in which demand is invariant to prices and
incomes.
Expenditure measures are shown have strong potential to mitigate these costs. How-
ever, these opportunities diﬀer according to both the allocation mechanism adopted, but
also, importantly, the form of the SWF (the scope for aggregate welfare gains being gen-
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erally greater in the weighted utilitarian case).
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3 LEAVING LAS VEGAS? CLIMATE CHANGE AND
CAPITAL DURABILITY
3.1 Introduction
Stern (2013) emphasises the need to broaden the set of environment-economy interac-
tions analysed, to include the impact of climate change on capital formation, in an eﬀort to
improve policy guidance on the desirable extent of greenhouse gas emission reductions. In
this context, this chapter analyses key theoretical issues aﬀecting the macroeconomy and
tax policy in the presence of linkages between fossil fuel combustion and capital durability
due to climate change.
It is intuitive that existing weather conditions aﬀect the operating life of physical capi-
tal, including buildings, transport and energy infrastructure. Heat and cold related stresses
as well as rainfall degrade road and railway networks (Chinowsky et al. (2015), Jollands
et al. (2007), and Nemry and Demirel (2012)). Nemry and Demirel (2012), for example,
estimate that 30-50 percent of the cost of maintaining such infrastructures in the European
Union (EU) are weather related.
Buildings also degrade more rapidly in the presence of adverse weather conditions.
Increased upkeep costs, for example are a familiar pattern for homeowners in temperate
zones in winter. Such costs rise markedly following extreme weather events, particularly
ﬂoods and storms: average annual insured losses from such events between 1990-2010, for
example, are estimated to be on the order of $(2008)35 billion (Barthel and Neumeyer
(2012)).22
However, the assertion here is that weather related capital losses are likely to be af-
22 However, such statistics are likely to represent only a small fraction of the physical eﬀects due to weak diﬀusion of
insurance services in developing countries, commonly just a few percent of total asset values (Mills (2005)).
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fected  generally (but not universally across all asset types) increased  by future climate
change related to fossil fuel use. In this context, available analyses by engineers, climate
scientists and sector specialists predict that coastal ﬂooding, more powerful wind storms,
and subsidence due to more intense rainfall or melting permafrost is likely to damage
buildings and infrastructure (Field at al. (2014)).
It is also possible, for example, that drought may even render capital obsolete in some
regions over the longer term: one high proﬁle example is the city of Las Vegas which
depends on the Colorado river for virtually all its water (and where opportunities to
increase supply appear limited). It thus appears conceivable that decreased runoﬀ rates
in the Colorado river basin of up to 20 percent predicted by mid Century may threaten
the long term viability of sections of the municipality (Miller et al. (2011)).
Analysis of direct linkages between climate change and physical capital is now the
subject of emerging research: Moore and Diaz (2015), for example, recently studied the
sensitivity of growth pathways to these eﬀects using an IAM featuring capital and labour
inputs to production (see also Fankhauser and Tol (2005)).
However, these studies ignore potential interactions with the exhaustible character of
fossil fuel inputs: in particular, more rapid depreciation inﬂuences the Hotelling portfolio
condition. To the best of my knowledge, only Bretschger and Valente (2011) have studied
this linkage in a resource based economy. The authors ﬁnd that spillovers aﬀecting capital
durability inﬂuence the level of output, but not its growth rate.23
This chapter oﬀers new theoretical insights into the relationship between fossil fuel
use, the operating life of physical capital, and the time path of resource depletion and
output, focussing on the following hitherto unanswered questions: First, how does savings
behaviour inﬂuence the macroeconomic and policy implications of more rapid environmen-
23 A handful of studies postulate environmental spillovers aﬀecting capital durability within AK production frameworks,
eﬀectively simulating standard productivity eﬀects: see, for example, Bretschger and Valente (2011), model 1, Bretschger
and Suphaphiphat (2013), Soretz (2007)).
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tally related capital depreciation? Second, what is the likely magnitude of any resulting
distortions? Third, what are the implications for corrective tax policy? Fourth, are any
resulting distortions sensitive to wider ﬁscal policy design? Finally, to what extent are
these ﬁndings sensitive to assumptions over the endogeneity of technological development?
It demonstrates that the main ﬁnding of Bretschger and Valente (2011), that spillovers
aﬀecting capital durability cause level but not growth eﬀects on the time path of output
and consumption, rests critically on the assumption that savings adjusts optimally to
market incentives: if behaviour is Keynesian, for example, capital linkages have negative
eﬀects on growth in steady state.24
Turning to the second question, no previous study has sought to quantify these eﬀects
in the context of a resource based economy, or to undertake a detailed analytic exercise
on the possible magnitude of endogenous depreciation rates. Analysis of the available
literature indicates that overall depreciation might increase, proportionately, by perhaps
1-10 percent in the long run (within say 20-50 years). This is shown to have non trivial
macroeconomic eﬀects: potentially resulting in a fall in output growth, for example, on
the order of 0.05 percent for the Keynesian model under plausible parameter values.
The third and fourth questions also remain substantively open. Corrective taxes are
shown to fall less rapidly in the presence of a capital spillover. Moreover, the magnitude
of any resulting distortions is substantially inﬂuenced by the tax treatment of investment:
for example, under central assumptions, the output-capital ratio is estimated to increase
by an additional 12 percent in the presence of a modest income tax of 20 percent if net
investment is exempted from the tax base. Finally, this chapter ﬁnds that the key results
24 While optimal savings choices formed under rational expectations remain a powerful benchmark, both a macro economic
and an emerging behaviourist literature  which emphasises the computational complexity implied by dynamic optimizing
behaviour  suggests that households may commonly apply simple heuristic approaches in practice: see, for example,
Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1991), Carroll and Summers (1991), Carbone and Hey (1997), Hey and Dardanoni (1988),
Thaler (1994), and Winter et al. (2012).
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outlined above hold in the presence of fully endogenous technological development.
The structure of the remaining chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 outlines a variant of the
basic model due to Sinclair (1992). Section 3.3 extends it to include spillovers from resource
depletion to capital depreciation, and analyses the implications for the macroeconomy and
policy. Section 3.4 analyses these issues within an optimal growth framework (drawing on
Sinclair (1994)), together with the importance of wider policy choices over the taxation of
income and expenditure for the size of any resulting distortion. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Fixed savings model with exogenous depreciation
This section adapts a simple growth model due to Sinclair (1992) with exogenous depre-
ciation and an environmental spillover aﬀecting productivity. This serves to both introduce
the structure of the basic model, together with the underlying assumptions, and sharpen
the subsequent analytic focus on the inﬂuence of endogenous depreciation under diﬀerent
assumptions, regarding savings behaviour and technological development.
Central to both Sinclair's (1992, 1994) papers are the assumptions that natural resource
stocks are ﬁnite, such that the associated price dynamics obey the following Hotelling rule
(Hotelling (1931)):25
25 The theory is intellectually compelling as a long run description of fossil fuel markets, given their extremely slow
replenishment rates. However, empirical evidence for the Hotelling rule is generally inconclusive, being impinged, for
example, by a lack of detailed data (particularly relating to marginal production costs) and the challenge of adapting
econometric tests to speciﬁc market conditions. Krautkraemer (1998) and Slade and Thille (2009) provide excellent surveys
of the literature.
A variety of alternative models of price determination have been developed, which also raise theoretical and empirical
issues. Cremer and Salehi-Isfahani (1989), for example, argue that domestic investment priorities by resource producers lead
to a backward bending supply curve and thus periods of high and low prices. However, this theory rests on unrealistic capital
account assumptions and ﬁnds mixed empirical support (Dahl and Yücel (1991), Griﬃn (1985), Salehi-Isfahani (1987)).
Others researchers emphasise the role of anti-competitive behaviour by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC): (see Adelman (1982), Gilbert (1978), Salant (1976) for inﬂuential early contributions). However, evidence of
material price eﬀects from OPEC cooperation is inconclusive, with the exception of a period around the 1980s (Alhaji and
Huettner (2000), Almoguera et al. (2011), Dahl and Yücel (1991), Griﬃn (1985), Griﬃn and Neilson (1994), Gülen (1996),
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Pˆ (t) = r(t)− j (3.1)
where P (.) and r(.) represent, respectively, the oil price and (gross of depreciation)
rental payment at time t (ˆ denotes a growth rate); and j ∈ (0, 1) is the proportion
of the capital stock which depreciates in each period (and is assumed time invariant).
Assumptions of perfect foresight and zero extraction costs underpin the condition in this
form.
Resource stocks evolve according to the following transition equation:
E(t) = −S˙(t) = x(t)S(t) (3.2)
where E(.), x(.) and S(.) are total inputs to production, the proportion of the stock
depleted, and the aggregate stock remaining in the ground at time t respectively (˙ signiﬁes
the time derivative).
Production, Q(.), is Cobb-Douglas in form, bearing constant returns to scale, such that:
Q(t) = T (t)K(t)a1N(t)a2E(t)1−a1−a2 (3.3)
where, T (.) is a technology index, and K(.) and N(.) are stocks of capital and labour
respectively (the later is assumed to grow at a constant exogenous rate n).26
Spilimbergo (2001)).
Modern scholarship has tended to employ structural, rather than reduced form, tests on energy market fundamentals,
reﬂecting concerns over the endogeneity of oil prices to macroeconomic activity. Barsky and Kilian (2002) and Kilian (2009),
for example, emphasise the importance of aggregate demand shocks to energy price dynamics. Recent concerns about
possible distortions to oil prices arising from ﬁnancial market activities have found limited support in the literature (Fattou
et al. (2013), Killian and Lee (2014)).
26 The Cobb-Douglas functional form is adopted due to its attractive limiting properties (and analytic tractability):
speciﬁcally, that resources are an economic necessity (in the sense that absolute exhaustion leads to economic collapse), and
physical capital returns fall as produced stocks accumulate relative to resource inputs (Dasgupta and Heal (1974)). A higher
degree of substitutability between labour and physical capital likely contravenes laws of thermodynamics (Dasgupta and
Heal (1979), p.211), and dismisses resource sustainability issues. However, some researchers argue that natural resources are
so fundamental to production that the relationship with physical capital may be complementary (Georgescu-Roegen (1975)).
Conclusive empirical evidence to support this point is scant (see Neumayer (2000) for a helpful survey). I thus cautiously
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Output can either be consumed or added to the capital stock, with the proportion of
output which is invested being determined here by an exogenous savings parameter, s.
The equation of motion in capital, assuming (time invariant) depreciation is thus:
K˙(t) = sQ(t)− jK(t) (3.4)
Although lacking clear micro foundations, this Keynesian assumption may be a reason-
able ﬁrst approximation of the empirical relationship between savings and incomes (Camp-
bell and Mankiw (1989, 1991), Carroll and Summers (1991)):27 Campbell and Mankiw
(1989, 1991), for example, estimate that the eﬀect of predictable changes in aggregate
income on total consumption in the US and other Organisation for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) countries are accounted for if a substantial proportion
(between 1/3 and 1/2 half) of households observe decision rules of this kind. These rather
crude papers loosely ascribe these eﬀects to the presence of liquidity constrained con-
sumers. A subsequent behaviourist literature emphasises constraints on rational decision
making implied by rational expectations models, potentially leading householders to ap-
ply simpliﬁed rules of thumb, such as Keynesian ﬁxed propensities, when forming savings
choices (Carbone and Hey (1997), Hey and Dardanoni (1988), Thaler (1994), Winter et
al. (2012)).
Factor inputs earn their marginal products, reﬂecting perfectly competitive markets.
Gross of depreciation rental rates and oil prices are thus:
r(t) = a1
Q(t)
K(t)
(3.5)
maintain the assumption of substitutability between capital and energy.
27 Moreover, posited declines in savings rates in the US since the 1980s do not clearly hold if asset values are included in
wealth calculations (see, for example, Juster et al. (2006)).
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P (t) = (1− a1 − a2) Q(t)
E(t)
(3.6)
Oil consumption is assumed to generate an environmental externality, m, which con-
strains productivity growth, h, as follows:
Tˆ (t) = h−mx(t) (3.7)
where h ≥ 0, and m > 0.
Thus externalities from resource extraction are assumed to limit productivity growth.28
Following Barbier (1999) and Sinclair (1992, 1994), the magnitude of these eﬀects is cali-
brated as a proportion of extracted resources in any period.29 This is designed to facilitate
steady state analysis, and simplify calculations by limiting the number of state variables
(compared to modelling externalities as a function of pollution stocks, for example).
However, this approach raises two important issues: ﬁrst, the calibration of m is sen-
sitive to S, and might reasonably be adjusted, for example, in the case of major resource
discoveries or new extraction technologies. Second, depletion declines over time, yet a
falling time path for m is inconsistent with steady state. This implies, perhaps not unrea-
sonably in the context of climate change, for example, that the damage from a unit of oil
28 Stern (2007), Nordhaus (2007, 2008), Tol (2002), Weitzman (2009), by contrast, model reductions in output levels as a
convex function of temperatures. The empirical literature on this question remains inconclusive. Cross sectional studies have
tended to ﬁnd strong negative relationship between temperatures and per capita output levels (Dell, et al. (2009), Gallup et
al. (1999), Masters and McMillan (2001), Sachs (2001, 2003)). However, these are susceptible to bias from omitted economic,
social and institutional factors which may be potentially correlated with weather conditions (Acemoglu et al. (2002), Dell
et al. (2009, 2014)). The most recent and advanced panel based studies appear to broadly support the formulation adopted
here (Bansal and Ochoa (2011a, 2011b) and Dell et al. (2012)).
29 Note that a wide variety of pollution sources have been modelled in the environment-growth literature, including output
(e.g. Keeler et al. (1972), Van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991)), consumption (e.g. Heal (1982)), accumulated capital (e.g.
Bretschger and Valente (2011), Stokey (1998)), and even economic depreciation (as in Mäler (1974)). The speciﬁcation
adopted here (appropriately) renders input substitution an important mitigation strategy (infeasible where pollution is a
ﬁxed coeﬃcient of output, say).
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rises over time (Sinclair (1990)).
In order to study the dynamic eﬀects of taxation, Z(t) denotes an ad valorem levy on
E(.) imposed at time t, with time derivative given by: z(t) = Z˙(t)
1+Z(t)
.
Lemma 3.1: A stable steady state in depletion and interest rates exists if
a1 > s.
Sketch proof. Steady state expressions for depletion and interest rates are given by (a
derivation and formal analysis of stability properties are found at Appendix A):
x∗A = (h+ a2n+ j (1− a1)) (a1 − s) + zs (1− a1) (3.8)
r∗
a1
A = (h+ a2n+ j (1− a1))− z (1 +m− a1 − a2) (3.9)
where A = a1 (1− a1 − a2) + a2s + m (a1 − s). By inspection, a1 > s, is suﬃcient for
A > 0. Figure 1 illustrates the saddle path stability of these points for the case of both a
strong and a moderate climate externality.30 
This is a dynamic eﬃciency condition which is hereafter maintained.
Lemma 3.2: The exogenous capital depreciation term, j, unambiguously
raises steady state depletion and interest rates.
Sketch proof. By inspection of equations (3.8) and (3.9),dx
∗
dj
, dr
∗
dj
> 0.  This is intuitive:
oil inputs to capital replacement raise depletion for any given stationary value of r; while
greater capital scarcity drives up interest rates for any given value of x (shown in Figure
1).
Lemma 3.3: i) m unambiguously reduces x∗ and, ii) a stationary tax, z(t) =
0, is non distortionary.
30 The externality is deﬁned as strong (moderate) if m > (<)a1 + a2. Sinclair (1992) shows that the global warming
parameter counterbalances the Hotelling eﬀect by which higher interest rates lead to a faster rate of exhaustion (dominating
the overall eﬀect in the strong case. However, available evidence suggests this is unlikely to hold (see, for example, Nordhaus
(2007)), thus the focus here is principally on the moderate externality case, m < a1 + a2.
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Figure 1
Interest and depletion rates with exogenous depreciation
This ﬁgure depicts the stationary interest rate and oil market loci (given by equations (A.1) and (A.2))
in x, r space (the arrows denote transitionary forces). Stationary depletion  which rises with r under
the moderate externality (but is downward sloping in the strong case, due to resulting weaknesses
in the macroeconomy)  shifts right for j > 0 (from x to x′): lower net of depreciation returns reduce
stationary values of x for any given gross interest rate (by the Hotelling condition). In addition, j causes
the stationary interest rate locus to shift rightwards (from r to r′) given higher oil inputs to capital
replacement. Steady state interest and depletion rates thus rise unambiguously (from x∗, r∗ to x′∗, r′∗).
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Sketch proof. By inspection of equation (3.8), dx
∗
dm
< 0, dx
∗
dz
|z=0= 0. 
Climate change hampers productivity and promotes resource sustainability. A station-
ary tax simply captures a proportion of the rents earned by resource owners. However,
a rising ad valorem charge (i.e. z(t) > 0) accelerates depletion and squeezes output due
to lower productivity growth and scarcer resource inputs (this is a key insight of Sinclair
(1992)).
Lemma 3.4: Steady state growth increases with s and is negatively associated
with m and j.
Sketch proof. Steady state output growth is given by:31
AQˆ∗ = s ((h+ a2n+ j (1− a1))− z (1 +m− a1 − a2))− Aj (3.10)
dQ∗
ds
> 0, dQ
∗
dm
, dQ
∗
dj
< 0. 
As is standard in neoclassical resource growth models, productivity growth critically
determines output growth along the optimal pathway (Stiglitz (1974)). In this model, a
rising tax lowers steady state growth. This also holds for an increase in j which slows
capital accumulation. In contrast to the standard Solow model, the savings rate is posi-
tively associated with long run growth since higher savings imply slower resource depletion
through the Hotelling condition.
3.3 Fixed savings model with endogenous depreciation
This section analyses the potential eﬀects of accelerated depreciation due to climate
change. This reﬂects concerns among engineers, climate scientists and sector specialists,
in particular, over possible ﬂooding of coastal and riverine assets from higher sea levels,
instability of physical structures built on permafrost, and damage to infrastructure and
buildings from heat, precipitation and wind related stresses (or perhaps early obsolesence
31 This is derived by substituting (3.4) and (3.5) into (3.9).
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of capital due to water scarcity).
Let depreciation now depend (for simplicity, linearly) on the proportion of the total oil
stock extracted in period t. The equation of motion for capital thus becomes:
K˙(t) = sQ(t)− (j + θx (t))K(t) (3.11)
where θx(t) represents the total proportion of capital which erodes due to spillovers
from fossil fuel combustion in period t.
The Hotelling portfolio condition for the evolution of oil input prices is now given by:
Pˆ (t) = r(t)− j − θx(t) (3.12)
The externality aﬀecting capital durability thus slows long run resource price growth.
Lemma 3.5: Under maintained assumptions, a steady state i) exists, and,
ii) is saddle path stable, if: m > θ (1− a1)
Sketch proof. Steady state expressions for depletion and interest rates are given by (see
Appendix A for details):
x∗B = (h+ a2n+ j (1− a1)) (a1 − s) + zs (1− a1) (3.13)
r∗
a1
B = (h+ a2n+ j (1− a1))− z (1 +m− (1− a1) θ − a1 − a2) (3.14)
where B = a1 (1− a1 − a2) + a2s+ (m− θ (1− a1)) (a1 − s).
i) By inspection, B > 0 under the stated condition; ii) Figure 2 panels a) and b)
illustrate the resulting stability of the steady state.32 
32 m > θ (1− a1) is also necessary for ii). This is evident from inspection of Figure 2 panel c), which depicts the
failure of this ordering. The necessary condition for i) is given by: θ (1− a1) − m < a1(1−a1−a2)+a2s(a1−s) . This implies a
less restrictive upper bound on the magnitude of θ, but nonetheless one which seems highly unlikely to bind. To see this
intuitively, consider the most constraining case where m is zero (i.e. environmental spillovers act exclusively through the
capital channel). Assuming a1 = 0.35, a2 = 0.6, s = 0.2, x = 0.03 and total annual depreciation of 7 percent, equilibrium
existence requires that the environmental spillover accounts for no greater than around 3/4 of all eroded capital. Drawing
on a review of the available literature on potential climate change related capital losses in Appendix A this appears to be a
plausible hypothesis.
29
The stability of the economic system depends on the magnitude of any spillover from
resource usage to capital durability relative to that aﬀecting productivity. If the stated
condition fails, the additional capital scarcity due to θ is suﬃcient to overwhelm the
downward pressures on marginal product imposed through m. This condition is hereafter
assumed to be satisﬁed.
Proposition 3.1: Under maintained assumptions, steady state depletion and
interest rates are reduced by climate change (absent corrective tax policy).
Sketch proof. By inspection of B. 
Figure 2, panels a) and b) illustrate a fall in the stationary depletion and interest rates
(from x∗, r∗ to x′∗, r′∗ respectively) arising from an increase in climate change damages
(through both capital and productivity channels) for the cases where m > θ (1− a1).
The overall inﬂuence of climate change on steady states in oil and capital markets de-
pends on the relative magnitude of the two spillovers: lower net returns places downward
pressure on depletion rates through the Hotelling condition. However, slower capital ac-
cumulation raises stationary interest rates, given the ﬁxed proportion of output which is
invested and the diminishing factor returns assumption.
That environmental factors inﬂuence growth and depletion rates where savings deci-
sions are behavioural or Keynesian in character is an insight not previously found in the
literature (in the most closely related papers, Bretschger and Valente (2011) adopt a ra-
tional expectations based model of savings, while Moore and Diaz (2015) and Fankhauser
and Tol (2005) ignore Hotelling interactions).
Corollary 3.1: Steady state growth rate is negatively associated with θ.
Sketch proof. The condition for steady state growth is given by:33
BQˆ∗ = (s− θ (a1 − s)) (h+ a2n+ j (1− a1)) + sz (1 +m− a1 − a2)−Bj (3.15)
33 This is derived by substituting from (3.11) and (3.13) into (3.14). Setting θ = 0, this expression reduces to 3.10.
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Figure 2
Interest and depletion rates with endogenous depreciation
This ﬁgure illustrates the eﬀect of an increase in climate change  under diﬀerent relative magnitudes
of the productivity and capital depreciation spillovers  on the stationary capital and oil market loci
(given by equations (A.3) and (A.4)) in x, r space (where ′ denotes the inﬂuence of more powerful climate
externalities). Panels a) and b) show the resulting fall in steady state depletion and interest rates (from
x∗, r∗ to x′∗, r′∗ respectively) for the strong and weak externality cases (respectively) where m >
θ (1− a1). Panel c) demonstrates the weak externality case in which the capital eﬀect is large relative to
the inﬂuence of climate change on productivity, i.e. m < θ (1− a1): here both the stationary interest rate
(high depletion causing suﬃcient capital scarcity to bid up rental returns) and depletion loci are upward
sloping, such that climate change increases steady state depletion and rental rates. However, this is a
knife edge result since these exert horizontal and vertical forces of repulsion respectively (the arrows
denoting transitionary forces).
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By inspection,dQˆ
∗
dθ
< 0. 
The destruction of physical capital implied by θ > 0 has a negative eﬀect on both the
level and growth rate of output: since output growth is determined by the rate of capital
accumulation, and thus the steady state interest rate.
The inﬂuence of the savings rate on steady state output growth is modiﬁed by an
additional feedback in this model: higher savings lower the interest rate, resulting in more
gradual depletion. However, a lower x now further inﬂuences the depletion locus through
the Hotelling condition.34
Corollary 3.2: The corrective tax path is less negatively sloped than in the
absence of a spillover aﬀecting capital durability.
Sketch proof. Assuming that oil taxes are constant in the absence of climate change
(i.e. z = 0 if m = θ = 0), it follows from (3.13) that x∗ |z=m=θ=0= x∗ |z=z∗(m,θ>0) (i.e. the
eﬀects of the externality on steady state oil depletion are corrected) under the following
tax path:35
z∗ = −(m− θ (1− a1)) (a1 − s)
s (1− a1)
(h+ a2n+ j (1− a1))
(a1 (1− a1 − a2) + sa2) (3.16)
Under maintained assumptions: dz
∗
dθ
> 0, z∗ < 0. 
The capital spillover has a negative eﬀect on the level and growth rate of output, which
tempers the oil exhaustion problem, thereby limiting the required incentives for resource
producers to defer production (which arise from a downward sloping tax path).
34 By inspection, m > θ (a1 − s) is suﬃcient to sustain Sinclair's conclusion that policies to stimulate savings also serve
to preserve ﬁnite natural resources.
35 Corrected here implies returning the dynamic oil extraction pathway to that which would occur absent the climate
change externality.
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Discussion and numerical results
Applied analysis into the eﬀects of climate change on capital durability, although still
meagre, suggests that depreciation rates could commonly be raised by a substantial amount
for a broad class of assets: Appendix A surveys the available literature on the potential
extent of such losses, and interprets the relevant insights to parameterize the model using
standard depreciation assumptions for the asset class in question.36 Although naturally
subject to considerable uncertainty, the results of this survey suggest that  taking account
of the potential to limit capital losses through adaptive investments and behaviour 
overall depreciation could increase, proportionately, by perhaps 1-10 percent in the long
run (within say 20-50 years).
Table 1 outlines the results of the model under a range of possible parameter choices
over m and θ. It assumes that the share of income to capital labour and oil are 0.34,
0.6 and 0.06 respectively. Values of the savings, depreciation, technology and population
growth rates are set at 0.2, 0.08, 0.015 and 0.01 respectively. Under these assumptions,
the results indicate that accelerated depreciation due to environmental degradation has
potentially an important inﬂuence on steady state depletion, interest rates and output
growth under reasonable parameters.
For instance, annual oil extraction is predicted to be 5.29 per cent in the absence of
either productive or capital spillovers. This falls by around 5 percent in the eventm = 0.08.
However, roughly nine-tenths of this reduction is counteracted in the event that θ = 0.2
(consistent with roughly 5 percent of total capital outﬂows due to environmental factors).
Gross interest rates are predicted to be 0.8 percent lower than the baseline for m = 0.08
and θ = 0, but just 0.1 percent lower if θ = 0.1. Output growth of 2.58 percent is
predicted in the absence of environmental eﬀects, falling to around 2.05 percent in the
36 Ideally, aggregate changes would be calculated by weighting these changes by the ratio of the value of asset class to the
overall stock, a step which has not been attempted here.
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event m = 0.08 and θ = 0. A positive capital durability eﬀect, θ = 0.1, lowers output by
0.05 of a percentage point.
3.4 Optimal growth model with environment-capital spillovers
I now explore the implications of capital spillovers speciﬁed in equation (3.11) within
an optimal growth framework (drawing on Sinclair (1994)).37 The representative agent
is assumed to maximise the sum of a discounted, additively time separable sequence of
utility over consumption (a requirement which is relaxed in the next chapter), subject to
a productive constraint which includes the resource-capital durability spillover (and initial
conditions, K0, S0, N0).
This problem is easily expressed by the following (present value) Hamiltonian function:
Max
{c(t),E(t)}∞t=0
V =
ˆ ∞
0
(e−it
c(t)1−v − 1
1− v +
λ(t)
(
Q(.)− c(t)N(t)− (j + θx(t))K(t)− K˙(t)
)
)dt (3.17)
where c is household consumption; v and i represent the individual preference param-
eters of the household over inter temporal substitution in consumption and impatience
37 By contrast, environmental quality (or even the stock of natural resources) is sometimes assumed to enter the utility
function directly, either as a stock (as in Keeler et al. (1972), Becker (1982), d'Arge and Kogiku (1973), Krautkraemer
(1985), and Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1993)) or a ﬂow variable (for example, Forster (1973), Gruver (1976), and Smulders
and Gradus (1996)) or both (see, for example, Van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991), Bretschger and Valente (2011)). Of
itself, the form of preferences has a limited bearing on research insights (Panayotou (2000), Smulders and Gradus (1996)).
However, the implicit assumption of additive separability between consumption and environmental quality is less benign:
Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1993), for example, demonstrate that a (weakly) negative relationship with environmental
amenity values is important for the stability and uniqueness of a steady state (see also Heal (1982) and Stokey (1998)). This
is an empirical question, for which no evidence - to the best of my knowledge - yet exists. More broadly, consumption is
commonly inseparable from leisure in micro data (Browning and Meghir (1991)), but may be a more plausible assumption
at a macroeconomic level (see, for example, Mankiw et al. (1985)).
34
Table 1
Steady state depletion, interest rates and output growth with capital spillovers
θ
0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.2
0 5.29 - - - -
0.08 5.02 5.14 5.26 - -
m 0.1 4.78 4.89 5.00 - -
0.15 4.56 4.66 4.76 4.86 4.97
0.2 4.36 4.45 4.54 4.63 4.73
(a) Depletion, annual percentage of resource
stocks
θ
0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.2
0 15.87 - - - -
0.08 15.07 15.42 15.78 - -
m 0.1 14.35 14.66 14.99 - -
0.15 13.69 13.97 14.27 14.58 14.91
0.2 13.09 13.35 13.62 13.90 14.20
(b) Gross interest rates, annual percentage
θ
0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.2
0 2.58 - - - -
0.08 2.05 2.02 2.00 - -
m 0.1 1.56 1.53 1.49 - -
0.15 1.13 1.08 1.04 0.99 0.95
0.2 0.73 0.68 0.63 0.57 0.52
(c) Output growth, annual percentage
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respectively; and λ(.) is the co state variable. All other variables are as deﬁned above.
Lemma 3.6: In an optimal growth framework, θ slows consumption growth,
ceteris paribus.
Sketch proof. The Euler equation for consumption is given by (derived formally at
Appendix A):
r(t)− i− n− j − θx(t) = vcˆ(t) (3.18)
where dcˆ
dθ
< 0. 
This interaction between consumption growth and the Hotelling condition, which diﬀers
from the model outlines above, rests critically on the assumption that savings behaviour
is endogenous to (in this case lower) investment returns.
Proposition 3.2: Steady state depletion, growth and net returns are unaf-
fected by the capital spillover.
Sketch proof. Steady state expressions are given by (see Appendix A for a derivation):
Cx∗ = (v − 1) (h− n (1− a1 − a2)) + (1− a1) (i+ z) (3.19)
(r − j − θx∗)C = hv + n (a2 + (v − 1)m)−
z (v (1− a1 − a2 +m)) + i (a2 −m) (3.20)
a1Cc
∗/k∗ = (v − a1) (h− n (1− a1 − a2) (1 + (v − 1) (1− a1) θ)−(
z
(
1 +m− a1 − a2 − (1− a1)2 θ
)
+ i (1− a1)
)
) + (n+ j) (1− a1)C (3.21)
g∗C = h− (1− a1 − a2)n− (1− a1 − a2 +m) (z + i) (3.22)
where C = v (1− a1 − a2 +m) + a2 −m, and c/k represents the ratio of consumption
to capital.
By inspection, dx
∗
dθ
, d(r
∗−j−θx∗)
dθ
, dg
∗
dθ
= 0. 
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As in the case of the ﬁxed savings model, the capital spillover causes the Hotelling
line to tilt, such that depletion falls for any given stationary gross interest rate. However,
adjustments in savings behaviour (through the output-capital ratio) imply higher gross
interest rates for a given rate of depletion and output growth. These Ramsey and Hotelling
eﬀects perfectly oﬀset, yielding higher gross interest rates but leaving net returns and
growth unaﬀected (shown in Figure 3).
In terms of environment-economy interactions, resource depletion and growth depend
(as in Sinclair (1994)) solely on m as the sign of (1− v)): if v > (<)1, which implies a
low (high) degree of inter-temporal substitutability, then the negative income eﬀects from
lower productivity dominate (are outweighed by) the positive substitution eﬀects due to
future consumption becoming more expensive relative to the present.
Appendix A reviews the empirical evidence on potential values of v  equal (under
strict assumptions) to the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (EIS) 
given its centrality to the model results.38 It ﬁnds that appropriate values of the EIS in
the context of aggregate macroeconomic study are markedly lower than 1, perhaps in the
range 0.2-0.66 (implying v of 1.5-5).
Lemma 3.7: Stability of the steady state requires that: θ (1− a1) < m.
Sketch proof. See Appendix A for details.  The supporting argument closely relates
to that of Lemma 3.5, ii).
Policy implications: commodity taxation
I now consider the implications of θ > 0 for the optimal taxation of oil. This is
undertaken in standard fashion, by comparing the solution to the decentralized problem
38 The EIS has broad macroeconomic and policy implications, for example, as a determinant of: the magnitude of
distortions from capital taxation (King and Rebelo (1990)), the long run importance of national debt burdens and unfunded
social security commitments (Hall (1988)), and the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy in smoothing consumption over the
business cycle (see, for example, Woodford and Walsh (2005)).
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Figure 3
Interest and growth rates with endogenous depreciation
This ﬁgure shows (in r, g space) the inﬂuence of higher resource related depreciation rates on the steady
state time path of output in the optimal growth model with capital spillovers: depletion falls for any given
stationary gross interest rate, due to lower net returns (causing the Hotelling line to pivot clockwise). This
can be seen by comparing the dotted and solid Hotelling lines (which depict this relationship both with
and without the capital spillover respectively). However, this also encourages reduced investment, yielding
higher gross interest rates for a given rate of output growth (such that the Ramsey line shifts anti clockwise,
from the solid to the dotted locus). These Ramsey and Hotelling eﬀects perfectly oﬀset, yielding higher
gross interest rates but leaving net rates of return and growth unaﬀected.
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with the choice of the social planner.
The representative agent behaves as if her oil extraction decisions does not aﬀect the
aggregate stock (denoted by S¯) when maximising the following function:
Max
{c(t),E(t)}∞t=0
V =
ˆ ∞
0
(e−it
c(t)1−v − 1
1− v +
λ(t)
(
Q(S¯(t))− c(t)N(t)− (j + θx¯(t))K(t)− K˙(t)
)
)dt (3.23)
where x¯(t) =
(
−Σ
o
S˙o(t)
S¯(t)
)
.
It follows from the assumption that a large number of such households (indexed by o)
exist, that individual resource extraction decisions have no inﬂuence on x¯ in the limit.
From the perspective of the representative agent, at least, individual oil market choices
remain optimal (warranting no corrective tax).
Unlike the representative agent, however, the social planner is assumed to factor in the
external beneﬁts of leaving an additional unit of oil in the ground, s˜, both in terms of
higher aggregate productivity and lower capital depreciation. As such, her constrained
optimization problem can be represented as follows:
Max
{c(t),E(t)}∞t=0
V =
ˆ ∞
0
(e−it
c(t)1−v − 1
1− v +
λ(t)
(
Q(s˜(t)))− c(t)N(t)− (j + θx˜(t))K(t)− K˙(t)
)
)dt (3.24)
where x˜(t) = −S˙(t)
s˜(t)
.
Corollary 3.3: The optimal tax at steady state falls more slowly for θ > 0.
Sketch proof. The optimal tax is given by (a derivation is fond at Appendix A):
z∗ = −
x∗
(
m− θ
(
1− a1
(
1− c∗/k∗
r∗
)))
(1− a1 − a2) (3.25)
dz∗
dθ
= x∗
((
1−a1
(
1− c∗/k∗
r
))
(1−a1−a2) +
a1
r∗
(
d[c∗/k∗]
dθ∗ −
d[r∗]
dθ∗
1
r∗
)
(1−a1−a2)
)
> 0, by envelope theorem; and z∗ < 0,
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since m > θ
(
1− a1
(
1− c∗/k∗
r∗
))
> θ (1− a1).39 
The additional tax term in θ serves to correct the distortion to output levels arising
from less durable capital (which reduces incentives to defer current consumption).
Qualitatively, Sinclair's insight that optimal taxes should fall over time is preserved
under the stability condition. However, in a transitionary environment from initially low
consumption/ high capital ratios, for example, an upward tax prescription may neverthe-
less apply during a convergence period.
Policy implications: ﬁscal interactions
This section analyses interactions between spillovers aﬀecting physical capital durability
and the taxation of income and investment, demonstrating the important implications of
choices over these tax bases for the magnitude of any resulting distortions (see Kaldor
(1955) on the pioneering case for an expenditure tax base).
Income taxation
Let us start by introducing a constant tax, ZQ ∈ [0, 1] on income (with no exemption
for net investment). Assuming that household utility depends solely on decisions over
private goods,40 the objective function of the representative household is given by:
Max
{c(t),E(t)}∞t=0
V =
ˆ ∞
0
(e−it
c(t)1−v − 1
1− v + λ(t)((1− ZQ)Q(t)−
− c(t)N(t)− (j + θx(t))K(t) + y(t)N(t)− K˙(t))dt (3.26)
39 Note
c∗/k∗
r∗ =
c(t)N(t)
a1Q(t)
<1.
40 This could arise if public goods provision decision is pre optimised, or, alternatively, could reﬂect a highly pessimistic
view of public services!
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where y(t)N(t) represents lump sum redistribution of tax revenues satisfying the fol-
lowing balanced budget condition: y(t)N(t) = Z(t)E(t) + ZQQ(t).
Lemma 3.8: An income tax slows the rate of consumption growth, capital
accumulation and oil price increases.
Sketch proof. See Appendix A for details. 
Crucially, the income tax distorts the optimal capital investment programme due to
lower net returns to investment, yielding slower consumption, and  by the Hotelling
condition  oil price growth, ceteris paribus.
The income tax causes the Ramsey curve, together with the stationary interest rate and
consumption-capital loci, to pivot anti-clockwise in r, c/k space (due to lower net returns
and the eﬀects of scarcer capital). The inﬂuence of the income tax on the dynamic system
of equations is discussed in Figure 4.
Proposition 3.3: An income tax leaves steady state depletion, output growth
and net investment unaﬀected, but raises gross rental rates.
Sketch proof. This follows by inspection of the following steady state expressions for
depletion, interest rates and output growth:
Cx∗ = (v − 1) (h− n (1− a1 − a2)) + (1− a1) (i+ z) (3.27)
(r (1− ZQ)− j − θx∗)C = hv + n (a2 + (v − 1)m)−
z (v (1− a1 − a2 +m)) + i (a2 −m) (3.28)
g∗C = h− (1− a1 − a2)n− (1− a1 − a2 +m) (z + i) (3.29)
dr∗
dZQ
> 0. See Appendix A for details. 
The adjustment in steady state gross interest rates implies an interaction with changes
in consumption levels arising from θ (the possible magnitude of this eﬀect, based on
plausible assumptions for the model inputs, are discussed below).
Brown expenditure tax
Figure 4
Interest, depletion and consumption-capital loci under an income tax
This ﬁgure analyses the dynamics of the model featuring capital spillovers (given algebraically at Appendix
A), focussing on the key inﬂuences of an income tax:∗ in particular, ZQ distorts the transition equation in
rental returns causing both a lower depletion rate (in x,r space) and consumption capital ratio (in c/k,r
space) for a given stationary value of r. This can be seen by comparing the dotted with the solid lines
(which represent the loci with and without the tax respectively) on the upper panels. As highlighted
by Sinclair (1990), the slope of the stationary consumption capital ratio (in c/k,r space) depends on the
relative concavity of output in capital relative to utility in consumption: in the more probable case of
v > a1, such that this locus is upward sloping, the income tax causes the stationary consumption capital
ratio to fall for a given gross rate of return (while the opposite holds if inter temporal consumption is
highly elastic, v < a1). This is shown in the lower two panels.
∗Note that the representation of both the stationary depletion rate and consumption capital ratio (in x,c/k space),
for example, are not discussed - being unaﬀected by ZQ (while analysis of stationary interest rates in x,r space is
restricted to the stable, moderate case in which a1 + a2 + (1− a1) θ > m > (1− a1) θ).
Let us now adjust the tax base to include income net of accumulated capital assets to
avoid double taxation of investment, denoted by ZBEXP (where superscript B indicates the
exemption of changes in resource stocks from the tax base). Maintaining the assumption on
public expenditures as in the previous subsection, the Hamiltonian for the representative
household is given by:
Max
{c(t),E(t)}∞t=0
V =
ˆ ∞
0
(e−it
c(t)1−v − 1
1− v + λ(t)(
(
1− ZBEXP
)
(Q(t)−
(j + θx(t))K(t)) + (y(t)− c(t))N(t)− K˙(t))dt (3.30)
where the revised balanced budget condition is given by:
y(t)N(t) = Z(t)E(t) + ZBEXP
(
Q(t)− (j + θx¯(t))K(t)− K˙(t)
)
.
Lemma 3.9: Consumption growth, capital and oil price transition are in-
variant to a brown expenditure tax, ZBEXP .
Sketch proof. See Appendix A for details. 
Avoiding double taxation of investment prevents a dynamic distortion in consumption,
capital (and thus by the Hotelling condition, oil) markets. The inﬂuence of the brown
expenditure tax on the dynamic system of equations is discussed in Figure 5.
Proposition 3.4: The steady state is unaﬀected by ZBEXP (i.e. there are no
interactions with θ).
Sketch proof. See Appendix A. Steady state expressions are as given by equations
(3.19)-(3.22).
Unlike the income tax case, both gross and net of taxation rates of return are unaﬀected
by the expenditure based levy: the adjustment in the output-capital ratio arising from the
external eﬀect to capital durability does not interact with this tax design, since investment
is undistorted.
Green expenditure tax
An extensive literature advocates comprehensive (including changes in natural resource
43
Figure 5
Interest, depletion and consumption-capital loci under an expenditure tax
This ﬁgure analyses the dynamics of the model featuring capital spillovers (given algebraically at Appendix
A), focussing on the key inﬂuences of an expenditure tax:∗ in particular, ZBEXP now bears additionally
on the stationary depletion causing an (anti) clockwise pivot in x, r (x,c/k) space. This can be seen by
comparing the dotted with the solid lines (which represent the stationary loci with and without a tax
respectively) on the upper panels. The expenditure tax also causes the stationary interest rate locus to
pivot (anti) clockwise pivot in c/k, r (x, r) space. This is shown in the lower panels.
∗The eﬀect on the stationary consumption capital ratio is similar to the income tax (represented in c/k, r space),
although upward sloping under the revised conditionv
(
1− ZBEXP
)
> a1; while in x, c/k space, transition is qual-
itatively similar to the base model, but downward sloping if v(1 − ZBEXP ) > 1. These instances are not depicted
above. Analysis of stationary depletion focuses on the stable, moderate externality case.
44
stocks) national income accounting (see, for example, Arrow et al. (2003), Dasgupta and
Mäler (2000), Hamilton and Clemens (1999), Helm (2015) and World Bank (2011)).
Applying the insights from this literature to the design of a green expenditure tax,
ZGEXP , in which the depletion of oil stocks is brought within the base base, is reﬂected by
the following objective function of the householder:
Max
{c(t),E(t)}∞t=0
V =
ˆ ∞
0
(e−it
c(t)1−v − 1
1− v + λ(t)(
(
1− ZGEXP
)
(Q(t)−
(j + θx(t))K(t)− P (t)S˙(t)) + (y(t)− c(t))N(t)− K˙(t))dt (3.31)
where the balanced budget condition is given by:
y(t)N(t) = Z(t)E(t) + ZGEXP
(
Q(t)− (j + θx¯(t))K(t)− P (t)S˙(t)− K˙(t)
)
.
Lemma 3.10: The steady state is unaﬀected if changes in the value of re-
source stocks are included in the expenditure tax base, ZBEXP .
Sketch proof. Since ZGEXP is assumed constant, the rate of increase in prices due to
resource scarcity is unaﬀected. 
This follows the key ﬁnding of Stiglitz (1976). Importantly, though, the ﬁscal base is
enhanced (since stocks erode), requiring a lower rate to realize a given level of revenue.
Moreover, it is also worth noting that a shift from income to expenditure based taxation
may raise serious welfare issues during transition, since elimination of the tax distortion
aﬀecting household capital investment programmes would likely result in the (potentially
large scale) deferral of near term consumption.
Numerical results
The distortions to the output-capital ratio under the tax regimes analysed above are
estimated in Table 2 below. The undistorted steady state output-capital ratio is predicted
to be 16.7 percent, rising to 18.8 percent in the presence of an income tax. These ratios
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fall unambiguously with m and thus the productivity of capital, but rise with θ due to the
adjustment process described above.
In the case of the expenditure tax, for example, the output-capital ratio falls to 15
percent for m = 0.08 and θ = 0, but rises by 1.6 percent if θ = 0.1. In the presence of
an income tax, however, the distortion arising from the capital spillover is larger, rising
by 1.95 percent to 18.6 percent for m = 0.08 and θ = 0.1. Thus the fall in consumption
levels due to the capital spillover is exacerbated by the income tax distortion.
Uncertainty and transitional dynamics
The composition of capital losses may be challenging to ascertain: while storm damages
to buildings and infrastructure are perhaps readily assessable by households, ﬁrms and
insurers, the environmental component of these costs is perhaps less transparent. In other
cases, the inﬂuence of changing environmental conditions on capital durability is likely
to become apparent only gradually: for example, it may take time to realise that water
infrastructure has become outmoded in the event of changing patterns of rainfall (not least
given the natural variability which exists in hydrological patterns).41
Lemma 3.11: The resolution of uncertainty surrounding the magnitude of θ
impacts transitional dynamics if j is correctly evaluated.
Sketch proof. Consider the example in which θ > (=)0 but agents falsely believe θ˜ =
(>)0, where ˜ indicates the agent's perception. The ﬁrst case would imply that economic
depreciation is perceived to be bigger (smaller) than it really is: j˜(t) > (<)j. Learning
the true composition of capital erosion would leave transition towards the steady state
unaﬀected, since the portfolio condition is eﬃcient: j˜(t) + θ˜x(t) = j + θx(t).
However, in the second case, the agent believes capital is accumulating quicker (slower)
than it really is: j˜(t) + θ˜x(t) < (>)j + θx(t). This implies that oil prices rise too
41 I here assume, for simplicity, that all other economic parameters are fully observable.
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quickly (slowly) in transition, as the net marginal product is over (under) estimated:
Pˆ
(
j˜, θ˜, t
)
>(<)Pˆ (j, θ, t) On resolution of this uncertainty, oil prices to jump up (down)
and then rise at a slower (faster) rate, with output eﬀects being inversely related to prices.

If aggregate depreciation is observed correctly but excessively attributed to standard
wear and tear, resolution of uncertainty does not inﬂuence the Hotelling portfolio condi-
tion. However, if learning about environmentally related depreciation is such that overall
capital outﬂows are temporarily misperceived, an adjustment in price and output dynamics
takes place through the arbitrage condition.
Extension I: non separability of capital and productivity
Environmental externalities such as climate change are widely expected to bear more
heavily on less developed countries (that is, in a neoclassical sense, those with smaller
capital stocks). This raises the possibility of further indirect linkages between environ-
mental spillovers from fossil fuel use and technological progress. Reﬂecting this, consider
the following representation of technology growth:
Tˆ (t) = h− (m+ ψθ)x(t) (3.32)
where ψ determines the extent of any linkages between between capital decumulation,
productivity growth and external eﬀects due to environmental factors. The Hotelling
condition is again given by equation (3.12).
Corollary 3.4: θ inﬂuences steady state depletion and growth rates if pro-
ductivity depends on capital stocks as the sign of 1− v.
Sketch proof. This is evident from the following steady expressions (see Appendix A for
details):
Dx∗ = (v − 1) (h− n (1− a1 − a2)) + (1− a1) (i+ z) (3.33)
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(r − j − θx∗)D = hv + n (a2 + (v − 1)m)−
z (v (1− a1 − a2 +m)) + i (a2 −m) (3.34)
a1Dc
∗/k∗ = (v − a1) (h− n (1− a1 − a2) (1 + (v − 1) (1− a1) θ)−(
z
(
1 +m− a1 − a2 − (1− a1)2 θ
)
+ i (1− a1)
)
) + (n+ j) (1− a1)D (3.35)
g∗D = h− (1− a1 − a2)n− (1− a1 − a2 +m+ ψθ) (z + i) (3.36)
where D = C + (v − 1)ψθ.
By inspection of (3.33) and (3.36), dx
∗
dψ
> 0 if and only if 1− v > 0. 
Clearly, the ﬁnding that  when savings decisions are endogenous to interest rates 
capital spillovers generate level but not growth eﬀects on output depends on the assump-
tion that productivity growth is independent of capital accumulation (the eﬀects of ψ
being thus qualitatively similar to m).
Corollary 3.5: θ The optimal tax falls more rapidly than in the baseline
model for ψ, θ > 0.
Sketch proof. This is evident by inspection of the following expression for the optimal
tax:
z∗ = −
x∗
(
m− θ
(
1− a1
(
1− c∗/k∗
r∗
)
− ψ
))
(1− a1 − a2) (3.37)
By inspection, dz
∗
dψ
> 0 if and only if θ > 0. It follows from Corollary 3.3 that z∗ < 0.

Thus for ψ, θ > 0, the optimal tax falls more rapidly than in the absence of the in-
direct capital spillover, due to the additional productivity drag arising from a unit of oil
consumption. This tax policy prescription is not restricted to the steady state.
The ﬁnding modiﬁes the quantitative conclusions of Sinclair (1994), but supports qual-
itatively the insight that the optimal tax be falling over time. It thus emphasises the
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importance of understanding the precise nature of interactions between the environment
and the economy in seeking to determine policy.
Extension II: endogenous human capital formation
A further modelling priority emphasised by Stern (2013) concerns the potential impor-
tance of interactions between climate change and learning. This reﬂects emerging empirical
evidence linking, for example, heat stresses with reduced productivity and cognitive de-
velopment (Barbier (1999), Dunne et al. (2013), Hancock et al. (2007), Kjellstrom et al.
(2009, 2013)).42
A number of previous studies have explored the eﬀects of exhaustible resource degrada-
tion on productivity and learning using fully endogenous growth models (see, for example,
Barbier (1999), Scholz and Ziemes (1999), Shou (2000, 2002)).
I here extend Lucas (1988) and Shou (2000) to analyse the case in which both the returns
to training and the durability of capital are reduced by resource exploitation. Following
Lucas, I incorporate human capital as a determinant of productivity, with knowledge
growth a function of the , under the following production function:
Q(t) = AK(t)a1 (u(t)N(t)l(t))a2 E(t)1−a1−a2lo(t)γ (3.38)
where u(.) is the proportion of time spent working, l(.) represents human capital, and
la(.) =
´∝ oN(o)do´∝N(o)do denotes the average stock of human capital. γ > 0 reﬂects the assumed
positive. All other terms are as previously deﬁned.
Human capital is assumed to increase with investment in training, but is also aﬀected
by resource depletion as follows:
42 In a recent contribution, however, Zivin et al. (2015) found temperature increases have adverse eﬀects on cognitive
development which are conﬁned to mathematics over the short run (attributing the absence of a persistent inﬂuence to
adaptive behaviour).
49
lˆ(t) = Ω (1− u(t))− ιx(t) (3.39)
where ι > 0.
Corollary 3.6: Under endogenous human capital formation, i) steady state
depletion falls with θ in a Keynesian model, but is unaﬀected within a fully
optimized framework; and, ii) the stability the steady state depends on the
magnitude of capital relative to learning related spillovers: ι (a2 + γ) > (1− a1) θ.
Sketch proof. See Appendix A for details. 
Assumptions over savings choices continue to critically determine the macroeconomic
inﬂuence of environmental spillovers aﬀecting capital durability, while the stability of
the steady state depends on the relative magnitude of capital and productivity related
externalities. This ﬁnding closely parallels Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
Corollary 3.7: With endogenous human capital formation, i) the oil tax is
less downward sloping for θ > 0, and, ii) in the case of endogenous savings
decisions, optimal policy also requires both a wage tax and a subsidy to human
capital accumulation.
Sketch proof. See Appendix A for details. 
Optimal policy requires a corrective tax similar to that described in Lemma 3.7. How-
ever, the representative agent also fails to take account of the eﬀect of her training decision
on average skill levels. This is corrected through a wage tax and subsidy to human capital
accumulation (this ﬁnding is similar to García-Castrillo and Sanso (2000), Gomes (2003)
in models without resources and environmental spillovers).
3.5 Concluding remarks
Climate change is likely to increase the wear and tear to buildings and infrastructure.
Stern (2013) highlights the need to consider such eﬀects as part of eﬀorts to improve
guidance for policy makers on the appropriate extent of GHG emissions reductions.
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However, analysis undertaken thus far has tended to ignore potential interactions with
the exhaustible character of fossil fuel inputs (Fankhauser and Tol (2005), Moore and Diaz
(2015)). This chapter extends Bretschger and Valente (2011)  the only study to date of
this linkage in a resource based economy  by oﬀering a number of new theoretical insights
into the relationship between fossil fuel use, the operating life of physical capital, and the
time path of output and resource depletion.
First, it shows the sensitivity of Bretschger and Valente's ﬁnding to assumptions over
savings behaviour, and considers the implications of such spillovers for tax policy. Second,
it is the ﬁrst study which attempts to quantitatively assess the magnitude of these eﬀects
within a resource based model. Finally, it demonstrates the implications for optimal
commodity taxation, and analyses the importance of wider ﬁscal choices by government
to the magnitude of the resulting distortions
In the Keynesian model of Sinclair (1992), links between oil combustion and capital
durability are found to negatively aﬀect both the level and the growth rate of output in the
steady state, thereby tempering the downward pressure on steady state depletion arising
from climate change. Moreover, stability of the economic system requires a restriction
on the magnitude of the capital spillover relative to the productivity eﬀect. Numerical
results indicate that accelerated depreciation due to environmental degradation could have
macroeconomic signiﬁcance under plausible parameter values.
Extending Sinclair (1994), however, I ﬁnd that capital spillovers cause level eﬀects:
adjustments in savings behaviour (through the output-capital ratio) oﬀset the Hotelling
eﬀects, leaving net returns and growth unaﬀected. In addition, the magnitude of such
distortions are show to be sensitive to wider ﬁscal policy design, rising (potentially mate-
rially) in the presence of an income tax but invariant where net investment is exempted
from the ﬁscal base (assuming that revenues are recycled in lump sum fashion).
The optimal tax also falls more slowly at steady state for θ > 0 in order to correct the
distortion to consumption levels: the capital spillover reduces the oil exhaustion problem,
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thereby limiting the required incentives for resource producers to defer production (which
arise from a downward sloping tax path). Qualitatively, Sinclair's insight that optimal
taxes should fall over time, however, is preserved under the required stability condition.
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4 DEATH AND TAXES! MACROECONOMIC, FAMILY SIZE
AND RESOURCE POLLUTION
4.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the macroeconomic and policy implications of higher mortality rates
associated with fossil fuel combustion, highlighting, in particular, new insights into the
sensitivity of the resulting eﬀects to preferences over the aggregation of welfare within a
family or society.
The issue of air pollution  around 80 percent of which is estimated to be due to
energy combustion (GEA (2012))  came into ever sharper focus during 2015, for example,
following the US corporate scandal involving excessive nitrous oxide emissions from diesel
cars produced by Volkswagen (and the latest red alerts over smog levels in China, which
prompted mass closure of schools and the imposition of vehicle restrictions).
In terms of managing the health consequences, a prime area of concern relates to the
emission of particulate matters (PMs), which are known to cause cardio vascular and
respiratory illnesses and cancers in the US (see Pope and Dockery (2006) for a review of
the epidemiological literature).43 This issue is still more prescient  though less widely
studied  in developing countries where PM concentrations are commonly many fold higher
than in advanced countries (particularly in urban areas).
43 2 major longitudinal studies in the US, in which participants were monitored for an extended period, are particularly
noteworthy, due to the richness of the data (Dockery et al. (1993), Pope et al. (1995)). In regression analysis of mortality
on a wide range of socioeconomic and health related variables, Dockery et al. (1993), for example, conclude that the positive
relationship between air pollution and mortality rates is most severe for PMs with a diameter of less than 10 micrometres.
Nevertheless, even such expansive studies may suﬀer from mismeasurement of accumulated exposure to air pollution over
the life time of participants. Chay and Greenstone 2003(a,b) limit this concern by focusing on infant mortality: exploiting
exogenous variation in pollution levels in the US arising from the 1981-82 recession, and regulations embodied in the 1970
Clean Air Act, they ﬁnd that a one percent reduction in PM concentrations results in a 0.35-0.5 percent decline in infant
mortality.
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The World Bank (2007), for example, estimates that air pollution causes 500,000 deaths
annually in China.44 In a compelling study, Chen et al. (2013) ﬁnd that diﬀerences in
PM levels across sub regions of China account for a ﬁve and a half year diﬀerence in life
expectancy.45 Globally, ambient particle pollution from fossil fuel combustion accounts for
approximately 3.2 million premature deaths, equivalent to about 3 per cent of the global
burden of disease (Lim et al. (2013)).46
In addition, changing climatic conditions  due, in major part, to energy use  have
also been linked to adverse health outcomes. More frequent and intense heat waves due
to higher GHG concentrations have been shown to increase mortality rates in the US and
Europe (Christidis et al. (2012), Honda et al. (2014), Robine et al. (2007), Whitman et
al. (1997)): the extremely hot summer of 2003, for example may have caused as many as
70,000 deaths across 16 European countries.47
44 In a study of the health eﬀects of PMs in Dehli, World Bank (1997) ﬁnd that a 100- microgram (a roughly 30 percent
average) increase in PMs raises death rates by around 2.3 percent.
45 This result appears particularly robust given the large exogenous variation in air pollution which arises from diﬀerences
in publicly funded heating services between adjacent administrative districts (restrictions on migration also limit concerns
over the mismeasurement of pollution exposure).
46 In contrast, links between pollution and human fecundity rates are less clearly established. Despite declining birth rates,
particularly in advanced countries since the 1960s, an underlying trend has not been clearly established, given diﬃculties of
controlling for wider factors including smoking, obesity, trends towards child rearing later in life and issues measuring female
fecundity (Carlsen et al. (1992), Merzenich et al. (2010)). Robust links between pollution and male fertility, for example,
are limited to high exposure occupational groups (such as those working closely with pesticides and certain chemicals), and
a number of now largely banned substances such as Polychlorinated biphenyls. Among adult females clear-cut evidence is
also generally lacking, but is strongest for heavy metal contaminants (Mendola et al. (2008), Hauser et al. (2008)). Barreca
et al. (2015) ﬁnd that temperature shocks inﬂuence historical birth rates in the US, potentially with persistent eﬀects.
47 Recent studies point to a similar eﬀect in developing countries (Burgess et al. (2011), McMichael et al. (2008) and
Pudpong and Hajat (2011)). However, their magnitude appears sensitive to possible harvesting eﬀects (higher vulnerability
due, for example, to mild preceding winters), and may be concentrated among non working age people (Deschênes and
Moretti (2009), Fouillet et al. (2008), Rocklov et al. (2009), Stafoggia et al. (2009)). Questions also remain as to the extent
to which technologies and improved health services can mitigate such risks: Barreca et al. (2013), for example, highlight
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Climate change is also projected to alter the incidence of vector borne diseases such as
malaria and dengue fever (IPCC (2014)). These eﬀects are highly uncertain, but poten-
tially large in magnitude: Hales et al. (2002), for example, estimate that an additional
1.5-2.5 billion people could be exposed to a greater than 50 per cent risk of dengue fever by
the 2080's as a result of climate change and population growth (absent changes in health
care).48
Recently, scholarship has increasing focussed on links between climate change, resource
scarcity and shifting migration patterns (Carraro (2015), Ghimire et al. (2015)).49 Al-
though researchers and development specialists generally emphasise the importance of
economic and social factors, extreme weather events, reduced agricultural productivity,
sea level rise and other forms of slow onset environmental degradation have the potential
to fuel migratory patterns and increase the probability of civil conﬂict (Bilsborrow (1992),
Morrissey (2009)).50
Despite the evidence above, growth studies featuring exhaustible resources have tended
substantial declines in temperature related mortality due to diﬀusion of air conditioning (although this exacerbates CO2
emissions unless powered by renewables).
48 Drawing on a range of studies for Africa, IPCC (2007), for example, conclude that climate change will be associated
with geographical expansions of the areas suitable for malaria transmission in some regions (and possibly also over longer
seasons), while contractions may occur in other parts of the continent.
49 Desmet et al. (2015) simulate the welfare eﬀects of potential sea level rise using a theoretical macro model incorporating
linkages between geographical location, population density and productivity.
50 Some indications of future trends are beginning to emerge: low lying islands such as Tuvalu have already begun
discussions with Australia and New Zealand regarding relocation of entire populations in the face of predicted sea level rise.
However, the extent of these eﬀects are extremely uncertain, with the number of predicted climate migrants potentially
ranging from 25 million to 1 billion by mid century (Laczko and Aghazarm (2009); Myers and Kent (1995)). Moreover,
analysis of the macroeconomic eﬀects is confounded by the likelihood that population movements may often be localized
(Foresight (2011)).
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to assume demographics trends to be exogenous. Notable exceptions include studies
of interactions between resource scarcity, demographics and technological development
(Peretto and Valente (2015) and Schäfer (2014a)).51 In the environmental economics lit-
erature, Mariani et al. (2010) and Schäfer, (2014b) analyse the relationship between
pollution, human longevity and growth.52
In contrast, this chapter contributes to an understanding of feedbacks between pollu-
tion, mortality and the macro economy, focussing, in particular, on the implications of
societal choices over welfare aggregation (the neoclassical exhaustible resource literature
typically assumes that utility is formed over consumption per capita, rather than of a
group).53 This issue has important implications outlined below (Chapter 6 examines the
empirical consequences of diﬀerent approaches to welfare aggregation in the context of UK
energy tax reform).
In Section 4.2, I show that spillovers aﬀecting mortality have countervailing macroe-
conomic eﬀects to those arising from capital durability, which have not previously been
studied in an exhaustible resource setting: the former dominate in an optimal growth
setting, but are parameter dependent in the Keynesian model. The insights for resource
51 Peretto and Valente (2015) analyse an inﬁnite horizon Schumpeterian model, in which households have preferences over
the number of oﬀspring and ﬁnite resources enter into the production process. Their essential insight  that the coexistence
of stable steady state growth and an asymptotically declining demographic expansion depends on the relationship between
capital and resources in the production function  extends Dasgupta and Heal (1974). Schäfer (2014a) highlights the potential
for education technologies to improve resource sustainability within a ﬁnite horizon model featuring induced technological
change and exhaustible resource inputs to the intermediates sector.
52 Mariani et al. (2010), for example, highlight the potential for a non linear relationship between pollution and human
longevity to help explain observed bimodalities in the distribution of environmental quality and life expectancy across
countries. Jouvet et al. (2010) analyse issues relating to the coordination of health and pollution related policies, within a
similar ﬁnite horizon model in which overcrowding also generates a congestion externality.
53 As such, it does not fully consider important lessons from the social choice literature regarding the potential tyranny
of the individual (see, for example, Blackorby and Donaldson (1984), Cowell et al. (2010)).
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depletion are not previously uncovered by Fankhauser and Tol (2005) in a study using a
Ramsey model with labour and capital inputs.
In another previously uncharted area of research (Tol (2009) makes a passing reference
but oﬀers no analysis), Section 4.3 characterises the implications of demographic spillovers
for resource taxation under diﬀerent assumptions over utilitarian preferences: it shows
that optimal tax prescriptions, for example, may diverge from the basic downward sloping
paths identiﬁed in the resource tax literature, if the social planner places positive weight
on aggregate (rather than average) felicity levels.
Section 4.4 explores the relationship between mortality from energy use, resource sus-
tainability and the macroeconomy under the assumption that families are no longer in-
ﬁnitely lived: employing a framework in which environmental factors inﬂuence generational
survival changes, this spillover is shown to have potentially ambiguous eﬀects on the steady
state which depend on interactions between the resulting incentives on the young to save
and Hotelling condition. Section 5.4 oﬀers concluding remarks.
4.2 Fixed savings model with mortality eﬀects
Reﬂecting the linkages between fossil fuel usage and mortality rates outlined above, this
section extends Sinclair (1992) by postulating the following relationship between popula-
tion growth and oil market activity:
Nˆ (t) = n− ϕx(t) (4.1)
where n > ϕx(t) ≥ 0 captures the magnitude of the spillover from the resource to
labour market (for simplicity, capital depreciation is suppressed, all other aspects of the
model are as set out in Section 3.3).
Lemma 4.1: ϕ unambiguously lowers steady state growth, depletion and
growth rates.
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Sketch proof. This follows by inspection of the following steady state expressions (see
Appendix B for a derivation):
x∗F = (h+ a2n) (a1 − s) + zs (1− a1) (4.2)
r∗
a1
F = (h+ a2n)− z (1 +m+ a2ϕ− a1 − a2) (4.3)
FQˆ∗ = s (h+ a2n− z (1 +m+ a2ϕ− a1 − a2)) (4.4)
where F = A+ a2ϕ (a1 − s).54
By inspection: dx
∗
dϕ
, dr
∗
dϕ
, dQˆ
∗
dϕ
< 0. 
By slowing the rate of expansion of the labour supply, ϕ exacerbates the productive
distortions from climate change, reducing steady state oil depletion and interest rates
(assuming a zero tax trend for simplicity) by a greater degree than in the baseline model.55
Figure 6 illustrates these eﬀects.
Corollary 4.1: For ϕ > 0, a corrective tax path is more negatively sloped
than in the baseline model.
Sketch proof. Assuming that oil taxes are constant in the absence of climate change
(i.e. z = 0 if m = θ = 0), it follows from (4.2) that x∗ |z=m=θ=0= x∗ |z=z∗(m,ψ>0) (i.e. the
eﬀects of the externality on steady state oil depletion are corrected) if:
z∗ = −(m+ a2ψ) (a1 − s)
s (1− a1)
(h+ a2n)
(a1 (1− a1 − a2) + sa2) (4.5)
By inspection dz
∗
dϕ
< 0, z∗ < 0. 
The additional mortality spillover sharpens the incentives for resource producers to
defer production, warranting a more steeply downward sloping tax path.
54 As before, equilibrium existence thus requires the dynamic eﬃciency condition: a1 > s.
55 Equation (4.3) relates closely to the eﬀects of temperature change on interest rates through demographic changes
identiﬁed by Fankhauser and Tol (2005). However, since their model does not include exhaustible energy inputs, the insights
for resource sustainability are not previously uncovered.
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Figure 6
Oil and capital market loci with mortality eﬀects
This ﬁgure depicts the stationary interest rate and oil market loci in the Keynesian model featuring
mortality spillovers (algebraic expressions are found at Appendix B) in x, r space (the arrows denote
transitionary forces). Similar to the eﬀects of m, ψ causes stationary depletion to pivot anti clockwise
(where x and x′ represent the locus with and without the mortality eﬀect respectively), due to the
resulting weaknesses in the macroeconomy (potentially overwhelming the Hotelling eﬀect such that this
slopes downward). In addition, ψ causes stationary interest rates to pivot anti clockwise (where r and r′
again represent the locus with and without the mortality eﬀect respectively) through the additional drag
of x on output growth (in x, r space). Steady state interest and depletion rates thus fall unambiguously
(from x∗, r∗ to x′∗, r′∗).
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Interacting capital and labour eﬀects
As emphasised by Stern (2013) and Fankhauser and Tol (2005), spillovers from fossil fuel
combustion are likely to have multi-channelled eﬀects on the macro economy. I therefore
consider a model variant in which both ϕ and θ > 0 (such that capital accumulates as in
equation (3.11)).
Corollary 4.2: At a stable steady state, the combined impact of climate
change on depletion and output growth through productivity and mortality
spillovers dominate any capital eﬀects.
Sketch proof. Steady state expressions for oil and capital markets are given by:
x∗G = (h+ a2n) (a1 − s) + zs (1− a1) (4.6)
r∗
a1
G = (h+ a2n)− z (1 +m− (1− a1) θ + a2ϕ− a1 − a2) (4.7)
where G = F − θ (1− a1) (a1 − s). 
By inspection, dx
∗
dθ
> 0, dx
∗
dϕ
< 0, with G (m,ϕ > 0) > G (m,ϕ = 0) if and only if:
m + a2ϕ > θ (1− a1). This condition is also necessary and suﬃcient for saddle path
stability, since the stationary depletion locus is otherwise upward sloping, yielding knife-
edge properties (see Lemma 3.5).
In this Keynesian set up, the inﬂuence of the mortality (and productivity) channel
partly oﬀset that of less durable capital on output growth. It follows from previous analysis
that, within an optimal growth framework, the former eﬀects would dominate the level
eﬀect arising from θ.
4.3 Optimal growth model with mortality eﬀects
This section analyses mortality eﬀects using a model in which savings behaviour is opti-
mized. Unlike in the previous chapter, this extension proves to have qualitatively similar
60
ﬁndings in terms of the external eﬀects on the macroeconomy as compared to the ﬁxed
savings variant (but provides an important building block for subsequent analysis).
Speciﬁcally, I present new insights on the implications of household preferences over the
aggregation of welfare, for the economic and policy consequences of mortality spillovers,
which have not previously been studied in neoclassical growth literature with exhaustible
resources. To see this, I start by modify assumptions over the preferences of the represen-
tative agent.
Unlike the basic set up in Chapter 3, in which the representative agent aims to maximise
per capita utility, she is assumed here to place positive weight on aggregate welfare across
the family. This approach reﬂects well known ethical issues arising from SWFs based on
average utilitarian preferences which is sometimes referred to by social choice theorists as
the tyranny of the individual.56
The objective function is thus given by (once again suppressing physical capital erosion):
Max
{c(t),E(t)}∞t=0
V =
ˆ ∞
0
(
(
c(t)1−v − 1
1− v
)ξ
(N(t))1−ξ +
λ(t)
(
Q(.)− c(t)N(t)− K˙(t)
)
)dt (4.8)
where ξ ∈ [0, 1] . Evidently, this reduces to the basic model speciﬁcation in Section 3.4
in the case where ξ = 1 (and j = 0).
Lemma 4.2: The mortality eﬀect, ϕ, slows consumption growth for positive
weight on aggregate utility levels for 0 ≤ ξ < 1, ceteris paribus.
Sketch proof. The Keynes-Ramsey rule derived from (4.8) is given by:
r(t)− i− ξ (n− ϕx(t)) = vcˆ(t) (4.9)
56 Little empirical research on aggregation preferences has been undertaken thus far. Cowell et al. (2010), for example,
undertake an experimental enquiry into preferences over income transfers. Their results suggest that, of the sample for
whom a clear aggregation preference could be discerned, ξ = 1(0) for about 60 (40) percent of respondents respectively.
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By inspection, dcˆ
dψ
> 0 if and only if 0 ≤ ξ < 1. 
The oil related spillover to labour markets increases consumption growth, since total
consumption is shared among smaller families (an eﬀect which increases with ξ, d
2cˆ
dψdξ
> 0).
However, if the representative agent concerns herself only with the aggregate level of
consumption (i.e. ξ = 0), consumption growth is invariant to the spillover.
These eﬀects on the dynamics of the economy are illustrated in Figure 7 (see Appendix
B for algebraic expressions): ϕ causes the stationary depletion locus to pivot anti-clockwise
(in x, c/k space), due to lower oil demand; and the stationary rental growth locus to pivot
anti-clockwise through the additional drag of x on output growth (in x, r space).
Under the revised objective function, the stationary consumption-capital ratio now rises
(falls) with depletion rates if v > ξ (v < ξ): an increase in x causes both consumption
and capital to be shared among smaller families, but the eﬀect on consumption is dispro-
portionately small (large) with a low (high) willingness to substitute between future and
current populations.
Lemma 4.3: The suﬃcient and necessary conditions for existence of a
steady state are respectively: i) v > 1, and ii) (1− v)m+((1− a1) ξ − a2 − v (1− a1 − a2))ψ <
v (1− a1 − a2) + a2.
Proposition 4.1: i) Steady state depletion (and growth) declines with ϕ if
ξ > a2+v(1−a1−a2)
(1−a1) , and, ii) increases unambiguously with ξ (for ϕ > 0).
Sketch proof. Steady state expressions for depletion, interest rates, the consumption-
capital (per capita) ratio and output growth are given by (see also Appendix B):
Hx∗ = (v − 1)h− ((1− a1 − a2) v − (1− a1) ξ + a2)n+ (1− a1) (i+ z) (4.10)
r∗H = hv + n (a2ξ + (v − ξ)m)
− zv (1− a1 − a2 +m+ ϕ) + i (a2 −m− ϕ) (4.11)
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Figure 7
Optimal growth with mortality eﬀects
This ﬁgure analyses the dynamics of the model featuring capital spillovers (given algebraically at Ap-
pendix B), focussing on the eﬀect of the mortality and aggregation parameters:∗ similar to the Keynesian
model variant, ψ causes both the stationary depletion (in x,r) and interest rate (in x, c/k) loci to pivot
anti clockwise through lower oil demand and weaker productivity growth (from x to x′ and r to r′ ) re-
spectively (c/k acting as a close proxy for r). This is shown in the upper panels. However, the stationary
consumption-capital ratio now rises (falls) (in x, c/k space) with depletion rates if v > ξ (v < ξ): an
increase in x causes both consumption and capital to be shared among smaller families, but the eﬀect on
consumption is disproportionately small (large) with a low (high) willingness to substitute between future
and current populations. This is shown in the lower panels.
∗The eﬀects on the stationary interest rate and consumption capital ratio (in r, c/k space) are qualitatively similar
to the base model and, as such, are not depicted here. Analysis of the depletion locus (in x,r and x,c/k space)
focuses on the moderate externality case.
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a1Hc
∗/k∗ = (v − a1) (h− n (1− a1 − a2)−
(1 +m− a1 − a2 + ϕ (1− a1 − a2)) z)+
(1− a1) ((m+ a2ϕ− a1 − a2) i+ n(ξ (a2 −m)
v (1 +m+ a2ϕ− a1 − a2)− (1− ξ) (a1 + a2ϕ))) (4.12)
Hg∗ = h (1− (v − ξ)ϕ)− (1− a1 − a2 − (v − 1)ϕ)n−
(1− a1 − a2 +m+ a2ϕ) (z + i) (4.13)
where H = C + v (1− a1 − a2)ϕ− (1− a1) ξϕ+ a2ϕ..
Lemma 4.3 follows by inspection of H.
H dx
∗
dψ
= x∗ ((1− a1) ξ − a2 − v (1− a1 − a2)) > 0 if and only if:
((1− a1) ξ − a2 − v (1− a1 − a2)) > 0. H dx∗dξ = ((1− a1)n+ ϕx) > 0. This demon-
strates Proposition 4.1. 
A larger weighting on aggregate utility in the preferences of the representative house-
holder reduces the level of steady state depletion, given the greater relative value placed
on future welfare due to population growth.
Corollary 4.3: The impact of climate change on resource sustainability de-
pends on the sign of: ((1−a1)ξ−a2)ϕ+m
(m+(1−a1−a2)ϕ) − v.
Sketch proof. Evaluating x∗ |m=0,ϕ=0 −x∗ |m>0,ϕ>0> 0 = 0 yields the stated condition.

For the case in which ξ = 1, ϕ=0, this result reinforces the original ﬁnding of Sinclair
(1994), that the inﬂuence of global warming on steady state depletion depends on whether
or not v exceeds unity: if the willingness of households to substitute consumption across
time periods exceeds (is less than) 1, then the income eﬀects associated with the productive
externality dominate (are dominated by) the substitution incentives (since the externality
raises the cost of consumption today relative to the future), reducing (increasing) steady
state depletion.
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However, where the representative agent has positive utility over aggregate family con-
sumption levels (i.e. 0 < ξ < 1), this condition holds for inter-temporal preferences with
less than unitary elasticity (since the substitution incentives are diminished through the
eﬀects of aggregation).57 Thus, in this revised set up, the production externalities limit
growth (but alleviate resource sustainability issues) under less restrictive assumptions re-
garding the EIS.
Policy implications
I now consider the implications of mortality eﬀects for tax policy. This is once again
undertaken by comparing the solution to the decentralized problem with the choice of the
social planner.
When maximising her utility, the representative agent behaves as if her oil extraction
decisions does not aﬀect the aggregate stock or the proportion of the stock extracted
(denoted by S¯), given by the following Hamiltonian function:
Max
{c(t),E(t)}∞t=0
V =
ˆ ∞
0
(
(
c(t)1−v − 1
1− v
)ξ
(N(t, x¯))1−ξ +
λ(t)
(
Q(S¯(t))− c(t)N(t)− K˙(t)
)
+ µ(t) (n− ψx¯(t))N(t))dt (4.14)
where µ(.) denotes the co state variable in population. The private household thus
ignores the inﬂuence of her oil market activity on productivity and health as part of
individually optimizing behaviour.
By contrast, the optimization problem of the social planner is given by:
57 Diﬀerentiating (4.13) with respect to ψ conﬁrms that this condition also applies to steady state growth as one would
expect.
65
Max
{c(t),E(t)}∞t=0
V =
ˆ ∞
0
(
(
c(t)1−v − 1
1− v
)ξ
(N(t, x˜))1−ξ +
λ(t)
(
Q(s˜(t))− c(t)N(t)− K˙(t)
)
+ µ(t) (n− ψx˜(t))N(t))dt
The social planner thus internalizes the eﬀects of extraction decisions on both produc-
tivity and mortality rates.
Corollary 4.4: For v > 1 > ξ, ψ > 0 > Nˆ − i the slope of the correc-
tive oil tax trajectory rises over time, becoming upward sloping for t > t¯ =
m(v−1)
ϕ(1−ξ)(i−Nˆ(t))
(
r∗
c∗/k∗
)
.
Sketch proof. The optimal tax is given by (see Appendix B for a derivation):
z∗ =
−
(
m+ tϕ(1−ξ)
(1−v)
(
c∗/k∗
r∗
)(
i− Nˆ(t)
))
x
(1− a1 − a2) (4.15)
By inspection, under stated assumptions:58 dz
∗
dt
> 0 , z∗ > 0 if and only if t > t¯. 
Intuitively, equation (4.15) reduces to the basic tax prescription of Sinclair (1994) if
either ψ = 0, or the social planner cares only about average societal income, i.e. ξ = 1
(which is unaﬀected by the spillover). However for ϕ > 0,ξ 6= 1, a number of important
diﬀerences arise.
The mortality spillover causes current consumption to fall because the positive substitu-
tion eﬀects are outweighed by the negative income eﬀects, warranting a tax which falls less
rapidly than in the baseline model (the case supporting the assumption of v > 1 is outlined
previously). The tax trend is no longer time invariant, even for a steady state, because
the corrective component relating to the mortality spillover increases (in absolute value)
over time due to population growth. These eﬀects (including in the more improbable case
of v < 1) are discussed in Figure 8.
58 As discussed in Chapter 3, v ∈ {1.5, 5}; i and is commonly thought to be in the range 3-4 percent per annum, while
annual global population growth currently averages around 1-1.5 percent (exceeding 3 for a very limited number of low
income countries, in which i may itself be higher due to lower life expectancy).
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Figure 8
Optimal taxation with mortality eﬀects & an aggregate utilitarian SWF
This ﬁgure shows the optimal oil tax path in the presence of mortality spillovers for diﬀerent values of
the EIS. For v > 1, ϕ > 0 (shown in the right hand panel) causes a substitution of present for future
consumption. This warrants a tax which falls less rapidly than in the baseline model. The tax trend
is no longer time invariant, even for a steady state, because the corrective component relating to the
mortality spillover increases (in absolute value) over time due to population growth. For v < 1, ϕ > 0 the
optimal tax falls more rapidly than in the case of ψ = 0: current consumption rises due to the dominance
of the substitution eﬀects. The corrective component relating to the mortality spillover becomes more
powerful over time due to population growth, leading to an increasingly negative tax prescription over
time, dz
∗
dt < 0.
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The ﬁnding modiﬁes a central insight from the optimal exhaustible resource tax litera-
ture that tax paths be downward sloping (see, for example, Farzin and Tahvonen (1996),
Hoel and Kverndokk (1996), Sinclair (1994) and Ulph and Ulph (1994)).59
4.4 OLG model with mortality hazard
A key assumption underpinning the analysis above is that families are inﬁnitely lived. This
section departs from this standpoint by exploring the inﬂuence of mortality spillovers on
the macroeconomy within an OLG framework, where these inﬂuence the probability of
surviving into old age.
Existing studies of ﬁnite horizon models of growth with exhaustible resources assume
exogenous survival dynamics (Agnani et al. (2005), Babu et al. (1997), Howarth (1991),
John and Peccecchino (1994), John et al. (1995)).60 This is the ﬁrst study to my knowledge
to explore the implications of externality eﬀects aﬀecting production within an OLG model
which incorporates exhaustible resource inputs.
A basic variant of the model (modifying an earlier study by Sinclair (1990)) in which
survival rates are exogenous is ﬁrst presented as a benchmark, before endogenizing this
59 Within a ﬁnite horizon setting, Schäfer (2014b) posits a hump-shaped optimal output tax, with revenues employed to
ﬁnance abatement activities, because diverting resources away from production has adverse powerful eﬀects on fertility at
low levels of output (but abatement expenditures confer relatively greater beneﬁts at higher levels of development). Formally
speaking, this is a constrained optimal tax prescription since demographic choices are not endogenously formed. As such,
this represents a possible area for further work (discussed further in Chapter 7). Implicitly, I assume that child rearing
taxes are infeasible. Jouvet et al. (2010), for example, analyse a second best pollution tax arising from limitations to inter
generational transfers.
60 Kemp and Long (1979) ﬁrst explored the role of exhaustible resources for inter generational savings, but assumed these
to be inessential inputs to production. Jouvet et al. (2010), Mariani et al. (2010) and Schäfer (2014b) explore the inﬂuence
of environmental spillovers aﬀecting longevity and growth, but do not consider natural resource inputs. Schäfer (2014a)
explores interactions between induced technological change, population dynamics and exhaustible resource utilization.
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probability as a function of resource extraction decisions.
OLG model with exogenous survival probability
Households are assumed to live for 2 periods, young and old. A single good is either
consumed or invested. Consumption in old age is sustained by investments from wage
income earned in youth (for simplicity each individual is endowed with one unit of labour),
which earns a known rate of return.
The representative household is thus assumed to solve the following utility maximization
problem:
Max
c1,c2
E1U = (1− b) logc1 + (1− ρ) blogc2+
λ
((
W − c1 − PS
N
)
(1 + r+1)− c2
)
(4.16)
Preferences over consumption in periods 1 and 2 (denoted by c1 and c2 respectively)
are here assumed to be Cobb-Douglas; b weights preferences over these two periods; W is
the wage rate earned on labour supplied in the ﬁrst period; and, r+1 represents interest
earned on savings in the successive period.
Finally, ρ indicates the probability of not surviving until old age. It has the eﬀect of
depressing savings since it reduces the expected value of deferred consumption (savings
can only be enjoyed by survivors!). Natural resources are assumed to be endowed to the
generation of old people, thus requiring the young to purchase oil out of their ﬁrst periods
budget constraint at a cost per capita of PS
N
. Oil prices thus aﬀect the supply of capital
in the successive period.
Production depends on the labour of the young, and capital and exhaustible natural
resources supplied by the old, and is given (in intensive form) by:
qt = Ttk
a1
t
(
xtSt−1
N
)a2
(4.17)
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where qt represents output per head in time t. St−1 are oil reserves in period t− 1. xt
represents the proportion of oil stocks extracted in period t. Tt is a productivity term,
which is assumed to evolve according to an exogenous rate of technological progress, h,
net of a productivity drag due to climate change, m, given by:
T+
T
= (1 + h) (1− x)m (4.18)
All factor inputs earn their respective marginal products. Once again, natural resource
prices are assumed to obey the Hotelling portfolio equilibrium such that:
1 + r+ =
P+
P
(4.19)
where P+
P
is the rate of oil price growth.
Lemma 4.4: With an exogenous hazard risk, existence of a steady state
requires that a2 < a¯2 = b (1− ρ) (1− a1 − a2) xt(1−xt).
Proposition 4.2: An exogenous mortality hazard unambiguously increases
steady state interest and depletion rates.
Sketch proof. The stationary Hotelling and Savings curve are given by (see Appendix
B for further details):
(1− x∗) =
(
(1− ρ)1−a1−a2 (1 + h)
(1 + r+1)
1−a1
) 1
1−a1−a2−m
(4.20)
r∗ =
a1
[
(1− ρ)1−a1−a2 (1 + h) (1− x∗)a2] 11−a1(
b (1− ρ) (1− a1 − a2)− a2 (1−x
∗
t )
x∗t
) (4.21)
By inspection, r∗ < 0 if a2 > a¯2; dx
∗
dρ
, dr
∗
dρ
> 0. 
The savings rate is downward sloping, a higher value of x implies slower output growth:
a faster rate of decline in scarce inputs acts in a similar way to a decline in technical
progress. The Hotelling curve bends backwards if m > 1 − a1 − a2, due to the negative
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interaction with the non oil economy (in the absence of a productivity spillover, i.e. m = 0,
there is an unambiguously positive, but concave, link between oil depletion and the rate
of interest).
ρ cause a leftward shift in the stationary Hotelling locus, due to the eﬀects of scarcer
savings operating through the arbitrage condition; together with a rightward shift in the
savings curve, since the expectation of a lower survival rate depresses savings (thereby
increasing rental payments for a given depletion rate). These eﬀects are shown in Figure
9, panel a)). The restriction on a2 ensures that purchasing oil stocks does not takes up all
the savings of youths.
OLG model with endogenous survival probability
I now extend the previous model by considering the implications on growth, as well as
oil and capital markets, when mortality is exogenous to oil extraction. As such, the
probability of survival into old age is assumed to be:
n = ρ− ςx (4.22)
where ςx indicates the additional inﬂuence of oil usage on mortality rates.
It follows that the revised household optimization problem reﬂects this adjustment
expectation of survival into old age:
Max
c1,c2
E1U = (1− b) logc1 + (1− ρ− ςx) blogc2+
λ
((
W − c1 − PS
N
)
(1 + r+1)− c2
)
(4.23)
Thus mortality risk lowers savings according to the following expression W − ct =
(1− ρ− ςx) bW . This creates an additional source of endogeneity between interest and
extraction rates.
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Lemma 4.5: With an endogenous hazard risk, existence of a steady state
requires that a2 < a¯2 = b (1− ρ− ςx) (1− a1 − a2) xt(1−xt) < a¯2.
Lemma 4.6: The mortality spillover, ς > 0, increases steady state interest
but the impact on interest rates is ambiguous.
Sketch proof. The stationary Hotelling and Savings curve are (now implicitly) given
by:
(1− x∗) =
(
(1− ρ− ςx∗)1−a1−a2 (1 + h)(
1 + r∗+1
)1−a1
) 1
1−a1−a2−m
(4.24)
r∗ =
a1
(
(1− ρ− ςx∗)1−a1−a2 (1 + h) / (1 + r)a2+m) 11−a1−a1−m(
b (1− ρ− ςx∗) (1− a1 − a2)− a2 (1−x
∗
t )
x∗t
) (4.25)
By inspection, applying envelope theorem, dx
∗
dς
> 0; while dr
∗
dς
depends on the sign of:
−
(
b (1− ρ− ςx∗) (1− a1 − a2)− a2 (1−x
∗
t )
x∗t
)
+b (1− ρ− ςx∗)
(
(1− ρ− ςx∗)1−a1−a2 (1+h)
(1+r)a2+m
) a1+a2+m
1−a1−a1−m
.

The endogenous component of the hazard rate eﬀects an anti-clockwise pivot in the
stationary Hotelling curve (see Figure 9, panel b): as x increases, the mortality spillover
reduces savings, increasing rental prices and thus depletion rates through the Hotelling
eﬀect. It also causes an anti-clockwise pivot in the savings curve, as lower savings rates fall
with higher depletion levels. If this later term in the condition stated above is suﬃcently
powerful, then downward pressure on savings due to reduced life chances from pollution
result in rental rates being bid up as x increases (see Figure (9), panel b)).
4.5 Concluding remarks
There is growing evidence on the links between global, and particularly local, air pollu-
tion and demographic factors such as mortality. Despite this, economic models of growth
featuring exhaustible resource inputs to production have thus far tended to assume demo-
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Figure 9
Mortality hazard and steady states in oil and capital markets
This ﬁgure illustrates the inﬂuence of exogenous and endogenous mortality spillovers on steady states in
oil and capital markets within the ﬁnite horizon model. In the exogenous cause, shown in the left hand
panel, ρ causes a leftward parallel shift in the stationary Hotelling locus (from x to x′), due to the eﬀects
of scarcer savings operating through the arbitrage condition; and a rightward shift in the savings curve
(from r to r′), since the expectation of a lower survival rate depresses savings (thereby increasing rental
payments for a given depletion rate). Steady state interest and depletion rates unambiguously rise with
ρ. In the endogenous cause, shown in the right hand panel, ς results in an anti-clockwise pivot in the
stationary Hotelling curve, since the mortality spillover has more powerful eﬀects in reducing savings (and
thus increasing interest rates) through the Hotelling eﬀect; and an anti-clockwise pivot in the savings
curve, as savings rates fall disproportionately with higher depletion levels. In this case, steady state
depletion increases but the outcome for interest rates is ambiguous.
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graphic factors are exogenous to extraction choices.
This chapter analyses the implications of higher mortality rates, associated with fossil
fuel combustion, for the macroeconomy and policy. It oﬀers new insights into the sensi-
tivity of the resulting eﬀects to the form of household preferences, including with regard
to the aggregation of welfare over family members.
Slower population growth imposes downward pressures on macroeconomic performance
in this class of model, warranting a more steeply downward sloping tax path under de-
scriptive analysis. However, these eﬀects are unlikely to take place in isolation (as noted
by Fankhauser and Tol (2005)).
I show that spillovers aﬀecting mortality have countervailing macroeconomic eﬀects
to those arising from capital durability, which have not previously been studied in an
exhaustible resource setting: the former dominate in an optimal growth setting, but are
parameter dependent in the Keynesian model.
Turning to issues relating to the aggregation of welfare, I show that climate change
lowers growth (but alleviates resource sustainability issues)  even if inter-temporal sub-
stitution preferences are moderately elastic  where substantial weight is placed on the
welfare of the family rather than the individual, modifying a core ﬁnding of Sinclair (1994).
This is also shown to have a potentially powerful on policy tax prescription, warranting
a tax which falls less rapidly than in the baseline model under maintained assumptions.
Moreover, the optimal tax trend is 'u' shaped, rather than declining monotonically (as
pollution aﬀects more people over time).
To the best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study which characterises the implications
of demographic spillovers for resource taxation. It thus oﬀers a rare exception to an existing
exhaustible resource tax literature, which typically emphasis that tax paths ultimately be
downward sloping.
Within a ﬁnite horizon model, I ﬁnd that environmental eﬀects bearing on generational
survival changes have potentially ambiguous eﬀects on steady state interest rates which
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depends on the resulting incentives on the young to save and the Hotelling condition.
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5 A CHANGING CLIMATE FOR CONSUMPTION?
MACROECONOMICS AND POLICY IN THE PRESENCE
OF RESOURCE-DEMAND SPILLOVERS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the macroeconomic and policy implications of intra temporal exter-
nalities from resource utilization aﬀecting household energy consumption. Research has
focused on the impacts of the energy sector on climate change. However, recent contribu-
tions have highlighted the potential countervailing eﬀects of changing weather conditions
on residential energy demand in the US and, to a lesser extent, Europe (Amato et al.
(2005), Rosenthal et al. (1995), Ruth and Lin (2006), Scott et al. (1994)).
This body of research consistently demonstrates two key sensitivities: ﬁrst, fewer cold
winter days reduce heating related demand. Second, more frequent and intense hot sum-
mer spells are likely to boost air conditioning usage. The balance of these factors depends
substantively on geography, with savings from lower heating requirements expected to
dominate in higher latitude regions and increases in cooling related energy usage greater
in hotter regions (Huang and Scott (2007)).61
Macroeconomists have sought to incorporate these insights into increasingly complex
models (Aaheim et al. (2009), Bosello et al. (2007), Eboli et al. (2010), Isaac and van
Vuuren (2009), Nordhaus (1991) and Tol (2002)). However, such allocative shocks have
rarely been examined in isolation, rendering it diﬃcult to identify and interpret their
eﬀects. Moreover, insights for corrective tax policy have not hitherto been analysed.
In this context, Section 5.2 simulates the potential macroeconomic inﬂuence of climate
61 Observed temperature increases are themselves increasing in the distance from the equator: warming in the polar
regions has hitherto warmed 6-8 times faster than equatorial zones (IPCC (2014)).
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change arising from shifting patterns of residential energy demand in the UK, and char-
acterises previously unexplored implications for diﬀerential taxation of resources across
usages. It demonstrates that a spillover which shifts the division of oil resources from
consumption to production has negative implications for output and depletion levels but
no growth eﬀects (although these are likely in transition). It further oﬀers a theoretical
argument for diﬀerential energy taxation (by end usage) on eﬃciency grounds (practical
examples of such tax treatments have hitherto been grounded in a distributional rationale).
The analysis thus far has assumed that utility inter temporally separable (i.e. pref-
erences are independent of past consumption choices). This approach has been entirely
standard in the macro literature until quite recently. However, economists have increas-
ingly explored the plausibility that historical consumption behaviour inﬂuences present
day demand (Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Constantinides (1990)).62
In particular, macroeconomic models which relax this assumption appear better able to
explain, for example, the cyclical co movement of labour supply and consumption (Barro
and King (1984)), the lack of volatility in wages (Kennan (1988)), the inﬂuence of nominal
interest rates on real activity (Fuhrer (2000), Smets and Wouters (2007)), or the apparent
willingness of households to take on risk (Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane
(1999)).
However, to date, only a very limited number of studies have relaxed time inseparabil-
ity assumptions in exhaustible resource based growth models. Krautkraemer (1985) and
Manning (1978) are early examples of modelling time dependence  by including resource
stock arguments to the utility function  and ﬁnding that consumption is shifted to the
62 Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that empirical evidence on habit persistence is mixed (with many studies
simply calibrating analytic models to historical data). Dunn and Singleton (1986), for example, ﬁnd limited evidence of
external habits in monthly consumption data. This contrasts with the results of Constantinides and Ferson (1991) and
Heaton (1995) at quarterly frequencies. Micro economic studies have also yielded inconclusive empirical ﬁndings (see, for
example, Alessie and Teppa (2010), Browning and Collado (2007), Dynan (2000), Guariglia and Rossi (2002) and Ravina
(2005)).
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future if cumulative resource exploitation lowers the marginal utility of consumption.
A further branch of literature explores the inﬂuence of time dependent discount rates
for optimal renewable resource extraction choices (Hepburn et al. (2010), Zhang (2013));63
Ikefuji (2008) studies interactions between consumption habits, growth and optimal pollu-
tion abatement activities and ﬁnds. The author ﬁnds that faster habit formation reduces
the marginal abatement cost (and growth rates) and thus optimal environmental policy.
However, research into the eﬀects of consumption habits on growth and exhaustible
resource depletion has thus far been rather scarce. Valente (2011) analyse interactions
between consumption habits and bequests within an OLG model featuring exhaustible
resources. They show that the initial stock of habit, determines whether this preference
form results in level rather than permanent growth eﬀects (see also Schäfer and Valente
(2011), discussed above)).64
In light of this, Section 5.3 explores the potential inﬂuence of consumption habits on the
macroeconomic and policy implications of production externalities due to climate change
and (together with potential spillovers to capital durability discussed previously). I ﬁnd,
for example, that introducing external habits raises depletion, provided the negative inﬂu-
ences of capital thinning and the productivity spillover do not outweigh upward pressures
63 Hepburn et al. (2010) explore the inﬂuence of hyperbolic discounting on ﬁsheries, highlighting that high near term
discount rates generate the potential for stock collapse. By contrast, Zhang (2013) analyses renewable resources using an
application of the Uzawa (1968) framework, which implies heavier discounting as consumption levels rise (while necessary
for system stability, this approach is questionable from an intuitive perspective) (see also Maeda and Nagaya (2010) for an
analyse of interactions between the Hotelling condition, the EIS, and switching points to a backstop under time dependent
discount rates).
64 Speciﬁcally, if the stock of habits is below a threshold then bequests are operative such that stronger habits have level
eﬀects on output and increase long run resource usage (by inducing temporarily greater willingness to accumulate capital,
and input substitution). By contrast, if initial habits exceed this level, then there are growth eﬀects: bequests shut down
and growth is faster, and extraction time proﬁle ﬂatter. Zhang (2013) ﬁnds that habits inﬂuence the speed of economic
adjustment, but not the steady state using a model featuring renewable resource inputs.
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due to technology and impatience.
5.2 Climate change and consumption of energy services
This section models potential spillovers from resource usage to the allocative behaviour of
the household, reﬂecting the potential for environmental externalities to inﬂuence demand
for energy intensive services, for example by reducing heating requirements as a result
of milder winters, or increasing the need for air conditioning due to hotter summers (see
Appendix 5 for a survey of the literature on the potential magnitude of these eﬀects).
To explore these issues, I adapt once more the basic neoclassical growth model with
exhaustible resources, such that energy is consumed by the representative householder 
to provide heating services, for example  subject to the following Cobb-Douglas utility
function:
Max
{c(t),E(t),χ(t)}∞t=0
V =
ˆ ∞
0
(e−it
(
c(t)1−v − 1
1− v +
((1− χ (x (t)))E (t))1−w
1− w
)
+
λ(t)
(
Q(.)− c(t)N(t)− K˙(t)
)
)dt (5.1)
where w is the preference parameter over directly consumed energy services; 1 − χ(.)
determines the proportion of oil allocated to consumption, which is subject to the following
postulated relationship:
χ (x (t)) = ζx(t) (5.2)
ζx(t) > (<)1 determines the magnitude and sign of the allocative shift; and the revised
production function is given by: Q(.) = A(t)K(t)a1N(t)a2 (χ (x (t))E (t)) (1−a1−a2). All
other terms are as previously deﬁned.
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Optimal oil allocation  the balance between resources used in consumption and pro-
duction  satisﬁes the following condition:
χ∗ (x (t)) e−it ((1− χ∗ (x (t)))E(t)) −w = λ(t) (1− a1 − a2) Q(t)
E(t)
(5.3)
which determines that, at the margin, the utility from oil allocated to consumption is
equal to its shadow value in production.
Lemma 5.1: An interior solution requires that z = −i.
Diﬀerentiating condition (5.3) with respect to time, and substituting for the time path
of the marginal product of oil, yields the following expression for the growth rate of oil
allocated to production:
χˆ (1 + wΛ (x (t))) = z + i (5.4)
where Λ (x (t)) = χ(x(t))
1−χ(x(t)) represents the ratio of oil used in production to consumption
in the presence of the allocative spillover. The stated condition holds by inspection.
If this knife-edge condition fails, the ratio of oil used in production and consumption
is not stable over time (dΛ(x
∗)
dt
6= 0), leading to either economic collapse, or the production
only representation outlined previously.
Lemma 5.2: Under stated assumptions, allocation of oil to the householder
aﬀects depletion rates as the sign of 1 − v. Furthermore, this condition also
determines the inﬂuence of the preference parameter, w.
Sketch proof. Steady state depletion, interest rates, consumption-capital and output
growth are given by (see Appendix D for further details):
I (Λ (x∗))x∗ = (v − 1) (h− n (1− a1 − a2)) +(
wΛ (x∗) (1− a1) + (v (1− a1 − a2) + a2)
(1 + wΛ (x∗))
)
(i+ z) (5.5)
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I (Λ (x∗)) r∗ = vh+ n (a2 + (v − 1)m) + i
(
a2 −m
(
wΛ (x∗)
1 + wΛ (x∗)
))
−
vz
(
(1− a1 − a2 +m)wΛ (x∗)− (1− a1 − a2)
(1 + wΛ (x∗))
)
(5.6)
a1I (Λ (x
∗)) c∗/k∗ = nI (Λ (x∗)) + (v − a1) [h− n (1− a1 − a2)−(
z
(
(1− a1 − a2 +m)wΛ (x∗)− (1− a1 − a2)
(1 + wΛ (x∗))
)
+ i (1− a1)
)
] (5.7)
g∗I (Λ (x∗)) = h− (1− a1 − a2)n−
w
(
Λ (x∗) (1− a1 − a2 +m) + (v − 1) (1− a1 − a2)
(1 + wΛ (x∗))
)
(z + i) (5.8)
where:
I (Λ (x∗)) = (v (1− a1 − a2) + a2 + (v − 1)m) +
w
(1 + wΛ (x∗))
(v − 1) (1− a1 − a2)
U (Λ (x∗)) −dx
∗
dΛ∗ =
wΛ
(1+wΛ)2
(v − 1) (1− a1 − a2) (i+ z − wx∗) > 0 if v < 1. Under main-
tained assumptions, I (Λ (x∗)) = − (v−1)(1−a1−a2)
(1+wΛ(x∗))2
(
(1 + (w − 1) Λ (x∗))− w dΛ
dx∗
dx∗
dw
)
x∗. The
second part of the result follows by envelope theorem. 
Thus depletion rates fall with the allocation of oil resources to consumption due to
the slower accumulation of productive capital. Moreover, for an increase in w, marginally
utility falls more rapidly with higher oil consumption, raising incentives for the householder
to preserve scant resources, thereby increasing the scale of the adjustment.
It follows that a shift in energy allocation away from household consumption has the
potential to raise depletion and output growth: a 4 percent fall in the share of demand
by households, for example  which, as evidenced by the literature survey at Appendix 5
represents an indicative order of potential magnitude for the UK by around mid century
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 corresponds with a 5 percent reduction in depletion rates for plausible assumptions over
preferences and income shares to resources.65 66
Tax policy under a consumption spillover
Macroeconomic simulations of such allocative shifts in energy demand have not hitherto
formally characterised the policy implications for energy taxation. I make an eﬃciency
based argument here for diﬀerential taxation of energy across consumptive and productive
usages. However, and importantly, any welfare gains should be appraised against the
potential costs in terms of revenue leakage and additional complexity in tax administration.
To illustrate this, consider the following revised decision of the representative household,
assuming the imposition of the optimal oil excise, is given by:
Max
{c(t),E(t),χ(t)}∞t=0
V =
ˆ ∞
0
(e−it
(
c(t)1−v
1− v +
((1− χ (x¯))E (t))1−w
1− w
)
+
λ(t)
(
Q(S¯, x¯, Zχ)− (c(t)− y(t))N(t)− K˙(t)
)
)dt (5.9)
where Q(., Zχ) = A(t)K(t)a1N(t)a2 (χ (x¯) (1− Zχ(t))E (t)); Zx represents an ad val-
orem surcharge on oil used in production; and the redistribution of revenues satisﬁes a
balanced budget constraint given by: y(t)N(t) = Zx(t)χ (.)E (t).
Lemma 5.3: Optimal policy warrants an additional levy on energy used in
65 Speciﬁcally, v = w = 1.5, a1 = 0.34, a2 = 0.6 χ = 0.25, h = 2%, n = 1%.
66 Simulations which incorporate the inﬂuence of climate change on household energy demand into macroeconomic models
without exhaustible resource inputs to production identify long terms output eﬀects on the order of a few tenths of one
percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in magnitude (Aaheim et al. (2009), Bosello et al. (2009, 2007), Eboli et al.
(2010), Jorgensen et al. (2009)). The sign of such eﬀects often diﬀer across regions, being negative for hotter regions (see, for
example, Aaheim et al. (2009); Eboli et al. (2010)), and is disputed for some important economies such as the US (contrast
the ﬁndings, for example, of Eboli et al. (2010) with those of Jorgensen et al. (2004)).
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production, Zχ to correct the distortion to the intra temporal allocation of oil
resources, given by: Z(t)χ = 1− ((1−χ(x∗))E(t))
−w
((1−χ(x¯))E(t))−w .
Sketch proof. See Appendix D. 
Optimal tax policy thus warrants an additional measure to correct the distortion to the
intra temporal resource allocation. Such diﬀerential taxes on energy have been employed
across a wide range of countries: in the UK, for example, diesel for agricultural uses has
been subject to preferential excise treatment; while residential use of kerosene is more
lightly taxed than aviation fuel in many developing countries.
However, these policies were originally designed with the objective of pursuing redis-
tributive goals. Such arguments are generally considered weak in advanced countries where
well developed social security systems oﬀer alternative mechanisms for their achievement,
which may be preferred both in theory and practice.
By contrast, this analysis presents an eﬃciency based rationale.67 However, one should
be mindful of the potential costs in terms of revenue leakage and additional complexity in
tax administration. One key issue in this latter regard, concerns the risk of tax leakage
from imperfect market discrimination.
Practical eﬀorts to mitigate these risks have sometimes relied on colouration of fuels for
particular usages, which can, in theory at least, be monitored. However, such responses
are inevitably imperfect and costly to implement, particularly in countries with weak tax
administration.
Consumption tax rates: numerical results
Appendix D summarizes currently available evidence concerning the potential respon-
siveness of energy demand to climatic conditions, and draws inference for potential correc-
67 Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a, b), for example, show that, under certain key assumptions, it is preferable to tax ﬁnal
consumers, since it avoids distorting production decisions (which serve to erode the tax base). Such theories have had a
profound inﬂuence on the evolution of modern tax systems, including growing international preferences for implementing a
VAT. However, taxing externalities lies outside the general prescription that levies not be imposed on business inputs.
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tive tax policies in the UK. These studies diﬀer importantly in terms of their projections.
However, in broad terms, they project that climate change has the potential to impact
residential heating demand in the range +2% to -10% by mid century (and suggest that
industrial energy demand in invariant to temperature changes).
Equating 1 − χ with the share of total energy use by households in the UK at 28
percent (DECC (2012)), Table 3 below provides a simple range of numerical results for
the corrective tax on energy used in production under diﬀerent assumptions over the size
of the allocative shift and the preference parameter w. In the case of w = 1, for example, it
suggests, for example, that a 4 percent shift in oil resources towards consumption implies
an extra 3.1 percent ad valorem charge on oil allocated to production.
5.3 Environment, the macroeconomy and consumption habits
Despite the increasing popularity of inter-temporally non separable preference forms in
modern macro theory, the classical separability assumption has typically been retained in
the neoclassical exhaustible resource modelling.
A number of studies explore the implications of time dependent discount rates (Hepburn
et al. (2010), Maeda and Nagaya (2010), Zhang (2013). However, research into the eﬀects
of consumption habits on growth and exhaustible resource depletion has thus far been
rather scant (Valente (2011), Zhang (2013)).
This section analyses interactions between habit formation and the sustainability of
growth in the presence of exhaustible resources, and considers the implications for both the
macroeconomy and the design of corrective tax policy (together with possible interactions
with other climate related externalities).
The representative agent is thus assumed here to have isoelastic preferences over con-
sumption relative to average consumption levels in the preceding period as follows:
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Table 2
Steady state gross interest rates with endogenous depreciation
θ
0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.2
0 16.67 - - - -
0.08 15.00 15.74 16.60 - -
m 0.1 13.75 14.32 14.97 - -
0.15 12.78 13.23 13.74 14.30 14.93
0.2 12.00 12.37 12.78 13.23 13.72
(a) Expenditure tax
θ
0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.2
0 18.83 - - - -
0.08 16.75 17.61 18.60 - -
m 0.1 15.19 15.84 16.58 - -
0.15 13.97 14.49 15.06 15.07 15.70
0.2 13.00 13.42 13.88 14.38 14.94
(b) Income tax
Table 3
Ad valorem corrective tax rates under consumption spillovers
This table provides a simple range of numerical results for the corrective tax on energy used in production
tax under diﬀerent assumptions over the magnitude of the spillover and the preference parameter w.
(1− χ∗) / (1− χ¯)
0.90 .92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.02
1 9.8 6.6 3.8 1.6 0.8 0 -0.8
w 2 20.6 13.6 7.7 3.1 1.6 0 -1.6
3 32.5 21.1 11.8 4.7 2.4 0 -2.4
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Max
{c(t),E(t)}∞t=0
V =
∞∑
0
(e−it
(c(t)− J(t))1−v − 1
1− v +
λ(t)
(
Q(.)− c(t)N(t)− K˙(t)
)
) (5.10)
where J(t) = αca(t − 1) (where ca indicates the average consumption rate across all
households). This is subject to initial conditions in both capital, labour and the stock of
external habits:K(0), N(0), and J(0).
Following Campbell and Cochrane (1999), I deﬁne the surplus ratio: L(t) = (c(t)−J(t))
c(t)
≤
1 . Thus marginal utility in period t is given by:
U (C(t)) = e−it (c(t)− J(t))−v = e−itL(t)−vc(t)−v (5.11)
Diﬀerentiating (5.11) with respect to time and substituting for marginal utility and the
shadow value of capital, yields the following consumption Euler:
v
L(t)
cˆ(t) = r(t)− i− n (5.12)
Thus incorporating external habits slows consumption growth (relative to the case in
which α = 0). Combining with the transition equation in physical capital, yields the
following expression for the ratio of consumption to capital:
cˆ(t)− kˆ(t) = c(t)/k(t) + (n (v − L(t)) + L(t)r(t)− L(t)i) /v − r(t)/a1 (5.13)
Proposition 5.1: In the absence of an oil tax, the habit parameter increases
steady state depletion and interest rates ifm < a2.
Sketch proof. Solving the revised system of equations involving the new consumption-
capital transition given by 5.13 yields the following steady states expressions in interest
rates, depletion, consumption-capital ratio, output growth and the surplus ratio:68
68 By inspection these expressions reduce to the baseline case where L = 1, corresponding with the absence of preferences
over a habit stock (L∗ is naturally falling in the strength of the habit stock).
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(C − (1− L∗) (a2 −m)) r∗ = vh+ n (a2 + (v − L∗)m)
+ iL∗ (a2 −m)− vz (1− a1 − a2 +m) (5.14)
(C − (1− L∗) (a2 −m))x∗ =
(v − L∗) (h− n (1− a1 − a2)) + (1− a1)L∗ (i+ z) (5.15)
a1 (C − (1− L∗) (a2 −m)) c∗/k∗ = (v − L∗a1) =
(h− n (1− a1 − a2)− (z + iL∗ (1− a1))) +
(n+ j) (1− a1) (C − (1− L∗) (a2 −m))
(5.16)
(C − (1− L∗) (a2 −m)) g∗ = L∗ (h− (1− a1 − a2)n− (1− a1 − a2 +m) (z + i)) (5.17)
L∗ =
(
1− α
1 + g∗
)
(5.18)
dr∗
dα
> 0, dx
∗
dα
> 0 under the stated conditions. 
α encourages households to defer consumption, given the positive inﬂuence on wel-
fare (utility being formed over the diﬀerence rather than the level of the good demand).
However, a higher growth rate strengthens the climate change externality, rendering con-
sumption in the future more expensive relative to today. The overall inﬂuence on depletion
and rental returns in the real economy therefore depends on the relative size of the two
eﬀects.
Tax policy under habit formation
This subsection examines the tax policy implications of external habit formation by
comparing the consumption choices of the representative household with those of the
social planner. The former is assumed to maximise the following:
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Max
{c(t),E(t)}∞t=0
V =
∞∑
0
(e−it
(
c(t)− J¯(t))1−v − 1
1− v +
λ(t)
(
(1− ZQ)Q(.)−N(t) (c(t) (1− Zc) + y(t))− K˙(t)
)
) (5.19)
where J¯(t) = αca(t − 1) indicates the external stock is considered invariant to her
consumption decision, and Zc is an ad valorem consumption tax, obeying the following
intra temporal budget constraint: Z(t)c(t)N(t) + Z(t)P (t) = y(t)N(t).
Diﬀerentiating the consumption ﬁrst order condition with respect to time yields the
following Euler equation:
v
L(t)
cˆ(t) = (1− ZQ) r(t)− i− n− zc(t) (5.20)
where zc(t) =
Z˙c(t)
1+Zc(t)
.
The social planner is assumed to maximise the following:
Max
{c(t),E(t)}∞t=0
V =
∞∑
0
(e−it
(
c(t)− J˜(t)
)1−v
− 1
1− v +
λ(t)
(
(1− ZQ)Q(.)− c(t)N(t)− K˙(t)
)
) (5.21)
where J˜(t) = αca(t− 1) is an endogenously determined state variable.
Diﬀerentiating (5.21) with respect to c(t) yields:
e−it
(
c(t)SP − J(t)SP )−v−
αe−i(t+1)
(
c(t+ 1)SP − J(t+ 1)SP )−v = λ(t)SPN(t) (5.22)
where the term αe−it+1
(
cSP (t+ 1)− JSP (t+ 1))−v captures the negative inﬂuence on
utility in period t+ 1.
Diﬀerentiating with respect to time and substituting from (5.20) gives the following
consumption Euler for the social planner:
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−i− vcˆ(t)
(
1
L(t)SP
+
αe−iM(t)
L(t+ 1)SP (1 + g(t))
)
+ λˆSP (t) + n (5.23)
where M(t) =
(c(t+1)SP−J(t+1)SP )−v
(c(t)SP−J(t)SP )−v is the ratio of indirect (due to the habit) and direct
marginal eﬀects on utility from consumption in period t.
Restricting attention to taxation on the balanced growth path, employing (5.18) and
the marginal productivity of capital condition, this can be expressed:
v
LSP (t)
((
1 + gSP (t)
)
+ αeiM(t)
(1 + gSP (t))
)
cˆSP (t) = r(t)SP − i− n (5.24)
Lemma 5.5 The optimal consumption tax is increasing in the habit param-
eter.
Sketch proof. The optimal consumption tax path, at steady state, is calculated by equat-
ing (5.20) with (5.24), given by:
z∗c =
(
αe−iM(t)
(1 + gSP (t)) + αeiM(t)
)(
rSP (t)− i− n) (5.25)
which is positive by inspection, and increasing in the habit parameter (provided m < a2).
 The householder has an excessively smooth consumption proﬁle from the perspective of
the social planner, by failing to capture the negative inﬂuence of her decision on marginal
utility of other households as a result of a lower surplus ratio. The optimal consumption
tax is thus rising to correct for this incentive.
Habit formation and spillovers aﬀecting capital durability
Lemma 5.6 The optimal consumption tax is increasing in the habit param-
eter is falling in θ.
Sketch proof. This is evident by inspect of the following optimal tax expressions:
z∗c =
(
αe−iM(t)
(1 + gSP (t)) + αeiM(t)
)(
rSP (t)− i− n− θxSP ) (5.26)
 The prescribed consumption tax path is thus less steeply sloped, and the optimal
capital tax rate reduced, in the presence of an environmental-resource impact to capital
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durability, due to the additional externality bearing on the consumption path and net
returns.
5.4 Concluding remarks
The ﬁrst part of this chapter analyses the macroeconomic and policy implications of
intra temporal externalities from resource utilization aﬀecting consumption markets. In
contrast to the more standard approach of exploring the contributions of the energy sector
to climate change, it analyses counter directional eﬀects: in particular, the inﬂuence of
changing weather conditions on residential heating and cooling demand.
I simulate the potential macroeconomic inﬂuence of climate change arising from shifting
patterns of residential heating and cooling demand in the UK, and characterises previously
unexplored implications for diﬀerential taxation of resources across usages: a shift in
energy allocation away from household consumption due to climate change raises depletion
and output growth and potentially warrants a surcharge on oil allocated to production.
Extending the theme on the importance of preference forms for the transmission of
environment-economy spillovers, the second part of the chapter analyses the macroeco-
nomic and policy implications of potential interactions between consumption habits and
wider externalities from fossil fuel usage.
Despite the growing popularity of non separable time preferences within mainstream
macroeconomics, research into the eﬀects of consumption habits on growth and exhaustible
resource depletion has thus far been rather scarce.
Introducing an external habit of the form adopted by Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
causes steady state depletion and interest rates to rise provided the climate change exter-
nality is not too large.
Once again, the tax policy insights are sensitive to the form of economy-environment
externality: in particular the prescribed consumption tax path is less steeply sloped in
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the presence of an environmental-resource impact to capital durability, which lowers net
returns.
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6 THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY
TAX REFORM IN THE UK
6.1 Introduction
The analysis above has thus far explored economic and policy issues arising from diﬀerent
possible macro linkages between exhaustible resource and the economy  under particular
assumptions, including over the structure of preferences and the determinants of savings
behaviour  within a dynamic, general equilibrium framework featuring a single represen-
tative agent.
Such approaches are helpful in framing this important global problem. However, we
need to recognize that national level policy choices, in particular by the major emitters,
will be critical to limiting the costs and risks associated with climate change. Concerns
about the distributional consequences of more rational taxation of energy within countries
rise to the fore in this context.
This chapter focuses on heterogeneity in the burden of climate and energy policy costs
for the case of the UK.69 It oﬀers detailed appraisal of the economic and welfare conse-
quences of potential indirect energy tax reforms within a static and partial equilibrium
framework, in which behaviour diﬀers across households. In particular, it seeks to address
the following key questions:
What are the likely economic and revenue eﬀects of imposing carbon taxes on all do-
mestic fuels and standardizing their VAT treatment in the UK (domestic fuels are subject
to a reduced rate of VAT, and direct carbon taxation on households is currently limited
69 This chapter is a substantially revised and extended version of Jones (2012). It builds on this previous study in a
number of key regards, including by: i) formally modelling the inﬂuence of socioeconomic variables on demand behaviour,
ii) improving the underlying estimation techniques (based on less restrictive exogeneity assumptions) and robustness tests,
and, iii) analysing the implications for welfare, including the inﬂuence of diﬀerent preference forms in the SWF.
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to electricity)?70 What are the welfare consequences of such reforms, considering poten-
tially divergent behavioural responses across socioeconomic groups? How are these costs
inﬂuenced by any weighting over family size within the SWF, as well as allocative choices
by government over any resulting revenues?71
From an eﬃciency perspective, the case for such reforms is compelling: the current
reduced rate of VAT  5 percent as compared to the standard rate of 20 percent  en-
courages economically costly substitution between domestic fuels and other commodities;
while the absence of broad based carbon pricing generates incentives for excessive pollution
((Crawford et al. (2011), HM Treasury (1993)).72
However, the distributional consequences associated with indirect taxation of basic com-
modities, such as energy, are potentially more concerning; in particular, higher resulting
prices may threaten the welfare of vulnerable groups. This is because lower income house-
holds are commonly more ﬁnancially reliant on these goods, and may have more limited
substitution possibilities than wealthier households (particularly in the short term).
In this context, relatively little analysis has been undertaken into how the burden of
energy tax reforms in the UK  considering potentially important diﬀerences in behaviour 
70 IFS highlight the substantial gaps which exist between the 2015 election policy statements and the ﬁscal adjustment
targets of the major parties; and emphasise that VAT rates would likely need to rise to meet current deﬁcit reduction
goals, despite recent election promises to the contrary (similar statements were made prior to rate rises in the 2010-2015
Parliament) (Crawford et al. (2015)).
71 Fullerton (2011) identiﬁes 6 diﬀerent economic channels through which energy taxes could impact the distribution of
incomes and consumption, including, for example, higher product prices, shifting returns to factors of production and the
incidence of resulting environmental beneﬁts. This study is concerned narrowly with the direct economic and welfare costs
of carbon and energy tax reforms.
72 Despite mounting evidence on the economic risks from climate change, only electricity  which is covered by the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme  is subject to a formal carbon charge in the household sector. The Climate Change Act (2008)
sets ambitious targets for the UK to reduce GHG emissions by at least 34 percent by 2020 compared with 1990 levels.
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might be shared across households and socioeconomic groups. Detailed micro level analysis
is therefore needed to assess the distributional implications of more rational taxation of
energy goods on vulnerable social groups, and to inform policy makers on appropriate
expenditure policy adjustments for limiting the most serious inequities.
Existing research to data has typically assumed that UK household demand is unaf-
fected by energy tax reforms (Baiocchi et al. (2010), Dresner and Ekins (2006), Druckman
and Jackson (2008), Symons et al. (2002)). This risks over estimating the ﬁscal base and
biasing welfare losses (an issue shown to be quantitatively important here). Pearson and
Smith (1991) and Sterner (2007) analyse energy demand and tax revenues using average
own price and expenditure elasticities, thereby failing to capture important behavioural
diﬀerences across households which may critically inﬂuence tax incidence.
Heterogeneity in energy consumption behaviour has been studied in the context of
UK space heating demand (Jamasb and Meier (2010), Meier and Reddanz (2010)) and
transportation (Blow and Crawford (1997), Santos and Catchesides (2005)) within single
equation estimation frameworks. However, by ignoring the inﬂuence of a broad set of cross
price eﬀects, these studies are unsuited to analysing the welfare eﬀects of non marginal
tax changes of the sort discussed below (Banks et al. (1996)).
Among the existing literature which captures such interactions, only Symons et al.
(1994) and Jones (2012) have analysed the eﬀects of carbon tax in the UK. However,
market and technological conditions have evolved greatly in the 20 years since the former
study was conducted, and the policy insights are weakened by the rather implausible tax
rates simulated (around 10 times higher in real terms than current policy guidelines).
Jones (2012) is a more recent, but nascent, contribution on this topic; in particular, it
does not formally model the inﬂuence of socioeconomic variables, or the implications of
tax reform, on energy demand; or the implications for aggregate welfare. Moreover, the
underlying estimation techniques impose highly restrictive exogeneity assumptions, and
the speciﬁcation and identiﬁcation strategy is not subject to formal testing.
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This chapter contributes to the rather limited stock of existing behavioural research
into the distributional eﬀects of energy tax reform in the UK in a number of key regards.
First, it is the ﬁrst behavioural study of carbon taxes, which analyses a broad set of cross
price eﬀects, to have been conducted since the liberalisation of electricity and natural gas
markets.73 Second, it is the ﬁrst research to produce money metric estimates of the welfare
consequences of such reforms, and to analyse the implications of diﬀerent approaches to
the aggregation within the SWF.74 Finally, it provides insights into hitherto unexplored
interactions between VAT and carbon tax changes.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 presents a structural non linear
demand model, originally due to Banks et al. (1997). Section 6.3 outlines the data sources
and estimation approach. Section 6.4 presents the key ﬁndings in terms of the economic
and welfare eﬀects of VAT and carbon tax reform in the UK. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 A non linear model of structural demand
Analysing the distributional consequences of energy taxes requires a robust representation
of consumer behaviour, which properly characterises the impact of income and relative
price changes on consumption. However, these behavioural characteristics are likely to
vary widely across households, rendering it important to capture their entire distribution
when seeking to assess the incidence of energy and other indirect tax reforms.
73 Johnson et al. (1990) and Symons et al. (1994) draw on data series ending in 1986. Marked changes in household energy
usage and technologies have taken place since this time, including, for example, substantial eﬃciency gains in traditional
appliance and the mass diﬀusion of information technologies.
74 Money metric welfare estimates have been undertaken by Brännlund and Nordstrom (2004), Bureau (2011), Cornwell
and Creedy (1997), Parshardes et al. (2014), Romero-Jordán and Sanz-Sanz (2009), Tiezzi (2005) and West and Williams
(2004) for Sweden, France, Australia, Spain, Italy, Cyprus and the US respectively. Blow and Crawford (1997) analyse
money metric welfare losses in UK gasoline markets only.
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The standard analytic approach is to take the preferences of households as the primitive,
and then analyze the consequences for behaviour (and the consistency of any econometric
results with classical theory). In this context, I here extend a model ﬁrst developed by
Banks et al. (1997), itself an extension of the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a), which has a number of attractive features
In particular, it is consistent with the axioms of choice, can be readily estimated at
high degrees of disaggregation, allows the slope of the Engel curves to vary at diﬀerent
points in the expenditure range (such that goods may be luxuries at some income levels
and necessities at others),75 and, importantly, is shown to ﬁt the data well. The structure
of the model is outlined below.
Log indirect utility function is of the form:
logX(p,z,m) =
((
(logm− log(Υ (p)))
∆(p)
)−1
+ω(p)
)−1
(6.1)
where m represents total household expenditure, p and d are vectors of prices and other
controls respectively; Υ (p) is a continuously diﬀerentiable homogeneous function of degree
one facing consumers in prices; ∆(p) and ω(p) are continuously diﬀerentiable homogeneous
functions of degree zero.76
Extending Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a), the functions Υ (p) and ∆(p) take the
following ﬂexible form given by:
75 This is shown to be empirically desirable below (see also Hausman et al. (1995); Banks et al. (1997)).
76 Homothetic preferences imply that budget shares depend only on relative prices. However, Boppart (2014), for example,
demonstrates that expenditure shares on goods are lower among rich compared to poor households in the US. He develops
a model in which the marginal propensity to consume goods and services diﬀers across the income spectrum, such that
inequality aﬀects the aggregate demand structure. This approach is used to explain the structural phenomenon of declining
consumption shares to, and prices of, goods relative to services with the balanced output growth and stable interest rates
which form the basis of Kaldor's stylized facts.
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log(Υ (p,d)) = α0 +
∑
k
ϑikdik +
∑
k
ϑitΦit +
∑
i
αi log pi +
1
2
∑
i
∑
j
γij log pj log pi (6.2)
where dik and Φit are demographic translators bearing on demand for good i (these
controls have the interpretation of determining subsistence budget share requirements) and
deterministic time trends respectively (note that prices are assumed to be homogeneous
across households and are therefore not indexed by o).77
∆(p) is the Cobb-Douglas price aggregator given by:
∆(p) =
∏
i
p∆
o
i (6.3)
where: ∆oi = ∆
o
i +∆
o,d
i Dummy, with Dummy
o taking the form of an indicator variable,
such as the presence of children in the family;78
ω(p) is assumed to take the form:
ω(p) =
∑
i
ωoi log pi (6.4)
Diﬀerentiating X(p,mo,d) with respect to mo, pi, and substituting for the derivatives
of the price aggregates, yields the following budget share equation for household o on good
i, denoted by shareoi :79
77 The function Υ (p) is commonly approximated by a Stone index given by:
∑
i
sharei log pi, where share
o
i represent the
expenditure share on good i. This index has the potential to introduce measurement error; for example it is not invariant
to changes in the price units. A Laspeyres price index which replaces sharei by sharei,a, the sample average budget share,
is preferred (Moschini (1995)). However, in practice, these choices were not found to inﬂuence the parameter estimates
materially (with a Laspeyres index employed).
78 Demographic interactions with prices, for example, were not revealed by the data (unlike, for example, West and
Williams (2004) in a study of US gasoline demand). Do permits the expenditure reaction functions to vary according to
household characteristics.
79 These are derived from the indirect utility function using Roy's identity as follows: shareoi =
pix
o
i
mo
=
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The following budget share equation is thus estimated below:
share (p,m, z)oi = α
o
i +
∑
k
ϑikd
o
ik +
∑
k
ϑitΦit +
∑
j
γij log pj+
∆hi
(logmo − log(Υ (p)))
Υ (p, z)
+
ωoi
∆(p)
(
logmh − log(Υ (p)))
Υ (p, z)
2
(6.5)
subject to these constraints which are derived (respectively) from the theoretical re-
strictions of adding up, symmetry and homogeneity:
∑
i
γij = 0,
∑
i
αi = 1,
∑
i
ϑik = 0,
∑
i
ϑit = 0,
∑
i
∆i = 0,
∑
i
ωi=0 (6.6)
γij = γji (6.7)∑
j
γij = 0 (6.8)
Price and expenditure elasticities are derived by diﬀerentiating the budget share equa-
tion (for good i, say) with respect to logmo and log pj respectively (and substituting for
b′(p)), yielding:
Ξoi =
∂δshareoi
∂ logmh
= ∆i + 2
ωoi
∆(p)
(logmo − log(Υ (p))) (6.9)
Ξoij =
∂shareoi
∂ log pj
= γij − Ξoi
(
αj +
∑
k
γjk log pk
)
− ω
h
i ∆j
∆(p)
(logmo − log(Υ (p))2
Υ (p, z)
(6.10)
Price and income elasticity equations are related to the budget share equations as
follows:
pi
mo
(
− δ logX(p,m
o)
δpi
δ logX(p,mo)
δmo
)
.
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eoi =
δxoi
δmo
mo
xhi
=
1
woi
δshareoi
δ logmo
+ 1 =
Ξoi
sharehi
+ 1 (6.11)
eo,uij =
δxoi
δpj
pj
xhi
=
1
shareoi
δshareoi
δ log pj
− δij =
Ξoij
sharehi
− δij (6.12)
where δij represents the Kronecker delta (equal to1 if i = j and 0 otherwise).
Exploiting the Slutsky decomposition, compensated demand elasticities are given by:
eo,cij = e
h,u
ij +
eoi
shareoi
(6.13)
I employ a Compensating Variation (CV) measure of welfare (which represents the
amount of money a household would require to maintain pre reform levels of utility at
post tax prices), given by:
CV o = C(p1, U o0 )− C(p0, U o0 ) (6.14)
Banks et al. (1996) emphasise the importance of incorporating substitution eﬀects into
assessments of non marginal tax reforms of the sort analysed below. The authors show
that a second order Taylor expansion of C(p1, U o0 ) around (p
0, U o0 ) yields the following
expression for CV:
C(p1, U o0 ) ≈ C(p0, U o0 ) +
∑
j
δC(p0, U o0 )
δp0j
(
p1j − p0j
)
+
∑
j
∑
k
δ2C(p0, U o0 )
δpjpk
(
p1j − p0j
) (
p1k − p0k
)
(6.15)
This can be re expressed in terms of observable variables as follows:
CV o ≈ ko −
∑
j
∑
k
δ2C(p0, U o0 )
δpjpk
(
p1j − p0j
)
p0j
(
1 +
∑
k
eo,cjk
(p1k − p0k)
p0k
)
(6.16)
where ko is some transfer to household o satisfying, in aggregate, the government's
revenue neutrality constraint, given by:
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∑
o
yo ≤
∑
o
∑
i
Z1i p
1
ix
o
i −
∑
o
∑
i
Z0i p
0
ix
o
i (6.17)
6.3 Data and estimation
This chapter employs repeated cross sectional data on approximately 50,000 households
drawn from the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES) between 1986 and 2009.80 This well
known data source details household expenditures on around 50 diﬀerent goods and ser-
vices, including food products, fuels, and other regular domestic purchases. An extended
discussion of the survey methodology, descriptive trends in the data, and estimation strat-
egy is found at Appendix D.
The data have been aggregated into 7 commodity groups summarised in Table 4. These
have been selected to make sense from a functional perspective (by grouping goods which
have similar uses together), but also to reﬂect both diﬀerent indirect tax treatments (in
order to be relevant for tax and revenue analysis) and a detailed focus on energy products
and policies.
This raises the potential for bias arising from zero expenditures (Blundell and Robin
(1999), Keen (1986)). However, current options for resolving this issue in a system of
equations remain limited: simply removing zero observations risks introducing selection
bias; while censoring is technically extremely complex.81
80 From 2001, the FES was combined with the National Food Survey and renamed the 'Expenditure and Food Survey'
(EFS), before being renamed the 'Living Costs and Food Survey' (LCF) in 2009. The FES, EFS and LCF are hereafter used
synonymously. Data on historical UK monthly temperatures are taken from the Met Oﬃce website: www.metoﬃce.gov.uk.
81 I have sought to balance the risks associated through my choice of aggregation, which yields zero expenditures in
less than 2 percent of the observations for most commodity groups, rising to around 15 percent for gas and gasoline. The
parameter estimates are found to be fairly stable across the conditional and unconditional distributions.
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Table 4
Description of commodity bundles
This table outlines the composite commodities which form the basis of the analysis, the individual goods
over which these groupings are formed, together with their respective tax treatments, average sample
expenditure shares and log prices.
Commodity Group Individual commodities Tax treatment Average share Weighted
of (non housing) average log
budget, 2008 price
Food, non VAT bread, cereals, beef, pork, lamb, Zero rate VAT. 0.20 5.78
ﬁsh, butter, oil, cheese, eggs, milk,
coﬀee, tea, vegetables, chicken
Food, VAT canteen, biscuits, soft drinks, Standard rate VAT 0.11 6.29
confectionery
Electricity Reduced rate VAT 0.05 6.20
Gas Reduced rate VAT 0.04 6.44
Gasoline Gasoline, Diesel VAT+Excise 0.07 6.55
General consumer Consumer goods, pet care, Standard rate VAT 0.31 6.15
telephone, domestic services, fees
& subscriptions, chemicals, personal
services, maintenance,
tax & insurance,∗men's clothing,
women's clothing, footwear
Leisure goods Audio visual, records. toys, garden, Standard rate VAT 0.22 6.50
and services entertainment, TV licence∗∗
∗Insurance services are exempt from VAT, but subject to a 5 percent insurance premium tax (raised to 20 percent
in 2015).
∗∗TV licenses are exempt from VAT.
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Endogeneity is an ubiquitous issue in applied economics given the potential for simul-
taneity bias, as well as measurement and/ or speciﬁcation error. Empirical tests, presented
below, clearly warrant estimation by Instrumental Variables (IV). However, non linear IV
estimates of the complex range of economic and demographic factors bearing on house-
hold energy demand behaviour analysed below proved both slow to compile and somewhat
unstable (the preferred demand speciﬁcation has on the order of ﬁve hundred estimated
parameters).
In light of this, I employ an iterated linear least squares estimator (ILLE)  which
exploits the fact that the model outlined above is linear conditional on parameters  that
is asymptotically equivalent to a non linear three stage least squares (3SLS) estimator and
computationally highly attractive (see Blundell and Robin (1999), Lewbel and Pendakur
(2009)).82 The basic approach is as follows: let θ be matrix all the parameters in the
budget share equation (6.5) such that shareo = f(θo).
Given the observations on shareo, I derive estimates, θˆ, for the system of equations
using linear 3SLS (employing an instrument vector q, satisfying the moment conditions
E (ε′q) = 0). Predicted budget shares are generated, and the process repeated, taking
the share estimates as data, to obtain a revised parameter vector ˆˆθ = Θ (ˆs). Further
iterations take place until convergence to a ﬁxed point, deﬁned by ˆˆθ = Θi
[
f(share,p, ˆˆθ)
]
,
is achieved.83
82 Blundell and Robin (1999) formally derive a variant of this estimator. The near equivalence of the ILLE and Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimates is conﬁrmed in Appendix D using a sample of available data. The ILLE is asymptot-
ically consistent in the presence of heteroskedastic and non normal errors (and eﬃciency losses arising from heteroskedastic
and non normal errors are shown to be small).
83 Note that maintained assumptions on Jacobian symmetry require cross equation restrictions at each iteration. In
practice, a high degree of convergence is achieved to high degree (10−6) after ﬁve or six iterations.
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6.4 Results
Determinants of demand
This section analyses empirical estimates of the relationship between prices, total expendi-
ture and demographic controls for individual commodities, focussing on energy products.
Table 5 presents the key price and expenditure coeﬃcients derived using both ordinary
least squares (OLS) and ILLE estimators (this is for ease of reference given the complexity
of the overall demand system in this study). Full sets of regression outputs, together with
analysis of the predicted errors, are found at Appendix D. Following Banks et al. (1997)
and Blundell and Robin (1999), I employ household income (and power transformations
of) as an instrument for expenditure. Wu-Hausman tests clearly indicate a preference for
the IV based estimates (Table 6 summarises the results of the key identiﬁcation tests).
Table 5
Comparing key parameter estimates: OLS vs ILLE
This table shows IV and OLS price and expenditure estimates.
Food (non VAT) Food (VAT) Electricity Gas Gasoline Consumer
IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS
Log expenditure -0.08 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.04
Log expenditure squared 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00
Log price food (non VAT) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.09
Log price food (VAT) 0.03 0.03 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.09 0.07
Log price electricity 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Log price gas 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.02
Log price gasoline -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.05
Log price consumer -0.07 -0.09 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.17 0.19
Constant 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.30 0.36
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Table 6
Summary of identiﬁcation tests
This table summarises the results of a number of key robustness checks. The data clearly support the
case for IV estimation. The instruments for expenditure  household income (and power transformations
of)  are highly informative; and Sargan tests do not appear to raise serious exogeneity issues.
Food Food Elect Gas Petrol Cons Leisure
(non VAT) (VAT) -tricity -umer
Wu Hausman (t-stat) 10.92 -13.94 4.31 -1.34 4.89 4.90 4.71
Sargan χ(1)2 3.24 1.20 2.78 1.70 1.31 3.11 1.28
(p-val) (.07) (.27) (.09) (.19) (.25) (.08) (.26 )
m3 (t-Test) -.53 -.13 -.51 1.04 .35 1.05 1.12
Homogeneity (t-stat) -.43 -.47 -.28 .05 .23 .80 .12
Instr. relevance (F-stat) 2999.9
Symmetry LR χ(15)2 (p-val) 1
∗Prices and demographic variables (excluding interactions with expenditure) are assumed exogenous.
∗∗Squared terms are signiﬁcant in all equations except for food (non VAT); and tests on higher order expenditure
terms are insigniﬁcant.
∗∗∗Homogeneity holds regardless of whether symmetry is imposed (the reported t-statistics are for the unrestricted
model). Symmetry is hereafter imposed to ensure consistency with micro theory and to simplify the subsequent
behavioural analysis.
Various demographic variables signiﬁcantly determine energy consumption, reinforcing
the merits of the disaggregated approach adopted here. Budget shares to electricity and
gas generally increase with the age of the household head, while that of gasoline observes
the opposite trend.84 Car ownership unsurprisingly has a signiﬁcant upward bearing on
gasoline demand, but has negative partial eﬀects on domestic fuels (indicating larger heat-
ing bills among less mobile households). Interestingly, the presence of children interacts
signiﬁcantly with expenditure, reducing the slope of the Engel curve for domestic fuels
(implying, perhaps not unreasonably, that fuels are a less essential good in a family set-
ting).85
84 Meier and Rehdanz (2010), for example, ﬁnd that space heating expenditures increase with household size, average
household age and number of children.
85 There are also some discernible trends, for example, towards declining expenditure shares in natural gas and gasoline
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Behavioural responses are most easily expressed in terms of elasticities: Table 7 sum-
marises both expenditure and (uncompensated) own price elasticity estimates (fuller in-
formation regarding the distribution of elasticities is found at Appendix D). For domes-
tic fuels, average expenditure responses are around the centre of the range of short run
estimates identiﬁed in the wider literature, and slightly towards the upper end of the
distribution of values in the case of gasoline (Espey and Espey (2004), Steinbuks (2011)).
However, the responses identiﬁed are widely dispersed (once again emphasising the
value of this form of micro behavioural analysis). Average expenditure elasticities fall for
petrol and gas as total expenditure rises. In the case of electricity, however, these have
an inverted 's' shape, with an inﬂection point at total non housing related expenditure of
around ¿25,000 per annum (and is inferior for more than 25 percent of households in the
sample).86 This rather interesting ﬁnding may relate to housing diﬀerences (controls are
imposed for the number of rooms but not size, for example).
Fuel is on average inelastically demanded (with values toward the upper end (in absolute
terms) of the short run price elasticities identiﬁed elsewhere in the literature (Espey and
Espey (2004), Steinbuks (2011)). Gas and petrol become less price elastic among higher
spending households. Price elasticities also observe rather diﬀerent degrees of dispersion
across energy products, varying considerably less for electricity than gasoline, for example
(also compared to Blow and Crawford (1997)).
from the mid 1990s and early 2000s respectively. This may reﬂect improvements in residential insulation and vehicle eﬃciency
(as well as greater use of public transport and improved communications technologies).
86 Baker et al. (1989) uncover a similar ﬁnding. The concept of a household production function in which high energy
prices cause low wage families to devote more time to cooking and other energy intensive domestic activities may be relevant
in this context (Becker (1965)).
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Table 7
Expenditure and uncompensated own price elasticities
This table outlines average, median and inter quartile values for both expenditure and (uncompensated)
own price elasticity estimates (denoted by superscripts w, 50, and 25/75 respectively).∗ All the fuels are
necessary goods on average, with gasoline being the most expenditure elastic. However, all these values
are highly dispersed, particularly in the case of electricity. Weighted own fuel price elasticities are all
negative and imply price inelastic demand (particularly for gasoline).
e
(w)
i e
(75)
i e
(50)
i e
(25)
i e
u(w)
ii e
u(75)
ii e
u(50)
ij e
u(25)
ij
Food (non VAT) 0.38 0.53 0.34 0.02 -1.28 -1.21 -1.29 -1.45
Food (VAT) 1.10 1.36 1.12 0.95 -1.77 -1.55 -1.88 -2.57
Electricity 0.26 0.43 0.15 -0.22 -1.00 -0.99 -1.00 -1.01
Gas 0.57 0.64 0.46 0.23 -0.91 -0.80 -0.90 -0.95
Gasoline 0.63 0.79 0.61 0.29 -0.66 -0.39 -0.61 -0.75
Consumer 1.07 1.21 1.09 0.99 -0.51 -0.32 -0.50 -0.62
Leisure 1.78 2.98 2.02 1.56 -1.61 -1.43 -1.80 -2.55
∗Averages are weighted by contribution of household to total expenditure on a given commodity.
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Carbon tax and VAT reform: energy usage and revenues
This section simulates the eﬀects of comprehensive VAT rate reform (in particular, the
elimination of reduced and zero ratings on food and fuel), and the imposition of carbon
taxes on gasoline and natural gas of ¿25 and ¿50 tCO2).87 These tax reforms  discussed
in detail in Appendix D  are modelled both independently and in combination (raising
previously unaddressed questions regarding potential interaction eﬀects).
Carbon taxes have potentially large predicted eﬀects on aggregate fossil fuel demand,
particularly for natural gas and to a lesser extent gasoline (detailed results are presented
in Figure 10). These results are not readily comparable with Symons et al. (1994), the
only other published study of this kind, given the widely divergent policy reform scenarios
which are modelled (the tax rates are 4-10 fold higher than in this analysis).88
These increases are less marked when implemented in conjunction with VAT rate re-
form (due to both the fall in relative prices and real incomes), emphasising the merits of
analysing interactions between indirect taxes. The impacts of VAT reform identiﬁed here
are not dissimilar to the average reduction in domestic fuel demand of 4 percent projected
by Johnson et al. (1990) arising from standardizing VAT at 15 percent, but are someway
smaller than the 5.8 percent average reduction identiﬁed by Crawford and Smith (1993)
in the case of a uniform 17.5 tax rate.
In terms of the distribution of behavioural responses, carbon taxes are predicted to
result in much larger proportionate reductions among lower spending households for gas
87 The gradual elimination of such anomalous treatment has been government policy since the early 1990s (HM Treasury
(1993)). Note that VAT reform is simulated for 2008 at the then applicable general rate of 17.5 percent. The simulated
carbon prices reﬂect government estimates of the levels currently required to achieve its objective of reducing emissions in
the household sector (DECC (2009)).
88 The authors predict a 24 percent reduction in gasoline related GHG emissions from a carbon tax levy of around ¿250
tCO2. Johnson et al. (1990) ﬁnd that an excise on motor fuels alone, roughly equivalent to a carbon tax of ¿150 tCO2 in
real value terms, reduces gasoline demand by 9 percent on average.
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Figure 10
Percentage change in aggregate fuel demand by policy scenario
This ﬁgure summarises the percentage change in total sample demand for each fuel across policy scenarios
under the assumption that all revenues are fully retained by the authorities. Carbon taxes (denoted in the
subsequent ﬁgures by CT) have large predicted eﬀects on fossil fuel demand, with aggregate reductions
on the order of 7-21 percent and 1-4 percent for natural gas and gasoline respectively across scenarios.
Electricity demand rises by approximately 1-3 percent in the case of the carbon tax scenarios. VAT reform
in the absence of carbon taxes is predicted here to have more modest eﬀects (although having important
revenue beneﬁts), reducing demand for electricity, gas and gasoline by around 0.3, 6.1 and 1.3 percent
respectively.
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and petrol (detailed results are presented in Table 8). This later ﬁnding appears to support
Blow and Crawford (1997)  who ﬁnd that that the lowest income quintile is roughly twice
as price elastic (in an uncompensated sense) as the upper most  as compared to Johnson
et al. (1990), who identify broadly homogeneous behavioural responses under a simulated
increase in fuel excise duties.
Electricity demand, by contrast, adjusts to a greater degree among higher spending
households across scenarios (a result which is not previously uncovered by studies on
domestic fuels combined (Johnson et at (1990), Symons et al.(1994)).89 VAT reform
and carbon price reform combined appears to slightly widen the distribution of predicted
behaviours: for example, demand reductions are relatively larger among lower spending
households for gas and petrol under the combined policy reforms.
These potential tax changes are also shown to have substantial revenue raising potential,
ranging from on the order of ¿(2008)5 to ¿(2008)30 billion across scenarios (shown in
Figure 11): in a rare example of a revenue forecast based on such sophisticated behavioural
analysis is rare, carbon taxes alone are predicted to have the potential to raise ¿(2008)5-10
billion.90 This represents a considerable sum indeed (equivalent to between one-quarter
and one-half of the total annual receipts from motor fuel excises, for example).
Welfare implications of energy tax reforms
I analyse aggregate welfare eﬀects under two diﬀerent possible speciﬁcations of the SWF:
89 This could be associated with the prevalence of powerful negative income eﬀects among poorer households, and strong
cross price eﬀects with both fuels and food. However, to some extent this type of result is a peril of such non linear models
(similar anomalies are also found by Johnson et al. (1990) in analysis of VAT reform, for example).
90 Dresner and Ekins (2006), for example, project revenues of around ¿1.2 billion annual from a tax of ¿10 tCO2 in the
UK, assuming demand is invariant to prices and incomes. Estimate revenues of ¿(2008)22 billion from VAT reform closely
parallels the result of Crawford et al. (2011).
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Table 8
Distribution of percentage demand changes by expenditure decile
This table summarises the distribution of behavioural responses across expenditure deciles for three sce-
narios. A number of trends are apparent: in the case of the ¿25 tCO2 carbon tax, proportionate demand
reductions are larger among lower spending households for gas and petrol: for example, the highest decile
group lowers gas consumption by 1.6 percent, compared to 10.7 percent for the lowest. Electricity demand,
by contrast, adjusts more among higher spending households across scenarios. This behavioural pattern
appears to be reinforced when carbon taxes are implemented in conjunction with VAT reform.
Expenditure decile Electricity Gas Petrol
Decile 1 0.5 -11.1 -4.8
Decile 2 0.9 -10.5 -4.3
Decile 3 1.1 -10.1 -3.9
Decile 4 1.5 -9.3 -3.7
Decile 5 1.6 -8.7 -3.5
Decile 6 1.9 -8.5 -3.1
Decile 7 1.9 -7.8 -3.1
Decile 8 2.3 -6.6 -2.9
Decile 9 3.0 -5.5 -2.5
Decile 10 4.1 -3.8 -1.3
Aggregate Sample 1.7 -7.6 -1.4
(a) Carbon tax ¿25 tCO2
Expenditure decile Electricity Gas Petrol
Decile 1 -7.0 -20.1 -5.2
Decile 2 -4.2 -19.2 -4.8
Decile 3 -2.9 -18.5 -4.5
Decile 4 -0.7 -17.2 -4.3
Decile 5 0.1 -16.3 -4.2
Decile 6 2.2 -15.8 -3.9
Decile 7 2.7 -14.7 -3.9
Decile 8 5.0 -12.7 -3.7
Decile 9 9.6 -10.9 -3.4
Decile 10 17.5 -8.1 -2.4
Aggregate Sample 1.0 -14.4 -2.5
(b) Carbon tax ¿25 tCO2 + VAT
Expenditure decile Electricity Gas Petrol
Decile 1 -7.5 -9.6 -0.5
Decile 2 -5.0 -9.1 -0.6
Decile 3 -3.9 -8.8 -0.7
Decile 4 -2.0 -8.1 -0.8
Decile 5 -1.3 -7.7 -0.8
Decile 6 0.5 -7.4 -0.9
Decile 7 0.9 -6.9 -0.9
Decile 8 2.9 -5.8 -0.9
Decile 9 6.9 -5.0 -1.0
Decile 10 13.8 -3.5 -1.3
Aggregate Sample -0.4 -6.7 -1.3
(c) VAT only
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Figure 11
Revenue eﬀects by policy scenario
This table 11 summarises the implications of each scenario for total sample revenues under each scenario,
and draws inference for the Exchequer. The removal of reduced and zero rates of VAT on domestic fuel
and food, increases sample revenues by around 21 percent. Given that combined fuel excise and VAT
receipts totalled around ¿105 billion in 2008 (HM Treasury (2009)), this represents additional potential
revenue of around ¿22 billion in that year.∗ It also highlights the important revenue earning potential of
carbon taxes: a levy of ¿50 tCO2, for example, is projected to increase sample tax revenues by around
10 percent, equivalent to around ¿10.5 billion in that year.
∗This assumes the sample is representative of the collective tax base (an issue discussed further in Appendix D).
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a) an unweighted utilitarian function given by SWFa =
∑
o
C1−vo −1
1−v ; and, b) a function in
which aggregate welfare is weighted by the number of household members, No, such that
SWFb =
∑
o
(
No
C1−vh −1
1−v
)
. The results are shown in Table 9 for each policy scenario under
plausible values of inequality aversion, v.
As outlined previously, a key feature of this analysis, is its detailed behavioural frame-
work, which provides a robust foundation for the appraisal of welfare implications. This
is highlighted by a comparison of such estimated eﬀects with those derived under a model
in which demand is invariant to prices. These ﬁndings are materially diﬀerent  com-
monly higher by on the order of 4-18 percent higher  to those presented above (shown in
Appendix D).
Table 9 shows the welfare losses in the event that revenues are fully retained by the
government (a choice which is diﬃcult to discount given the current ﬁscal situation in the
UK), and their sensitivity to assumptions over both the form of the SWF and parameter
choices over v. These are found to be potentially substantial, particularly for scenarios
involving both VAT and carbon tax reform, and in the cases of either a weighted SWF
and/or a low degree of inequality aversion.
The welfare consequences of energy tax reforms are aﬀected by the choice of government
over the allocation of revenues (explored in Table 10):91 in particular, the opportunities
to curb aggregate welfare losses diﬀer according to the allocation mechanism adopted, but
also, importantly, with the form of the SWF (the scope for aggregate welfare gains being
generally greater where this is weighted by family size).
Turning to indirect tax incidence questions in more detail, Table 11 analyses the distri-
91 The implications of revenue choices for carbon tax incidence has been a recent focus in the literature, but have assumed
demand is invariant to after tax prices (see Mathur and Morris (2014), Dinan (2012) for leading examples undertaken for
the US). Symons et al. (1994) analyse the potential impact of carbon tax receipts for the distribution of expenditure in the
UK.
Table 9
Aggregate welfare losses by policy scenario, percentage
This table summarizes the percentage welfare losses under each policy scenario and SWF. Across tax re-
form scenarios, the aggregate utility eﬀects have the potential to be substantial: for the case of logarithmic
utility (v = 1) and an unweighted SWF, carbon taxes result in between a 0.18 and 0.36 percent reduction
in total welfare. This rises to between 0.96 and and 1.13 percent when implemented in conjunction with
VAT reform. The welfare implications are highly sensitive to both the form of the SWF and the inequal-
ity aversion parameter. In the case of the former, aggregate losses are roughly 2-2.5 fold higher across
scenarios if household welfare is weighted by the size of the family (compared to the unweighted case). A
higher value of v reduces the aggregate welfare costs across tax reforms and SWFs  because although the
total demand reductions are among highest in aggregate terms at higher consumption levels, the eﬀects
are outweighed by lower marginal utility  falling by more than 95 percent if v = 3 as compared to the
case of logarithmic utility.
v 1 2 3
CT25 -0.184 -0.008 -0.000
CT50 -0.361 -0.015 -0.000
CT25+VAT -0.957 -0.048 -0.002
CT50+VAT -1.128 -0.055 -0.002
VAT -0.774 -0.039 -0.001
(a) Unweighted: SWFa
v 1 2 3
CT25 -0.420 -0.013 -0.000
CT50 -0.827 -0.026 -0.001
CT25+VAT -2.146 -0.082 -0.002
CT50+VAT -2.537 -0.095 -0.003
VAT -1.730 -0.067 -0.002
(b) Weighted: SWFb
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Table 10
Aggregate welfare losses by revenue recycling scenario, percentage
This table summarizes the eﬀects of full revenue recycling  through lump sum transfers and upticks in
child and unemployment beneﬁt respectively  for the cases of the carbon tax of ¿25 tCO2 (implemented
both with and without VAT reform) and VAT reform, under the posited forms of SWF given by SWFa
and SWFb. It conﬁrms that such expenditure measures have strong potential to limit aggregate welfare
costs. In the case of the unweighted SWF, SWFa, unemployment beneﬁt is the most eﬀective mechanism
among those considered (abstracting from any labour market eﬀects), yielding aggregate welfare gains;
while lump sum transfers to households are preferred to child beneﬁt increases (across scenarios and
degrees of inequality aversion). In the case of the weighted SWF, SWFb, the scope for Dalton improving
indirect tax reform appears more prevalent, with signiﬁcant opportunities across all the revenue recycling
options analysed.
v 1 2 3
No Recycling -0.184 -0.008 -0.000
Lump Sum 0.057 0.011 0.001
Child beneﬁt -0.029 -0.001 0.000
Unemployment beneﬁt 0.154 0.020 0.001
(a) Carbon tax ¿25, SWFa
v 1 2 3
No Recycling -0.420 -0.013 -0.000
Lump Sum 0.028 0.013 0.001
Child beneﬁt 0.125 0.008 0.000
Unemployment beneﬁt 0.044 0.020 0.001
(b) Carbon tax ¿25, SWFb
v 1 2 3
No Recycling -0.957 -0.048 -0.002
Lump Sum 0.263 0.040 0.002
Child beneﬁt -0.208 -0.021 -0.001
Unemployment beneﬁt 0.559 0.055 0.002
(c) Carbon tax ¿25 +VAT, SWFa
v 1 2 3
No Recycling -2.146 -0.082 -0.002
Lump Sum 0.137 0.048 0.003
Child beneﬁt 0.505 0.008 -0.000
Unemployment beneﬁt -0.024 0.046 0.002
(d) Carbon tax ¿25 +VAT, SWFb
v 1 2 3
No Recycling -0.774 -0.039 -0.001
Lump Sum 0.203 0.032 0.002
Child beneﬁt -0.168 -0.017 -0.001
Unemployment beneﬁt 0.473 0.048 0.002
(e) VAT, SWFa
v 1 2 3
No Recycling -1.730 -0.067 -0.002
Lump Sum 0.094 0.038 0.003
Child beneﬁt 0.409 0.007 -0.000
Unemployment beneﬁt 0.008 0.042 0.002
(f) VAT, SWFb
bution of CVs by expenditure decile across scenarios.92 These show that higher spending
households assume a greater degree of the absolute burden of indirect taxes, but that in
proportionate terms the costs are greater on low spending households.
6.5 Concluding remarks
Energy tax reform is urgently needed to both raise public revenues and deliver stated
commitments to reduce GHG emissions; in particular, such policies have the potential
to promote both greater conservation of energy and substitution from carbon based fuels
to cleaner alternatives (particularly important during a period of low fossil fuel prices,
despite recent advancements in renewable technologies such as solar).
The process of charging for GHG emissions has substantively begun with the introduc-
tion of the EU ETS in 2005. Coordinating the reinforcement and expansion of this scheme
with environmental levies on domestic fuels such as gas and gasoline  which are currently
exempt from environmental levies  is an important priority in this context.
While the economic eﬃciency case is compelling, the distributional consequences of
taxing basic commodities such as energy, are potentially concerning, because lower income
households are commonly more ﬁnancially reliant on these goods, and may have more
limited substitution possibilities than wealthier households (particularly in the short term).
Despite the emergence of these reform issues, detailed evidence on economic and welfare
impacts of policy implementation remains scant. A better understanding of the distribu-
tional implications of more rational taxation of energy is key to informing policy design,
and limiting the most serious inequities through appropriate expenditure policy adjust-
ments.
92 In a single equation study, Blow and Crawford (1997), ﬁnd that a 40 percent increase in excise duty, would require
average compensation equivalent to around 1 percent of total expenditure.
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Table 11
Distribution of compensating variation by expenditure decile
This table shows the distribution of CVs by expenditure decile. In each scenario, higher spending house-
holds assume a greater degree of the absolute burden of indirect taxes. A carbon tax of ¿25 tCO2, for
instance, is projected to cost a household at the 75th percentile of the expenditure distribution around ¿4
per week in welfare terms, roughly double that of the family at the 25th percentile. However, expressed
in proportion to total expenditure, the costs are greater on low spending households: a carbon tax of ¿25
tCO2, implemented in conjunction with VAT rate reform, would require compensation equal to 7 percent
of total weekly expenditure to maintain the welfare of the household at the 25th percentile, a ﬁgure which
falls to around 4 percent for the family at the 75th percentile. Broadly speaking, the degree of regressivity
is similar across reform scenarios.
CT25 CT50 CT25+VAT CT50+VAT VAT
1 0.55 1.04 3.85 4.31 3.32
2 1.01 1.93 6.02 6.87 5.04
3 1.44 2.79 7.77 9.02 6.37
4 1.75 3.40 8.45 9.98 6.79
5 1.96 3.83 9.36 11.08 7.51
6 2.32 4.55 11.18 13.23 9.00
7 2.79 5.48 11.87 14.34 9.24
8 3.06 6.03 13.63 16.34 10.77
9 3.56 7.05 14.42 17.58 11.11
10 4.51 8.94 17.67 21.70 13.50
(a) Mean weekly compensating variation by expenditure decile
(¿2008)
CT25 CT50 CT25+VAT CT50+VAT VAT
1 1.12 2.13 8.09 9.02 6.99
2 1.14 2.19 6.75 7.72 5.65
3 1.16 2.25 6.25 7.26 5.12
4 1.09 2.13 5.28 6.23 4.24
5 1.00 1.97 4.79 5.68 3.84
6 0.98 1.92 4.71 5.57 3.79
7 0.96 1.89 4.08 4.93 3.18
8 0.85 1.68 3.80 4.56 3.00
9 0.77 1.52 3.11 3.79 2.40
10 0.63 1.24 2.45 3.01 1.87
(b) Mean weekly compensating variation by expenditure decile
(percentage total expenditure)
This chapter demonstrates the large potential of carbon tax and VAT reform to help
curb emissions, but the substantial heterogeneity in the likely behavioural responses across
socioeconomic groups. It also highlights the possibility of complex and potentially un-
foreseen interaction eﬀects if these measures are implemented together, emphasising the
desirability of sequencing any reforms.
Carbon tax and VAT reform are also shown to have substantial revenue earning poten-
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tial, which is particularly valuable in the context of reducing the ﬁscal deﬁcit given the
increasingly apparent rigidities in public expenditures (budgets for health, education, de-
fence equipment, overseas aid and debt repayments are eﬀectively protected from further
retrenchment).
Ultimately, however, governments are concerned for public welfare (rather than narrow
economic impacts). In this regard, the sensitivity of utility losses identiﬁed above  to-
gether with the eﬃcacy of possible compensation mechanisms  to both the behavioural
structure of this analysis, and the precise form of the SWF, warrants particular regard by
policy makers considering changes in this area.
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7 CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE
EXTENSIONS
7.1 Limitations
A degree of circumspection is required when considering the merits of the various con-
tributions presented above, and planning for their future reinforcement and extension. In
this context, it is worth reminding oneself of the host of simplifying assumptions under-
pinning the theoretical modeling in Chapters 3 and 5 (many of which are nevertheless
common place in the literature).
The theoretical models are intended to facilitate insights into the relationship between
diﬀerent environmental eﬀects on the economy, and the inﬂuence of key supporting as-
sumptions, as part of eﬀorts to improve the development of climate and wider environ-
mental policy guidance. However, they are inevitably a simplistic representation of, for
example, the structure of the economy, technological development and household decision
making.
One particularly stern tenet is that of determinism, a criticism which applies broadly
in the climate change literature (Pindyck (2013), Stern (2013)). The dimensions of uncer-
tainty aﬀecting such dynamic control problems abound. They include, but are not limited
to: the magnitude of stocks, the nature and extent of externality eﬀects, the productivity
of investment returns, and even preference parameters.93
In terms of the underlying externality eﬀects, for example, an emerging literature has
studied the macroeconomic impacts of, and policy responses to, new patterns of natural
93 Arguably, economists are still searching for robust intellectual frameworks with which to analyse the implications of
climate change given the uncertainty which surrounds its possible eﬀects, including the small, but positive, possibility of
economic catastrophe (see, for example, Weitzman (2009, 2001)).
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disasters  emphasising the potentially important bearing that heightened climatic vari-
ability has on the certainty equivalent of investment returns (see, for example Bretschger
and Vinogradova (2014), Ikefuji and Hori (2012), Soretz (2007)).94
The role of policy in Chapters 3 and 5 is limited to tax-induced substitution between
natural and physical capital. As such, they ignore the potential macroeconomic eﬀects of
allocating resources to defensive technologies and behavioural changes, likely to be an
important component of the overall response to climate change (see, for example, Bosello
et al. (2009), Millner and Dietz (2015)).95
In terms of the representation of production, by incorporating a single fossil energy
good, the theoretical models employed do not capture potentially important inter-fuel
substitutions, for example between coal and natural gas, and increasingly, renewable en-
ergy sources (see, for example, Green (2009) for an overview of the market potential, cost
and systems implications of diﬀusing these technologies).96
94 Ikefuji and Hori (2012), for example, analyse a model in which pollution increases the occurrence rate of destructive
natural disasters. The authors ﬁnd that the optimal growth rate initially rises, but ultimately declines (since falling pro-
ductivity cannot be compensated for by faster human capital accumulation or more rapid convergence of the disaster risk).
Soretz (2007) ﬁnds that, if the variability of capital returns is inversely related to environmental quality, uncertainty has
an ambiguous impact on the optimal pollution level since the riskiness of environmental productivity reduces the certainty
equivalent of capital return. However, Bretschger and Vinogradova (2014) emphasise that the insights from these studies
are limited to simple expectational eﬀects in the presence of risk aversion given the assumption that environmental shocks
are idiosyncratic.
95 An extensive (and related) literature analyses the impacts of environmental policies on growth and employment. The
literature on green growth is generally mixed in its conclusions (and oftentimes subject to considerable deﬁnitional issues).
On balance, however, the productivity and employment potential of environmental policies are likely to be small at the
macroeconomic level and, in aggregate, negative - particularly in energy intensive economies (see, for example, Bowen
(2012), Elliott and Lindley (2014), Jones (2011)).
96 In exhaustible resource economics, such technologies are commonly modelled as a backstop. Heal (1976) demonstrates
that existence of a backstop  coupled with rising extraction costs, causes resource rent to fall over time as the switch point
draws closer. The inclusion of extraction costs (for simplicity, I have assumed these to be zero) has limited implications for
extraction pathways where these are a constant proportion of energy prices (Stiglitz (1976)), but would otherwise complicate
the analysis (for example, the shadow price of the resource increases more slowly if costs increase with cumulative extraction).
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In addition, the assumption of a single consumption good does not take account of
the potential for structural changes within an economy  for example, between energy
intensive manufacturing to cleaner forms of economic output such as in the tertiary sector
 which inﬂuence fossil fuel usage (changes which are increasingly in evidence today in
countries such as China).
Another key dimension of the climate change problem which is ignored here concerns
international aspects of climate policy. There is a large game theoretic literature which
analyses strategic interactions between nation states in the presence of free rider incentives
(see, for example, Barrett (2003), Bloch (1997), Finus (2001) and Rubio and Ulph (2006,
2008)).
This literature generally ﬁnds limited prospects for a stable and eﬀective climate coali-
tion, emphasising the likelihood of either narrow but deep or broad but shallow inter-
national agreements (and within heterogeneous frameworks, suggests the need for rather
unpalatable transfers from the most (commonly poor) to the least (mostly rich) aﬀected
countries).97
Thankfully, however, given the wide variation in abatement costs across countries
(OECD (2013a)), a number of research developments may oﬀer more promise of eﬀec-
tive future coalescence  following on from the recent international agreement in Paris98 
based on the possibility of multiple coalitions,as well as broader motivations for cooper-
ation (involving, for example, concerns over concepts of fairness) (see Hovi et al. (2015)
97 Coalition models, in which countries ﬁrst decide to participate in an agreement and subsequently choose abatement
levels to maximise the welfare of participants, ﬁnd the (Nash) equilibrium number of signatories is no greater than three. In
repeated game models, broad and deep commitments suﬀer stability issues because enforcement strategies (subsequent non
cooperation by other coalition members) are mutually harmful, weakening their credibility (Hovi et al. (2015)).
98 Note, however, that the commitments enshrined in this agreement are likely to be only partially implemented (see, for
example, George Monbiot writing in the Guardian 12 December 2015).
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for a recent review of a now voluminous literature).
Nevertheless, one important determinant of incentives to cooperative continues to con-
cern the risk that energy intensive, trade exposed, production could relocate to countries
outside a climate coalition. Although widely considered to be a key impediment to cooper-
ation (being often politically highly resonant), the literature generally ﬁnds weak empirical
evidence for pollution havens.99
7.2 Conclusions
This thesis is principally concerned with the economic implications of climate change,
which is one of the most pressing long run challenges of our time: Stern (2007) cogently
argue that emissions of GHGs constitute the greatest market failure the world has ever
seen. They conclude that, if unchecked, the overall costs of climate change would be
equivalent to a permanent loss of at least 5 percent of global income.
While the low discount rate which the authors apply to the future economic costs
remains the subject of much debate, the basic conclusion concerning the underlying se-
riousness of the issue appears sound: on current assessment, global surface temperatures
are likely to rise by 2.6-4.8 degrees C  a magnitude which risks large scale economic
disruption.
Determining, in economic terms, how seriously to take the problem is a key issue. This
question is embodied in the ongoing debate concerning the SCC  the economic damages
associated with a small increase in CO2 emissions  but is a challenging undertaking given
the complexity of the externality problem (although one which is diﬃcult for economists
99 In this context, the merits of imposing border tariﬀs on the carbon content of imports from non cooperating countries
have emerged in policy discourse (see Jones et al. (2013) for a discussion). While these are a potentially credible mechanism
for encouraging a broader coalition, they may be complex to administrate and potentially subverted in order to hide tariﬀs
or export subsidies.
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to ignore).
In this context, a recent debate in the literature has emerged concerning the quality of
the policy advice which is derived from IAMs, the central analytic tools underpinning such
assessments. Stern (2013) argues, for example, that the damage functions which determine
the external eﬀects of energy usage on the economy need to incorporate a broader set of
environment-economy interactions.
The other main component of these models is the welfare function. Here, the over-
whelming focus in the recent research literature has been on the appropriate discount
rate  clearly an important dimension to managing this (and other) long term resource
allocation problems,
However, a number of important issues have thus far received little attention in this
context including, for example, analysis of interactions between production externalities
and diﬀerent approaches to welfare aggregation (drawing on important lessons from the
social choice literature) and consumption habits (increasingly commonplace in modern
macro economics).
Chapters 3 - 5 constitute concerted eﬀorts to respond to these challenges by analysing
a range of potential environmental eﬀects on the economy, including on capital formation,
demographics and consumption patterns (reﬂecting the fact that energy use is likely to
impose multiple social costs on the economy), thereby exposing new insights into the
resulting eﬀects under particular assumptions over savings and preferences.
Chapter 3 focusses speciﬁcally on the direct eﬀects of climate change on physical capi-
tal (highlighted as a priority area for model development by Stern (2013)): buildings and
infrastructure, for example, are expected to suﬀer additional damages from coastal ﬂood-
ing, more powerful wind storms, and subsidence due to more intense rainfall or melting
permafrost (Field et al. (2014)); while water scarcity could make some settlements or
infrastructure unsustainable.
A few studies to date have analysed these eﬀects (Fankhauser and Tol (2005), Moore
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and Diaz (2015)). However, these contributions, by employing production functions with
only capital and labour, ignore potentially important interactions with the exhaustible
character of fossil fuel inputs, which arise because more rapid depreciation aﬀects the
Hotelling portfolio condition (by lowering net returns to investment).
Only Bretschger and Valente (2011) have studied this linkage. The authors ﬁnd that
spillovers aﬀecting capital durability inﬂuence the level of output but not its growth rate.
However, they do not consider the critical role that assumptions over savings behaviour
play in this insight, nor questions relating to ﬁscal policy design (or interactions herewith).
In this context, I show that:
 the ﬁnding of Bretschger and Valente (2011) rests crucially on assumptions that inter
temporal consumption and savings decision making are forward looking. If savings
behaviour follows a Keynesian rule of thumb, for example, such capital linkages are
shown to have negative eﬀects on the time path of output in steady state;100
 such direct capital channels have non trivial macroeconomic eﬀects, potentially re-
sulting in a fall in output growth, for example, on the order of 0.05 percent for the
Keynesian model under plausible parameter values;
 spillovers aﬀecting capital durability warrant a less steeply declining corrective tax
path; and,
 distortions are substantially exacerbated by the presence of an income tax, but are
unaﬀected by public ﬁnancing requirements if net investment is exempted from the
tax base (assuming here that revenues are recycled in lump sum fashion).
100 The consumption Euler is subject to wider empirical issues, including excess sensitivity to income (Campbell and
Mankiw (1998, 1991). Scholars increasingly emphasise, for example, the role of ﬁnancial innovation and increased liquidity
of housing wealth as a determinant of consumption growth patterns in the UK and US (Muellbauer and Murphy (1990),
Duca et al. (2012)).
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Chapter 4 focuses on the external eﬀects of resource exploitation on demographics. Energy
combustion is a major source of air pollutants, an issue which has come into sharp focus
with the recent US corporate scandal involving emissions from diesel cars (and red alerts
over smog in China which prompted mass closure of schools and the imposition of vehicle
restrictions).101
Pollutants from fossil fuels are strongly linked to human mortality rates in both the
epidemiological and social scientiﬁc literature: Lim et al. (2013), for example, attribute
around 7 percent of global disease to ambient air pollution, around 80 percent of which is
due to energy combustion (GEA (2012)).
Links between the climate externality and mortality rates have also been established
with some conﬁdence, for example as a result of more frequent and intense heat waves, or
through more proﬂigate spread of tropical diseases, such as dengue of malaria. Despite this,
growth models featuring exhaustible resources have thus far tended to assume population
growth to be exogenous.
Notable exceptions in this context include studies of interactions between resource
scarcity, demographics and technological development (Peretto and Valente (2015), Schäfer
(2014a)). In contrast, this chapter focuses on the macroeconomic and policy implications
of mortality eﬀects (and wider productive externalities), and on the role of preferences
over welfare aggregation. In particular, it demonstrates that:
 spillovers aﬀecting mortality have countervailing macroeconomic eﬀects to those aris-
ing from capital durability studied in the previous chapter. The former dominate in
an optimal growth setting, but are parameter dependent in the Keynesian model;
101 This issue is increasingly shaping policy in developing countries: in 2013, for example, the Chinese government published
an Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution which aims to reduce PM10 concentrations by 10 per cent
from 2012 levels nationwide by 2017.
124
 if the social planner places positive weight on aggregate (rather than average) felicity
levels, mortality spillovers potentially imply a 'u' shaped tax path, a policy prescrip-
tion which diverges from the basic downward sloping paths identiﬁed in the resource
tax literature; and,
 an exogenous mortality hazard unambiguously increases steady state interest and
depletion rates, but in an endogenous setting, the eﬀect of the demographic spillover
on interest rates is dependent on interactions between the resulting incentives on the
young to save and the Hotelling condition.
Chapter 5 focusses on potential spillovers from energy use to consumption, and their
implications for macroeconomic and policy development. It contributes to an emerging
body of research highlighting the potential impact of climate change on residential energy
demand (Amato et al. (2005), Rosenthal et al. (1995), Ruth and Lin (2006), Scott et al.
(1994)); in particular, it demonstrates that a spillover aﬀecting the division of oil resources
from consumption to production (as might be expected in the cold and temperate climates)
has:
 positive implications for output growth and depletion levels due to faster accumula-
tion of productive capital, provided inter-temporal substitution is suﬃciently inelas-
tic; and,
 previously unexplored implications for diﬀerential taxation of resources across usages.
The chapter also analyses the macroeconomic and policy implications of fossil fuel usage in
the presence of consumption habits: despite the growing popularity of consumption habits
within mainstream macroeconomics (Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Fuhrer (2000), Smets
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andWouters (2007)), these innovations have been almost universally overlooked in resource
economics (Schäfer and Valente (2014a, 2011), Zhang (2013)). I show that:
 introducing an external habit of the form adopted by Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
causes steady state depletion and interest rates to rise provided the climate change
externality is not too large; and,
 consumption externalities interact with spillovers to capital durability discussed pre-
viously, inﬂuencing the appropriate tax policy response.
Chapters 3 - 5 analyse macroeconomic and policy issues associated with resource exploita-
tion within a highly aggregated framework, featuring a single representative agent. Such
approaches are helpful in approaching this important global problem.
However, distributional issues abound, both within and across countries. In this con-
text, concerns over potentially adverse consequences on the welfare of low income groups
 which are particularly reliant on goods such as energy  are potentially key impediments
to critical national level policy reforms which are likely to increase their relative prices.
Detailed household level analysis is thus required to assess the economic and welfare
costs of more rational taxation of energy goods (including some of the more practical impli-
cations of uncertainties over preference forms), and to inform policy makers on appropriate
expenditure policy adjustments to avoid the most series inequities.
However, available evidence on detailed distributional aspects of energy tax reforms in
the UK  particularly those which capture the eﬀects of potentially divergent behavioural
responses across socioeconomic groups  are surprisingly limited (Crawford et al. (1993,
2011), Johnson et al. (1990), and Symons et al. (1994)).
Chapter 6 contributes to this existing stock of research on the economic and welfare
eﬀects of carbon and VAT reforms in a number of key regards:
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 ﬁrst, it is only comprehensive behavioural study of carbon taxes to have been con-
ducted since the liberalisation of electricity and natural gas markets, and to analyse
tax scenarios which are consistent with current stated government policy guidelines;
 second, it provides the ﬁrst money metric estimate of the welfare costs of carbon
tax incidence in the UK, and to analyse the implications of diﬀerent approaches to
aggregation within the SWF; and,
 third, as far as the author is aware, it is the ﬁrst analysis of interactions between
VAT and carbon tax reforms.
In terms of empirical ﬁndings, demographic variables are shown to inﬂuence consumption
substantially. Budget shares to electricity and gas, for example, increase with the age of
the household head, while that of gasoline observes the opposite demographic trend.
There is also some evidence to suggest declining expenditure shares in natural gas
and gasoline from the mid 1990s and early 2000s respectively, reﬂecting improvements in
residential insulation, vehicle eﬃciency, public transport and communications technologies.
Budget elasticities vary by household for all commodities (emphasising the value of
highly disaggregated analysis), and are particularly widely dispersed for electricity (which
is an inferior good for more than 25 percent of households in the sample). Among the fuels,
natural gas is on average the most price inelastic, with behavioural responses diminishing
at higher expenditure levels, particularly for petrol.
In the case of carbon taxes, larger proportionate reductions are predicted among lower
spending households for gas and petrol. This heterogeneity increases if VAT and carbon
tax reforms are implemented in combination.
Unifying VAT treatment at the standard rate increases sample revenues by around 18
percent, equivalent to additional potential revenue of around ¿22 billion. The opportuni-
ties from carbon taxes are here shown to be quite material, at least in the short term: a
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levy of ¿50 tCO2, for example, is projected to increase tax revenues by on the order of
¿10 billion.
The welfare costs of energy tax reform are also found to be substantial, particularly for
scenarios involving both VAT and carbon tax reform, and in the cases of an aggregate util-
itarian SWF or lower degrees of inequality aversion (highlighting the practical importance
of aggregation issues discussed previously).
The detailed behavioural framework adopted has an important bearing on the mag-
nitude of assessed welfare costs, which are generally on the order of 4-18 percent lower
compared with estimates based on analysis in which demand is invariant to prices and
incomes.
Expenditure measures are shown have strong potential to mitigate these costs, and diﬀer
according the adopted revenue allocation mechanism. Further extending an important
theme of the thesis, the form of the social welfare function also has an important inﬂuence,
with the scope for aggregate welfare gains generally greater in the case of a weighted SWF.
7.3 Extensions
A large number of possible future extensions to the theoretic work undertaken thus far
merit consideration. For the sake of brevity, I identify three broad areas:
The ﬁrst concerns strengthening the empirical foundations for the postulated spillover
eﬀects and preference forms. For example, the numerical results presented in Chapter 3
could be bolstered by a more systematic analysis of the sensitivity of capital durability to
changing weather conditions across diﬀerent asset classes.102 The development of empirical
evidence base surrounding the existence, and form, of consumption habits  which remains
102 Achieving a more robust aggregate parameter estimate for θ would inevitably be data dependent, requiring information
on capital and maintenance costs and operating lives (and beneﬁting from variation across climates for similar asset classes).
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limited despite the now broad diﬀusion of these preference structures  presents another
fertile opportunity.103
A second area for potential empirical follow up concerns the validity of the Hotelling
portfolio result. Despite the prevalence of this assumption in the literature, robust empir-
ical evidence remains lacking. This is in part due to the fundamental unobservability of
scarcity rents, and the absence of robust production and cost related data (available over a
suﬃciently extended period and at reasonable degree of disaggregation) for the extractive
industries.104
Third, it may be desirable to analyse policy issues relating to mortality spillovers within
a model of endogenous fertility. However, one issue that could limit such an enquiry is
the observed failure of these models to achieve stable, positive population growth in the
absence of ﬁrst best birth taxes (Spataro and Renström (2011, 2012)). Nevertheless,
constrained policy insights remain relevant in this context, in part due to the political
constraints on imposing child rearing or birth related poll taxes.
In addition, I am currently considering three possible extensions to the empirical work
undertaken in Chapter 6:
First, an analysis on energy tax interaction eﬀects with employment markets through a
relaxation of the separability assumption between consumption and labour supply. Only
Brännlund and Nordstrom (2004) have sought to address this issue as part of a micro
103 Evidence for or against the formation of energy consumption habits is a potentially interesting subset of this topic.
An enquiry on this topic has not been pursued as part of micro econometric analysis above due to identiﬁcation issues in
repeated cross section.
104 In light of the underlying commercial sensitivities, two possible research strategies bear particular merit. The ﬁrst
involves the identiﬁcation of scarce resources outside the sphere of the extractive industries for which data on prices, costs
and determinants of demand are more readily available (one idea might be to analyse the prices of historic properties, for
example). A second course of action could be to seek closer engagement with one or more industry participants, with a view
to utilising detailed production data subject to the necessary anonymization of the assets to which they relate.
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econometric study on carbon taxes.105
Second, a behavioural analysis of energy tax incidence studies in a developing country
setting, which contribute to an increasing share of GHG emissions and where potential
welfare issues are most acute given lower levels of prosperity. Research has recently begun
to emerge using input-output models (Blackman et al. (2009); Datta (2010)), or CGE
models with heterogeneous consumers (Devarajan et al. (2009); Yusuf (2007)). However,
these fall short of the fully behavioural gold standard attempted above.106
Third, a study into interactions between energy taxation and wider long term structural
changes such as ageing (perhaps the largest single ﬁscal challenge facing many countries
according to IMF (2015)). The empirical results presented above suggest important age
related determinants of energy demand which could be explored more deeply in a future
enquiry.
105 The simplest approach to endogenizing the labour-leisure choice is to introducing a time endowment into the budget
constraint (a key challenge being to estimate its appropriate size and value), and subsequently estimate cross price elasticities
with leisure goods. Alternatively, one could seek to identify and estimate a discrete choice model of labour supply. It could
therefore be interesting to explore whether the large variations in energy and carbon prices in recent years facilitates such
an estimation strategy.
106 A key problem is the infrequent collection of household survey data, which means that price variation over time can be
limited. Pashardes et al. (2014), for example, incorporate heterogeneity in household preferences such that eﬀective price
changes diﬀer across households, permitting system estimation from a more limited set of household expenditure surveys.
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A APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
Lemma 3.1
Totally diﬀerentiating equation (3.2) and (3.3) with respect to time, and combining
with (3.4), (3.5), (3.7) and yields the following equations of motion in depletion:
(a1 + a2) xˆ (t) = h+ a2n− (1− s)r(t)+
j (1− a1) + (a1 + a2 −m)x(t)− z(t) (A.1)
Totally diﬀerentiating equation (3.3) and (3.6) with respect to time, and substituting
for (3.1), (3.4), (3.5) and (3.7) yields the following equations of motion in interest rates:
(a1 + a2) rˆ (t) = h+ a2n−Or(t)−
mx(t) + j (1− a1)− (1− a1 − a2) z(t) (A.2)
where O =
(
1− a1 − a2
(
1− s
a1
))
.
Cross substituting between (A.1) and (A.2), evaluated at their stationary loci, yields
expressions (3.8) and (3.9). By inspection, these exist under the stated condition, a1 > s.
By equation (A.1), the stationary depletion locus is downward sloping when represented
in x, r space and generates a vertical force of attraction (being otherwise upward sloping
with 'knife-edge' properties).
By equation (A.2), the stationary interest rate locus is downward sloping since the
adverse productivity eﬀect squeezes rental payments (and exerts a horizontal force of
attraction). This is due to self-stabilizing character of the capital-output ratio in the
Solow model, which follows from the concavity of output with respect to capital.
The steady state oil and capital market, given by expressions (3.8) (3.9), are thus
saddle-path stable in the case of both strong and moderate climate externalities.
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Lemma 3.5
Totally diﬀerentiating equations (3.2) and (3.3) with respect to time, and combining
with (3.11), (3.5), and (3.7) yields the following equations of motion in depletion:
(a1 + a2) xˆ(t) = h+ a2n+ (a1 + a2 + (1− a1) θ −m)x(t)−
(1− s) r(t) + j (1− a1)− z(t) (A.3)
Totally diﬀerentiating equation (3.3) and (3.6) with respect to time, and substituting
for (3.11), (3.12) and (3.5) yields the following equations of motion in interest rates:
(a1 + a2) rˆ (t) = h+ a2n−Or(t)+ ((1− a1) θ −m)x(t)+
+j (1− a1)− (1− a1 − a2) z(t) (A.4)
Cross substituting between (A.3) and (3.9), evaluated at their stationary loci, yields
expressions (3.13) and (3.14).
θ > 0 reduces net of depreciation returns as depletion levels rise, lowering stationary
values of x for any given gross interest rate. Represented in x, r space, this eﬀect is
characterised by a clockwise pivot in the x˙ = 0 locus, which is downward sloping under
a stricter condition than in the baseline model: m > a1 + a2 + (1− a1) θ. In addition,
the capital spillover causes stationary values of r to fall more slowly with higher depletion
rates, ﬂattening the extraction time path. Thus the stationary interest rate locus also
pivots clockwise in x, r space.
If m < θ (1− a1), the stationary interest rate locus is upward sloping and exerts a
horizontal forces of repulsion  while the depletion locus is also upward sloping, and
subject to vertical forces of repulsion  leading to an unstable steady state.
Empirical evidence on direct capital-environment linkages
This section summarizes the current state of the empirical knowledge base concerning
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possible linkages between climate change and capital durability. In general terms, eco-
nomic analysis remains scarce, and no study is comprehensive in terms of its coverage of
the possible impacts. However, available evidence suggests that depreciation rates could
commonly be raised, and by a substantial amount, for a broad class of assets, including
buildings and infrastructures.107
Although studies diﬀer widely in terms of scope, three core methodological elements
exist in common. First, future trends in local climatic conditions, such as surface tem-
peratures, sea levels, precipitation and/or wind speeds, are forecast under diﬀerent GHG
emissions scenarios using meteorological simulation tools, known as General (or Regional)
Circulation Models (GCM/ /RCMs). Variance in weather conditions is most commonly
assumed to follow historical patterns (e.g. Chinowsky et al. (2013), Jollands et al. (2007),
Larsen et al. 2008) and Nemry and Demirel (2012)), although some studies attempt to
simulate changes in the frequency and distribution of weather events (e.g. Emmanuel
(2011), Feyen et al. (2012), Kunreuther et al. (2013), Ranger and Niehoerster (2012), and
Raible et al. (2012)).
Second, estimates are formed regarding the value and location of future assets, based
on simple extrapolations from existing infrastructure data. Third, assumptions are formed
regarding the vulnerability of the assets exposed to this adjusted proﬁle, drawing either
on available engineering evidence (e.g. Chinowsky et al. (2013), Larsen et al. (2008), and
Nemry and Demirel (2012)) or statistical estimates of the relationship between weather
variables and capital costs (e.g. Jollands et al. (2007)). Assumptions regarding how these
107 At the macroeconomy level, capital depreciation rates on the order of 5 percent annually are commonly assumed, based
principally on evidence from the US (Barro and Martin (1995)). Although the subject of limited research, depreciation
rates may be higher in developing countries: imported technologies may be unsuitable to the physical environment in less
developed regions, or more poorly maintained due to capacity limitations. Alternatively, less durable goods might be favored
by more ﬁnancially constrained investors (Bu (2006) and Udry and Anagol (2006)). In addition, the sensitivity of capital
accumulation to climate change may be greater in developing countries. These issues are untreated due to the lack of
empirical evidence.
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risks may be mitigated by defensive behaviour are summarized in each case below (I focus
on residual capital losses wherever possible).
Chinowsky et al. (2013), Jollands et al. (2006), Larsen et al. (2008) and Nemry and
Demirel (2012)) analyse the inﬂuence of climate change on transportation infrastructures.
These studies identify rising patterns of heat and precipitation related stresses and declin-
ing capital costs from freeze-thaw eﬀects. Studies of the EU and US, for example, ﬁnd
large variance in the magnitude of the overall eﬀects across countries and states (Chi-
nowsky et al. (2013), Nemry and Demirel (2012)). Overall, however, available studies
tend to predict increased maintenance costs aﬀecting road networks on the order of 1-9
percent, depending on the nature and extent of the climatic changes expected at the local
level and assumptions over defensive expenditures.
Chinowsky et al. (2013), for example, simulate the eﬀects of moderate climate change
across regions of the contiguous US on road maintenance costs using a GCM developed
for the Environmental Protection Agency. By spatially mapping these eﬀects (at a 2.5
degree squared resolution) to a detailed inventory of state level roads sourced from the
Department of Transportation (excluding interstate highways), and exploiting functional
relationships between precipitation, heat stress (and freeze-thaw) levels and road resurfac-
ing requirements employed by engineers  and assuming that more temperature resistant
asphalt binder is used where cost eﬀective (although unpaved roads are assumed to remain
unpaved)  the authors estimate a 2 percent increase in annual maintenance costs by 2075.
Nemry and Demirel (2012) undertake a similar study of climate change impacts on
EU road infrastructure. Using a very similar methodology to Chinowsky et al. (2013)
 including, for example, assumptions over the adaptation of asphalt  the authors ﬁnds
that average net road maintenance costs are expected to rise on the order of 1 percent.
This ﬁgure is somewhat lower than Chinowsky et al. (2013), despite the slightly more
pessimistic emissions growth scenarios (Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES)
A1B/ Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5) employed, which is likely to to be at
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least partly due to the exclusion of unpaved roads from the analysis (which are more
sensitive to changing conditions).
By contrast, Jollands et al. (2007) estimate the statistical relationship between road re-
pair costs reported by relevant public agencies and precipitation in Hamilton, New Zealand
(other weather variables such as wind speed and temperature were found to be insigniﬁ-
cant). These structural estimates provide a basis for assessing the eﬀects of climate change
under high and low emissions scenarios between 2005-2030 (this implicitly assumes the
cost eﬀectiveness of defensive expenditures is constant). By 2030, the study projects a 6-9
percent increase in maintenance costs using a GCM developed by the Commonwealth Sci-
entiﬁc and Industrial Research Organisation, and little change under the Hadley scenarios
using the model of the UK Meteorological Oﬃce.
Larsen et al. (2008) analyse the costs of changes in permafrost, ﬂooding risk and coastal
erosion due to climate change on the future costs of maintaining public infrastructure
in Alaska, including transportation and energy related structures. The authors simulate
changes in mean temperature and precipitation in six diﬀerent Alaskan localities under the
IPCCs A1B scenario using a suite of three GCMs in (considered middle of the road in terms
of future emissions growth) and map these eﬀects to a database of infrastructure asset
values (from public agency and insurance reports).108 In the case of road infrastructures,
the authors predict a 5-6 percent increase in road construction and maintenance costs
for the period up to 2030, and a 10-12 percent increase in the costs of maintaining and
replacing infrastructure across all asset classes.
A further branch of the literature has analysed the potential eﬀects of climate change
108 Their adaptation assumptions are crude and more pessimistic than Chinowsky et al. (2013) and Nemry and Demirel
(2012), but perhaps not unreasonably so given the 'lumpier' investment proﬁle of the assets under analysis. Speciﬁcally,
they determine that cost eﬀective changes in the location or construction of each piece of infrastructure only takes place
once climatic change reduces the life of a given asset by 20 percent (and more resilient replacement capital is 5 percent more
expensive).
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on capital losses due to extreme weather conditions. Such events are already hugely costly:
average annual insured losses from non geo-physical weather related events between 1990-
2010 is estimated to be on the order of $(2008)35 billion, roughly two-thirds of which
relate to non tropical storms and ﬂoods (Barthel and Neumeyer (2012)).109 Moreover,
these statistics cover a small fraction of the true picture, due to the limited diﬀusion
of insurance in developing countries, commonly just a few percent of the total value of
exposed assets (Mills (2005)).
Trends in insured losses due to climatic factors have not yet been robustly identiﬁed,110
perhaps partly due to data availability and statistical challenges associated with ensuring
their comparability across time given changes in wealth, population, and the physical
exposure of assets to weather events ((Pielke and Landsea (1998), Neumayer and Barthel
(2011)).111 However potential future patterns of extreme weather events are of more
concern in this context.112
109 Insured losses are those against which claims have successfully been levied by insured parties. A broader concept of
economic losses is most commonly analysed in the literature (see, for example, Miller et al. (2008), Pielke and Landsea
(1998), Barredo (2009)), but is of limited use in this context since these capture a wide range of direct and indirect eﬀects
(many of which lie outside the sphere of interest here), and are not subject consistent reporting or veriﬁcation (being self
reported rather than the outcome of industry loss appraisal procedures).
110 Barthel and Neumayer (2012), the only available analysis of global insured losses, fail to identify a robust trend (albeit
for a short however the times series). Studies for the US, for example have tended to identify rising patterns of costs
(Barthel and Neumayer (2012); Changnon (2007, 2008, 2009a,b). However, time series studies of weather events in Europe
and Australia have generally been more equivocal in their conclusions (Barredo et al. (2012), Barthel and Neumayer (2012),
Crompton and McAneney (2008), Kunz et al. (2009)). Importantly, the ﬁndings of all such studies are sensitive to a range
of factors including the choice of normalization and assumptions over defensive measures.
111 Data limitations have restricted extensive consideration of spatial asset variance. Ward and Ranger (2010) ﬁnd that
increased geographical exposure of assets may at least partly explain patterns of rising economic losses.
112 GCM simulations predict a wide range of potential changes, which can  with diﬀering degrees of conﬁdence  be
related to GHG emissions. Summarizing these, for example, IPCC (2014) predicts that extremely high seasonal sea levels
and and summer heat waves (particularly in Europe) are extremely likely (with strong causal links to human activities).
More frequent and intense patterns of heavy rainfall are also forecast, with reasonable causal links to climate change. The
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Analyses into the relationship between insured (mostly property related) losses and
wind damages, indicate that more powerful storms in Europe due to climate change could
lead to increases in the expected loss to value ratio on the order of 10-50 percent by
the second half of the 20th Century (Donat et al. (2011), Gerstengarbe et al. (2013),
Leckebusch et al. (2007), Pinto et al. (2012, 2010, 2007), Schwiertz et al. (2010)).
Assuming actuarially fair annual insurance premiums of around 0.15 percent of asset
values, and commonly maintained assumptions over building depreciation rates of around
2 percent per annum, this represents an proportionate increase in capital erosion on the
order of 0.75-3.5 percent.113
Considerably less consensus exists among studies of potential changes in hurricane
related capital damages, largely due to fundamental ambiguities in the underlying me-
teorology. Kunreuther et al. (2013), Raible et al. (2012), and Ranger and Niehoerster
(2012), for example, found conﬂicting signs in the damages across diﬀerent model projec-
tions in the Atlantic.114 A more limited evidence base also highlights the potential for
increased losses from typhoons in Asia, perhaps on the order of 20-40 percent by mid to
late century.115
nature of changes to hurricane and cyclone activity and causal links with climate change remain highly uncertain.
113 The ﬁndings are somewhat sensitive to whether the local damage threshold  commonly a cubic function of the diﬀerence
between maximum recorded gusts and the 98th percentile wind speed in a given locality  is adjusted for the new climate
adjusted wind speed (a crude measure of adaptive behaviour). Association of British Insurers (ABI) (2005) and Dailey et
al. (2009) also predict substantial increases in storm related losses in the UK and Europe (on the order of 14-35 percent)
but do not explicitly report insured asset values or premiums, making the results diﬃcult to interpret in this context.
114 Nevertheless, capital eﬀects have the potential to be important: Entergy (2010) for example analyses the implications
of hurricanes, subsidence and sea level rise in 77 counties across US gulf states using a simpliﬁed version of the Swiss Re
hazard speciﬁc loss functions for energy, transport and residential infrastructure. The study predicts an increase in capital
losses of $(2008) 5-10 billion by 2030, of which nearly 90 percent is oﬀshore energy and residential infrastructure. Assuming
a 4 percent average depreciation rate on these combined assets  reﬂecting a shorter operating life in the oﬀshore sector
relative to buildings  this represents a roughly 9-15 percent increase in capital replacement requirements.
115 ABI (2005), for example, ﬁnd increases in wind-related insured losses from extreme Japanese typhoons by around two
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Coastal and ﬂuvial ﬂooding is another potentially important channel for climate related
capital losses. Economic analyses are inherently more challenging due to the additional
dimensionality of the ﬂooding problem (depth!), the complexities of water ﬂows within
individual basins, and the generally limited availability of data relating to ﬂood defence
costs and capabilities. As such aggregate studies are inherently based on (often grossly)
simplifying assumptions.116 A number of studies take up the challenge for Europe and the
US (see, for example, Feyen et al. (2012), Hall et al. (2005), Ntelekos et al. (2010) and
Wobus et al. (2013)).
Wobus et al. (2013), for example, analyse the relationship between observed precipita-
tion trends from weather stations and ﬂood damages within 99 diﬀerent subregions of the
contiguous US. Due to concerns over data quality (being largely self reported), the authors
estimate a logistic regression to determine the probability of a weather event falling in the
top 25 percent of the distribution of damages, using trend variables (with the conditionally
expected loss estimated using a Monte Carlo approach which randomly picks (over a 1000
runs) from the uppermost 25th percentile of the empirical distribution of ﬂood damages
for the particular sub region). Assuming no change in the built environment, or in the
value of aﬀected buildings and property, expected annual losses are estimated to be $747
million per year by the end of the century (a 31 percent increase from current levels).
Feyen et al. (2012) present a more sophisticated study into the costs of river ﬂooding in
thirds to total $(2004)25  34 billion. Dailey et al. (2009) project increases in insured typhoon losses of 20 percent for a 2
degree temperature rise (likely by around the 2040s), rising to 32 per cent for a +4°C scenario. However, these results should
be interpreted with particular caution due to the narrow insured asset base in China (which may be misrepresentative of
aggregate hazards due to selection bias issues), and the absence of defensive expenditures in the modelling approach.
116 Ntelekos et al. (2010), for example, present a toy model in which future ﬂood costs are an exponential function of
growth, linearly transposed by emissions, the rate of urbanization, and an initial condition set to current ﬂood damages.
The results are somewhat limited in their worth but suggest that, for a long run growth rate of 1.5 per cent, the diﬀerence
between high and low emissions scenarios (SRES A2/B1) implies additional ﬂood related costs of around $(2008) 3 billion
annually by the end of the 20th century.
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the EU. Simulating the eﬀects of high (SRES A2) and low (SRES B2) emissions scenarios
using models developed by the Danish Meteorological Institute and the Rossby Centre,
the authors extract data on ﬂood inundation in each locality. Critically, and in contrast
to previous studies, these data capture changes in the variance of rainfall patterns. They
are transformed into direct monetary damage using country speciﬁc ﬂood depth-damage
functions and land use information, with population exposure determined by overlaying
the ﬂood inundation information with data on population density.117 For the EU27 as a
whole, they predict a 2.5-3.5 fold increase in current expected annual damages of ¿6.4
billion to ¿1421.5 billion (in constant prices of 2006) by the end of this century, depending
on the scenario.
Interpreting these ﬁnding for environmentally related depreciation rates naturally must
be broached with some trepidation. Feyen (2012), for example  technically the most rig-
orous study available  projects increases in annual insured losses due to ﬂoods of between
0.6 and 4.2 billion (2006) pounds for the UK. Assuming, for simplicity, the residential hous-
ing market and diﬀusion of buildings insurance remains constant at today's levels (¿4500
billion and around 2/3rd of all households respectively), and a 2 percent depreciation rate,
this represents an increase in that rate of between 1 and 7 percent.
No assessment of aggregate aﬀects across asset classes or climatic eﬀects is available,
and studies of particular markets and climatic eﬀects are inevitably subject to considerable
uncertainty relating to predictions over future climatic and economic conditions. Yet it
117 Due to the absence of reliable and comparable ﬂood defence data, the authors develop a simple rule to determine the
degree ﬂood protection (which truncates the damage function up to a occurrence probability threshold determined by a
functional relationship between per capita GDP relative to the EU average. Hall et al. (2005) employ a more sophisticated
treatment of ﬂood protection expenditures (in which the probability of failure by each defensive section for a given load
is directly estimated and interpolated for revised climate conditions). They predict notable increases in annual economic
ﬂood damages over the next century in the UK under a range of future development scenarios (however, the inﬂuence of
emissions is not isolated speciﬁcally). The UK Government's Foresight Programme estimated that global warming of 3°C to
4°C could increase ﬂood damage costs from 0.1 per cent up to 0.4 percent of GDP. Somewhat counter intuitively, much of
the investment in ﬂood defences and coastal protection was predicted in rural coastal areas (Foresight (2004)).
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follows from the analysis of the available studies above that there nonetheless appears to be
a reasonable degree of conﬁdence that changing climatic conditions substantively inﬂuences
capital durability: overall depreciation might be expected to increase, proportionately, on
the order of perhaps 1-10 percent in the long run (within say 20-50 years).
Lemma 3.6
Utility maximizing behaviour requires that the discounted marginal utility of consump-
tion should equal the shadow value of income in each time period: e−itc−v(t) = λ(t)N(t).
Taking the time derivative of this ﬁrst order condition yields:
−λˆ(t) = i+ n+ vcˆ(t) (A.5)
Thus the marginal utility of consumption should decline over time at the same rate as
the shadow value of income.
Critically, optimum programmes for capital and oil extraction satisfy the following
conditions:
0 =
δV
δK(t)
− δ
δ(t)
(
δV
δK˙(t)
)
=⇒ −λˆ(t) = r(t)− j − θx(t) (A.6)
0 =
δV
δS(t)
− δ
δ(t)
(
δV
δS˙(t)
)
=⇒ −λˆ(t) = Pˆ (t) (A.7)
Equations (A.6) and (A.7) state that the shadow value of stocks of capital and oil at
each date must equal the time derivatives of the shadow values of investment in oil and
capital respectively. Combining equations (A.6) and Equations (A.5) yields the stated
Euler equation in consumption.
175
Proposition 3.2
This model requires an additional equation determining the evolution in the ratio of
consumption to capital. This is derived by combining (A.6), (A.5) and (A.7) with the
budget constraint of the representative household and the marginal product given at (3.5),
and given by:
cˆ(t)− kˆ(t) = c(t)/k(t) + ((n+ j + θx(t)) (v − 1) + r(t)− i) /v − r(t)/a1 (A.8)
The remaining equations of motion of depletion, interest rates, consumption-capital
and output growth are given by:
(xˆ(t)− x(t)) (a1 + a2) = h+ a2n+
((1− a1) θ −m)x(t)− a1c(t)/k(t) + (1− a1) j − z(t) (A.9)
rˆ(t) (a1 + a2) = h+ ((1− a1) θ −m)x(t)+
((1− a1) θ −m)x(t)− a1c(t)/k(t) + (1− a1) j − z(t) (A.10)
Qˆ(t) = h− (m+ a1θ)x(t) + r(t)− a1 (c(t)/k(t) + j) + a2n+
(1− a1 − a2) Eˆ(t) (A.11)
where: R = (1−a1)(a1+a2)
a1
.
As before, θ causes the stationary depletion locus to pivot clockwise (in x, c/k space),
since gross returns fall with higher x: the Hotelling condition implies that lower net
returns raise growth for any stationary value of r. However, the capital spillover also
weakens incentives to save through the Ramsey eﬀect, pushing up gross interest rates for
any stationary growth rate (an anti-clockwise pivot in r, g space).
The solution to this system of 4 equations and 4 unknowns is given at (3.19)-(3.22)
(further guidance on these derivations is given below).
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Equation (3.19) is derived by solving (A.10) and (A.8) for r and c/k respectively at
their stationary loci, and then substituting the later into the former expression before
rearranging.
To derive equation (3.20), solve (A.9) and (A.8) for x and c/k respectively at the
stationary loci. Substitute for x into the later to obtain an expression for c/k. Now
further substitute the ﬁrst and third expressions into (A.10) evaluated at the stationary
locus, and rearrange.
Equation (3.21) is derived by solving (A.8) and (A.9) for r and x respectively at their
stationary loci; and then substituting for r and subsequently x into the transition equation
for rental rates before rearranging the terms.
To derive equation (3.22), substitute for r and xˆ − x into (A.11), and then further
substitute for x (from (A.8)). Next, solve (A.8) and (A.9) for r and x respectively, then
substitute for r and subsequently x into the transition equation for rental rates and rear-
range to yield an expression for output growth in terms of c/k.
Finally, solve (A.10) and (A.8) for r and c/k respectively, and then cross substitute to
yield an expression for c/k in terms of x. Further substitute for x from (A.9) evaluated at
the stationary locus, and for c/k into the previous expression for output growth.
Empirics of inter-temporal substitution
This section summarises available evidence on the empirical magnitude of this param-
eter. In particular, a substantial body of macroeconomic time series analysis into the
predictions of the consumption Euler have commonly found low (and quite precise) point
estimates of EIS, in the region of 0-0.5 (for example, Campbell (2003), Campbell and
Mankiw (1989, 1991), Hall (1988), Patterson and Pesaran (1992), Yogo (2004)).118
118 This is not to suggest complete consensus: Summers (1982) and Mankiw et al. (1985), for example, derive parameter
estimates which signiﬁcantly exceed 1. However, these point estimates are highly imprecise and may be biased upwards due
to inappropriate use of ﬁrst lags of interest rates as instruments, given serial correlation in discrete time consumption data
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By contrast, a large ﬁnance literature characterising the responsiveness of investment
returns to expected consumption growth have tended to yield higher (but less precise)
values of the EIS, in the broad range 1-5 (see, for example, Campbell and Mankiw
(1989), Campbell (1999), Grossman and Schiller (1981), Hansen and Singleton (1983), and
Mankiw (1981)). However, these inverse estimates suﬀer from more severe identiﬁcation
problems, since consumption is generally less variable than interest rates (Campbell and
Mankiw (1989), Yogo (2004)). Such weak instrument problems generally favour placing
greater weight on macro time series evidence.119
Perhaps more fundamentally, however, economists have disputed the robustness of the
inverse equality between inter temporal substitution and risk appetite due to failure of key
founding assumptions (see, for example, Hall (1988)). Consumption is unlikely to be log
normally distributed, for example, having greater probability mass at extreme values due
to prevalence of wars, ﬁnancial crises, and potentially catastrophic environmental issues
(Barro (2009), Stern (2007), Weitzman (2007, 2001)).120 Moreover, the requirements that
consumption today be independent of past consumption, or that inter-temporal respon-
siveness is constant over time, appears contestable.121
Two areas of theoretical advancement generally imply small upward revisions to EIS
(Hall (1988)).
119 The timing of information acquisition is key to a robust empirical test. A desirable instrument must proxy for all
information available at the time a consumption plan or investment decision is formed.
120 By contrast, cross sectional evidence suggests consumption is well approximated by a log-normal distribution (Battistin
et al. (2009)).
121 The EIS has been shown to rise with deregulation in ﬁnancial markets in Canada (see, for example, Wirjanto (1995)).
By contrast, Patterson and Pesaran (1992) ﬁnd no evidence of instability in the EIS during the early 1980's in the UK.
Blundell et al. (1994) and Attanasio and Browning (1995), for example, show that the EIS increases with income among
households in the UK (this is substantiated by cross country studies using aggregate data (Ogaki et al. (1996)).
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estimates. First, the emergence of new preference structure which separate risk aversion
and inter-temporal preference parameters (while retaining time separability), most notably
Epstein and Zin (EZ) (1989). A second branch of research retains expected utility theory,
but instead assumes habit formation (e.g. Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane
(1999)).122
An extensive micro economics literature also casts light on inter-temporal consumption
behaviour, and highlights key heterogeneities.123 Prevailing point estimates are generally
higher than their macroeconomic counterparts, however it is diﬃcult to identify systematic
diﬀerences due to sampling variation (Groom and Maddison (2013)). They also indicate
potentially serious aggregation issues associated with macro economic studies (Attanasio
and Weber (1995, 1993)).
Lemma 3.7
The Jacobian matrix, Jacobian, of the (log) linear system of diﬀerential equations is
122 Mean estimates drawn from a sample of 8 published studies which tests Euler equations derived from E-Z preference
forms are just 0.018 higher (a diﬀerence which is readily explained by heightened sample variation). While empirical
evidence on habits have generally lagged the theory, evidence suggests that their inclusion generally spurs a modest increase
in estimated EIS parameter values (since utility is formed over diﬀerences in consumption levels), perhaps on the order of
0.05 on average (Havránek et al. (2015)).
123 Consumption growth by richer households and those with asset holdings are more responsive to returns (Attanasio
and Weber (1995, 1993), Attanasio and Browning (1995), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Zeldes
(1989)). In terms of demographic and labour market characteristics, Attanasio andWeber (1995, 1993), for example, ﬁnd that
household size and employment status inﬂuence consumption levels. By contrast, Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994)
show that both female labour market participation and household demographics increase consumption growth. Berloﬀa
(1997) ﬁnds consumption growth eﬀects relating to the former but not the later. Data issues should not underestimated,
however: only short panels are available for broad based measures of consumption, obliging researchers to construct synthetic
panels ((e.g. Attanasio and Weber (1993, 1995), Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)), or use
narrow proxies for consumption, in particular food expenditure (e.g. Dynan (2000), Lawrance (1991), Maurer and Meier
(2008), Runkle (1991), Shea (1995), Zeldes (1991)), to avoid potential small T bias.
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given by:
Jacobian =
dr˙
dr
dr˙
d(C/K)
r˙
dx
d ˙(C/K)
dr
d ˙(C/K)
d(C/K)
d ˙(C/K)
dx
dZ˙
dx
dZ˙
d(C/K)
dZ˙
dx
=
 (a1 − 1)
r
a1
−a2
(a1+a2)
r
a1
−(m−(1−a1)θ)
(a1+a2)
r
a1(
a1
v
− 1) c/k c/k θ(v−1)
v
c/k
0 −a1
(a1+a2)
x a1+a2−(m−(1−a1)θ)
(a1+a2)
x
 (A.12)
The stated condition is suﬃcient | Jacobian |< 0 and one eigenvalue to be positive
(where | Jacobian | signiﬁes the determinant of Jacobian). It follows that the remaining
eigenvalues are oppositely signed and the system is manifold stable.
Corollary 3.3
The optimal tax in the presence of spillovers aﬀecting capital durability given at equa-
tion (3.11) is derived here.
In the case of the individual household, the ﬁrst order conditions for the optimal stock
and the time path of the ﬂow of oil are given, respectively, by:
dV (t)
dS(t)
= 0 (A.13)
d
(
dV (t)
dS˙(t)
)
dt
=
− λ(t)
(
(1− a1 − a2)Q(t)
S˙(t)
(
Qˆ(t)− Eˆ(t) + λˆ(t)
))
(A.14)
Setting these expressions equal, and substituting from the time derivative of the marginal
productivity condition for oil (3.6) together with the revised Hotelling condition (3.12),
yields the standard result that private interests alone are best served without policy in-
tervention.
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Unlike the representative agent, the social planner is assumed to factor in the external
beneﬁts of leaving an additional unit of oil in the ground, both in terms of higher aggregate
productivity and lower capital depreciation. The ﬁrst order conditions for the optimal
stock and the time path of the ﬂow of oil are in this case given, respectively, by:
dV (t)
dS(t)
= λ(t)
(
mQ(t)− θx(t)K(t)
S(t)
)
(A.15)
d
(
dV (t)
dS˙(t)
)
dt
= −λ(t)((1− a1 − a2)Q(t)
S˙(t)
(
Qˆ(t)− Eˆ(t) + λˆ(t)
)
−
θK(t)
S(t)
(
Kˆ(t) + x(t) + λˆ(t)
)
) (A.16)
Setting these expressions equal, and substituting from the time derivative of the
marginal productivity condition for oil (3.6), together with the revised Hotelling
condition (3.12), yields equation (3.25).
Lemma 3.8
Exploiting the condition for the optimal investment programme (A.6) gives:
(1− ZQ) r(t)− j − θx(t) = −λˆ(t) (A.17)
Combining (A.17) with the condition for the optimal oil extraction programme (Pˆ =
−λˆ) yields the following revised Hotelling condition:
Pˆ (t) = −λˆ(t) = (1− ZQ) r(t)− j − θx(t) (A.18)
Further substituting into the time path of the shadow value of consumption yields the
following Euler equation for consumption:
(1− ZQ) r(t)− i− n− j − θx(t) = vcˆ(t) (A.19)
This demonstrates Lemma 3.8.
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Proposition 3.3
The equations of motion in output, oil depletion, interest rates and the ratio of con-
sumption to capital in the presence of an income tax are given by:
Qˆ(t) = h+ a2n− (m+ a1θ)x(t) + (1− ZQ) r(t)− a1 (c(t)/k(t) + j) +
(1− a1 − a2) (xˆ(t)− x(t)) (A.20)
(xˆ(t)− x(t)) (a1 + a2) = h+ a2n+ ((1− a1) θ −m)x(t)−
a1c(t)/k(t) + (1− a1) j − z(t) (A.21)
rˆ(t) (a1 + a2) = h+ ((1− a1) θ −m)x(t) + a2 (c(t)/k(t) + n) + (1− a1) j−
(1− ZQ)Rr(t)− (1− a1 − a2) z(t) (A.22)
cˆ(t)− kˆ(t) = c(t)/k(t) = h+ ((1− a1) θ −m)x(t)+
((n+ j + θx(t)) (v − 1) + r(t) (1− ZQ)− i) /v−
r(t) (1− ZQ) /a1 (A.23)
The solution to this system of equations is given at (3.27)-(3.29).
Lemma 3.9
This is evident from condition (A.6), which implies:
r(t)− j − θx(t) = −λˆ(t) (A.24)
Substituting for the Hotelling condition thus yields a tax invariant rate of oil price
growth:
Pˆ (t) = r(t)− j − θx(t) (A.25)
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Further substituting for shadow value of consumption yields a consumption growth rate
which is undistorted by the expenditure tax:
r(t)− i− n− j − θx(t) = vcˆ(t) (A.26)
This demonstrates Lemma 3.9.
Proposition 3.4
The equations of motion in output, oil depletion, interest rates and the ratio of con-
sumption to capital for the optimal model with endogenous depreciation in the presence
of an expenditure tax are given by:
Qˆ(t) = h+ a2n−
(
m+ a1
(
1− ZBEXP
)
θ
)
x(t) +
(
1− ZBEXP
)
r(t)−
a1
(
c(t)/k(t) + j
(
1− ZBEXP
))
+ (1− a1 − a2) (xˆ(t)− x(t)) (A.27)
(a1 + a2) (xˆ(t)− x(t)) = h+ a2n+
((
1− a1
(
1− ZBEXP
))
θ −m)x(t)−
ZBEXP r(t)− a1c(t)/k(t) +
(
1− a1
(
1− ZBEXP
))
j − z(t) (A.28)
rˆ (a1 + a2) = h+ a2n−mx(t) + (1− a1 − ya2) (θx(t) + j)−
(1− a1 − a2) z(t) + a2c(t)/k(t)−
(
R− a2Z
B
EXP
a1
)
r(t) (A.29)
cˆ(t)− kˆ(t) = c(t)/k(t)− r(t) (1− ZBEXP ) /a1+(
n (v − 1) + (j + θx(t)) (v (1− ZBEXP )− 1)+ r(t)− i) /v (A.30)
The solution to this system of equations is given at (3.19)-(3.22).
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Corollary 3.4
The equations of motion of depletion, interest rates, consumption-capital and output
growth for the optimal model with endogenous depreciation, but assuming non separability
between capital stocks and productivity growth rates, are given by:
(xˆ− x(t)) (a1 + a2) = h+ a2n+ ((1− a1 − ψ) θ −m)x−
a1c(t)/k(t) + (1− a1) j − z(t) (A.31)
rˆ(t) (a1 + a2) = h+ ((1− a1 − ψ) θ −m)x(t) + a2 (c(t)/k(t) + n) +
(1− a1) j −Rr(t)− (1− a1 − a2) z(t)) (A.32)
cˆ(t)− kˆ(t) = c(t)/k(t) + ((n+ j + θx(t)) (v − 1) + r(t)− i) /v − r(t)/a1 (A.33)
Qˆ(t) = h+ a2n− (m+ ψθ + a1θ)x(t) + r(t)− a1 (c(t)/k(t) + j) +
(1− a1 − a2) (xˆ(t)− x(t)) (A.34)
The eﬀects of ψ are qualitatively similar to m: causing the stationary depletion lo-
cus to pivot anti-clockwise (in x, c/k space) while leaving the consumption-capital ratio
unaﬀected. The solution to this system of equations is given by (3.33)-(3.36).
Corollary 3.5
The optimal tax in the presence of spillovers aﬀecting capital durability, assuming non
separability between capital stocks and productivity growth rates of the form given at
equation (3.37), is derived here.
As before, the social planner considers the external beneﬁts of leaving an additional unit
of oil in the ground, S˜, as well as the inﬂuence of oil extraction, on aggregate productivity
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and the capital spillover (the oil market is assumed to be comprised of a single agent). As
such, her constrained optimization problem can be represented as follows:
Max
{c(t),E(t)}∞t=0
V =
ˆ ∞
0
(e−it
c(t)1−v − 1
1− v +
λ(t)
(
Q(s˜(t), ψ)− c(t)N(t)− (j + θx˜(t))K(t)− K˙(t)
)
)dt (A.35)
In the centralised case, the optimal oil extraction plan requires that:
λ(t)
(
(m+ ψθ)Q(s˜(t), ψ) + θx(t)K(t)
S(t)
)
=
−λ(t)((1− a1 − a2)Q(s˜(t), ψ)
S˙(t)
(
Qˆ(s˜(t), ψ)Eˆ(t) + λˆ(t)
)
−
θK(t)
S(t)
(
Kˆ(t) + x(t) + λˆ(t)
)
)
(A.36)
Substituting from the time derivative of the marginal productivity condition for oil
(3.6) together with the revised Hotelling condition (3.12), yields equation (3.37).
Corollary 3.6
Assuming physical capital accumulation follows a ﬁxed savings rule given by (3.11),
transition equations in depletion and interest rates are given by:
(a1 + a2) (xˆ(t)− x(t)) = (a2 + γ) (1− u(t)) Ω + a2n+ j (1− a1) +
x(t) (θ (1− a1)− ι (a2 + γ))− (1− s) r(t)− z(t) (A.37)
rˆ (a1 + a2) = (a2 + γ) (1− u(t)) Ω + a2n+ ((1− a1)− (a2 + γ) ι)x(t)+
(1− a1) j −Or(t)− (1− a1 − a2) z(t) (A.38)
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Cross substituting between these expressions (together with 3.39), evaluated at their
stationary loci, yields the following equations for steady state interest, depletion and
human capital growth rates:
Tx∗ = ((a2 + γ) (1− u) Ω + (1− a1) j) (a1 − s) + a2n+ zs (1− a1) (A.39)
Tx∗ = ((a2 + γ) (1− u) Ω + (1− a1) j) (a1 − s) +
+ a2n+ zs (1− a1) (A.40)
r∗
a1
T = (a2 + γ) (1− u) Ω + (1− a1) j+
− zs (1− a1 − a2 + ι (a2 + γ)− (1− a1) θ) (A.41)
lˆ = (a2 + γ) (1− u∗) Ω− ι (a2 + γ)x∗ (A.42)
where T = a1 (1− a1 − a2) + a2s+ (a1 − s) (ι (a2 + γ)− θ (1− a1)).
Steady state output growth is given by:
TQ∗ = (s− θ (a1 − s)) ((a2 + γ) (1− u∗) Ω + (1− a1) j + a2n)−
zs (1− a1 − a2 + ι (a2 + γ))− Tj (A.43)
Turning to the optimal growth framework, the representative household solves the
following dynamic optimization problem:
Max
{c(t),E(t),u(t)}∞t=0
V =
ˆ ∞
0
(e−it
c(t)1−v − 1
1− v +
λ(t)
(
Q(.)− c(t)N(t)− (j + θx(t))K(t)− K˙(t)
)
+
λ2(t) (Ω (1− u(t))− ιx(t)))dt (A.44)
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to c(.) and u(.) are given by:
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e−itc−v = λ1(t)N(t) (A.45)
λ1(t)a2
Q(t)
u(t)
= λ2Ωl(t) (A.46)
The optimal investment path once again requires that:
λˆ1(t) = i− a1Q(t)
K(t)
(A.47)
Human capital accumulation is deﬁned by the following transition equation:
λˆ2(t) = i− λ1(t)
λ2(t)
(
AK(t)a1 (u(t)N(t))a2 E(t)1−a1−a2l(t)γal(t)
a2−1)−
(Ω (1− u)− ιx(t)) (A.48)
Substituting for the market clearing condition: l(t) = la(t) for all t, yields the following
transition equation for human capital in the decentralized economy:
λˆ2(t) = i− λ1(t)
λ2(t)
a2
Q(t)
l(t)
− (Ω (1− u)− ιx(t)) (A.49)
Diﬀerentiating (A.46) with respect to time, and substituting for (A.46), (A.48) and
(A.49), as well as output and capital growth, yields the following expression for training
growth in the competitive setting:
uˆ(t) (1− a2) = (a2 + γ) Ω− Ωu(t) (a2 + γ − 1) + a2n+ j (1− a1)−
a1 (c(t)/k(t)) + x(t) ((1− a1) θ − ι (a2 + γ)) +
(1− a1 − a2) Eˆ(t)− j − θx(t) (A.50)
The remaining dynamic equations in oil demand, interest rates, and the consumption-
capital ratio are given by:
(a1 + a2) (xˆ(t)− x(t)) = (a2 + γ) Ω (1− u(t)) + a2n− a1c(t)/k(t)+
x(t) ((1− a1) θ − ι (a2 + γ)) + (1− a1) j + a2uˆ(t)− z(t) (A.51)
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rˆ(t) (a1 + a2) = (a2 + γ) Ω (1− u(t)) + x(t) ((1− a1) θ − ι (a2 + γ))−
a2 (c(t)/k(t) + n) + (1− a1) j −Rr(t)−
(1− a1 − a2) z(t) + a2uˆ(t) (A.52)
cˆ(t)− kˆ(t) = c(t)/k(t) + ((n+ j − θx(t)) (v − 1) + r(t)− i) /v − r(t)/a1 (A.53)
In the case of the social planner, optimal consideration of the externality aﬀecting
human capital accumulation, yields the following expressions for steady states in training,
depletion and net interest rates under given by:
x∗U = (((a2 + γ) Ω− (1− a1 − a2)n) ((v − 1))) +
z ((1− a1) + (v − 1) (a2 + γ)) + i (1− a1) (A.54)
(r∗ − j − θx∗)U = (a2 + γ) Ωv + n (a2 + (v − 1) ι (a2 + γ))−
zv (1− a1 − a2 + ιa2) + ia2 (1− ι) (A.55)
Uu∗ =
1
Ω
(n (a2 + (v − 1) ι (a2 + γ))−
zv (1− a1 − a2 + ιa2) + ia2 (1− ι)) (A.56)
where U = v (1− a1) + (v − 1) (γ + ι (a2 + γ)).
An interior solution  in the sense of positive eﬀorts made in human as well as physical
capital accumulation  implies that:
v (1− a1) + (v − 1) (ι (a2 + γ))− i (1− a1) >
(((a2 + γ) Ω− (1− a1 − a2)n− z (1− a1 − a2 + ι (a2 + γ))) (v − 1)) > 0 (A.57)
The long run comparative statics are similar to the model adapted from Sinclair (1992,
1994) above featuring exogenous technological progress: resource depletion, the time al-
location to training, and net investment returns increase with the productivity of the
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education sector and the impatience parameter and falls with the productive externality:
dx∗
dΩ
, du
∗
dΩ
, d(r
∗−j−θx∗)
dΩ
> 0, dx
∗
di
, du
∗
di
, d(r
∗−j−θx∗)
di
> 0, dx
∗
dι
, du
∗
dι
, d(r
∗−j−θx∗)
dι
< 0. A rising tax rate
reduces depletion, net returns and the allocation of training (through the productivity of
the education sector): dx
∗
dz
, du
∗
dz
, d(r
∗−j−θx∗)
dz
< 0
Comparison of equations (A.40) and (A.54) demonstrates part i) of Corollary 3.11.
Part ii) asserts that the model is manifold stable if (a2 + γ) ι > (1− a1) θ. To see,
consider the following Jacobian matrix of the (log) linear system of diﬀerential equations
which includes the diﬀerential equation in the allocation of training  given by:
Jacobian =

d ˙Y/K
dY/K
d ˙Y/K
dV
d ˙Y/K
dZ
d ˙Y/K
du
d ˙C/K
dY/K
d ˙C/K
dC/K
d ˙C/K
dx
d ˙C/K
du
dx˙
dY/K
dx˙
dC/K
dx˙
dx
dx˙
du
du˙
dY/K
du˙
dC/K
du˙
dx
du˙
du

=

(a1 − 1) ra1
(
(a2θ−(a2+γ)ι) ra1
a1−((a2+γ)ι+(a1−a2)θ)
)
0 0(
a1
v
− 1) c/k c/k θ(v−1)
v
c/k 0
0 −x
(
a1−((a2+γ)ι−(1−a1)θ)
a1
)
x 0
0 −u − ((a2+γ)ι−(1−a1)θ)
a1
u¯ (a2+γ)Ωu¯
a2

(A.58)
This condition is thus suﬃcient condition for | Jacobian |< 0  and thus the dynamic
system to be locally stable (given the existence of a positive eigenvalue).
Corollary 3.7
In the case of the Keynesian model, the capital externality tempers the downward
pressure of the productive externality on growth, depletion rates and capital returns.
Once again, assuming that oil taxes are constant in the absence of climate change (i.e.
z = 0 if m = θ = 0), it follows from equations (A.40) and (A.54) that the slope of the
corrective tax is given by:
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z =
(ι (a2 + γ)− θ (1− a1)) (a1 − s) ((a2 + γ) (1− u) Ω + j (1− a1))
s (1− a1) (a1 (1− a1 − a2) + sa2) (A.59)
which is shallower corrective than would be the case under solely the production exter-
nality.
Solving for the socially desirable tax rate within the optimal growth model with en-
dogenous technological development  derived in an analogous fashion to Corollary 3.3 
yields:
z∗ = −
a2ι− θ
(
1− a1
(
1− c∗/k∗
r∗
))
(1− a1 − a2) x
∗ (A.60)
However, in this context, there is an addition externality in the market for knowledge,
since the social planner considers the wider inﬂuence of individual training decisions on
productivity (through average skill levels).
To see this, consider the socially optimal investment in human capital (where the out-
come of the social planners decision is denoted by the superscript SP ) yields the following
rate of change in shadow prices:
−λˆSP2 (t) = i−
λSP1 (t)
λSP2 (t)
(a2 + γ)Q(t)
l(t)
− [Ω (1− u)− ιx(t)] (A.61)
Thus, by comparison with (A.49), human capital has a lower scarcity value under the
social planner since the full productive beneﬁts are accounted for when allocating training.
Diﬀerentiating (A.46) with respect to time, and substituting for (A.61), (A.48), (A.46),
as well as output and capital growth, yields the following expression for the training growth
in the competitive setting:
uˆSP (t) (1− a2) = (a2 + γ) Ω− Ωu(t) (a2 + γ)
(
1− 1
a2
)
+ a2n+ j (1− a1)−
a1 (c(t)/k(t)) + x(t) ((1− a1) θ(t)− ι (a2 + γ)) + (1− a1 − a2) Eˆ(t)− j − θx(t) (A.62)
Comparison of (A.62) and (A.50) reveals the additional distortion to human capital
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accumulation arising from the failure of the representative agent to internalize the ef-
fect of her own training decisions of average human capital levels (and thus aggregate
productivity).
To formalize the policy implications, consider the following decentralized utility max-
imisation problem:
Max
{c(t),E(t),u(t)}∞t=0
V =
´∞
0
(e−it c(t)
1−v−1
1−v +
λ1(t)((r(t)K(t) + (1− Zw)W (t)l(t)u(t) + (1− a1 − a1)P (t)− C(t)−
(j + θx(t))K(t)− (1− u(t)) l(t)Zh(t)− K˙(t))+
λ2(t) (Ω (1− u(t))− ιx(t)))dt (A.63)
where ZW , Zh represent taxes on wage income and training (the cost of training is
assumed to be foregone wages). This set up is constrained by the requirement on the
government to balance its budget:
ZW (t)W (t)l(t)u(t) = (1− u(t))Zh(t)W (t) (A.64)
Diﬀerentiating (A.49) and substituting as before, yields the following expression for the
growth rate of training:
uˆ (1− a2) = (a1 + γ) (Ω− ιx(t)) + Ωu (a2 + γ − 1)−
c(t)/(t)k +
ΩZh(t)
a2
(
1− Z˘W
) − ˙˘ZW
a2
(
1− Z˘W
) − j − θx(t) (A.65)
where Z˘W (t) = ZW (t)− Zh(t) serves to simplify the notation.
Setting (A.65) equal with (A.62) in the undistorted case (i.e. for x∗(z∗) = ι = 0)  and
assuming the labour income levy is stationary (required for the size of the governmental
sector to be non explosive), and substituting for the balanced budget constraint  yields
the following expressions for optimal policy:
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Z∗W = −
Z∗h
u
=
γ
(a2 + γ)
+
ι
a2Ωu
(A.66)
This comprises of a wage tax and subsidy to human capital accumulation. The magni-
tude of the interventions depends rises with the ratio of the productivity spillover to the
undistorted productivity of training and the time allocated to human capital accumula-
tion. This modiﬁes the ﬁnding of Gómez (2003) in a model without ﬁnite resources or
environmental externalities.
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B APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
Lemma 4.1
Totally diﬀerentiating equation (3.2) and (3.3) with respect to time, and combining
with (3.4), (3.5), (3.7) and the population growth rate given by equation (4.1) yields the
following equations of motion in depletion:
(a1 + a2) xˆ(t) = h+ a2n+ (a1 + a2 −m− a2ϕ)x(t)− (1− s) r(t) (B.1)
Totally diﬀerentiating equation (3.3) and (3.6) with respect to time, and substituting
for (3.1), (3.4), (3.5) and (3.7) yields the following equations of motion in interest rates:
(a1 + a2) rˆ(t) = h+ a2n− (m+ a2ϕ)x(t)−Or(t)− (1− a1 − a2) z(t) (B.2)
Thus ϕ causes the stationary depletion locus to pivot anti-clockwise (in x, r space):
higher depletion reduces output through the labour supply eﬀect. The stationary depletion
locus is thus upward sloping if: m + a2ϕ < a1 + a2, and generating a vertical force of
attraction (being otherwise upward sloping with 'knife-edge' properties). By imposing
further downward pressure on the growth rate as x increases, ψ also causes the stationary
rental growth locus to also pivot anti-clockwise (and exerts a horizontal force of attraction).
The steady state is thus manifold stable.
Cross substituting between (B.1) and (B.2), evaluated at their stationary loci, yields
expressions (4.2) and (4.3). By inspection, these exist under the stated condition, a1 > s.
Substituting for interest rates and capital transition into (4.3), yields (4.4).
Lemma 4.3 & Proposition 4.1
The dynamic equations for depletion, interest rates, consumption-capital and output
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growth are given by:
(xˆ(t)− x(t)) (a1 + a2) = h+ a2n− (m+ a2ϕ)x(t)−
a1c(t)/k(t)− z(t) (B.3)
(a1 + a2) rˆ(t) = h− (m+ a2ϕ)x(t) + a2 (c(t)/k(t) + n)−Rr(t)−
(1− a1 − a2) z(t)) (B.4)
cˆ(t)− kˆ(t) = c(t)/k(t) + ((n− ϕx(t)) (v − ξ) + r(t)− i) /v − r(t)/a1 (B.5)
Qˆ(t) = h− (m+ a2ϕ)x(t) + r(t)− a1c(t)/k(t) + a2n+
(1− a1 − a2) (xˆ(t)− x(t)) (B.6)
The solution to this system of equations is given at (4.10)-(4.13).
Corollary 4.3
As before, the private household ignores the inﬂuence on declining productivity and
population growth from her oil market activity.
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to the stock and ﬂow of oil respectively are given
by:
dV
dS(t)
= 0 (B.7)
d
dt
(
dV (.)
dS˙(t)
)
= λ
(
(1− a1 − a2)Q(t)
S˙(t)
(
Qˆ(t)− Eˆ(t) + λˆ(t)
))
(B.8)
By contrast, the optimization problem of the social planner is given by:
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Max
{c(t),E(t)}∞t=0
V =
ˆ ∞
0
(
(
c(t)1−v − 1
1− v
)ξ
(N (t, x˜))1−ξ +
λ(t)
(
Q(s˜(t))− c(t)N(t)− K˙(t)
)
+ µ(t) ((n− ψx˜(t))N(t)))dt (B.9)
where, as before, the term s˜ reﬂects the productive beneﬁts from unburned oil in the
ground, but also the inﬂuence of her oil market behaviour on population growth. The ﬁrst
order conditions with respect to the stock and ﬂow of oil respectively are given by:
dV (.)
dS
=
λ(t)
S(t)
(
(1− ξ) tψx(t)c(t)N(t)
1− v +mQ(t)
)
+ µ(t)
(
N(t)ψx(t)
s˜(t)
)
(B.10)
d
[
dV (.)
dS˙
]
dt
=
tλ(t) (1− ξ) c(t)N(t)ψ
S(t) (1− v)
(
λˆ(t) + cˆ(t) + Nˆ(t) + x(t) +
1
t
)
−
λ(t)
(
(1− a1 − a2)Q(t)
S˙(t)
(
Qˆ(t)− Eˆ(t) + λˆ(t)
))
+
µ(t)
(
N(t)ψ
s˜(t)
)(
µˆ(t) + Nˆ(t) + x(t)
)
(B.11)
Setting conditions (B.10) and (B.11) equal, and substituting for µ(t), µˆ(t) cˆ(t), yields
the following optimal tax condition given at equation (4.15).
Lemma 4.4 & Proposition 4.2
Taking the ratio of outputs in period t and t+ 1, and substituting from the transition
equation in oil stocks: St = St−1 (1− xt) , together with the Hotelling and marginal factor
returns conditions, yields the following expression for output growth:
(1 + g+1)
1−a1 =
(
qt+1 (1 + n)
qt
)1−a1
=
(1 + h)
(1− x)m (1 + n)
1−a1−a2
(r+
r
)a1
(1 + r+)
−a2
(B.12)
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which implicitly deﬁnes a law of motion for r. Evaluating equation (B.12) at the steady
state, and substituting for (1− x) (1 + r) = 1 + g, yields the stationary Hotelling Curve.
Turning to the capital market, by substituting for the marginal factor returns conditions
into the transition equation for oil stocks, one can write steady state growth in terms of
rental returns, preferences, the mortality hazard, and the oil extraction rate as follows:
1 + g =
r
a1
(
b (1− ρ) (1− a1 − a2)− a2 (1− x)
x
)
(B.13)
Further substituting for (1− x) (1 + r) = 1 + g, (B.12) and (4.20), evaluated at the
steady state, yields the stationary savings curve.
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C APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5
Lemma 5.1 & Lemma 5.2
Diﬀerentiating output with respect to time, and substituting for capital transition and
the Hotelling condition, generates the remaining transition equations in output, depletion,
interest rates, and consumption-capital:
Qˆ(t) = h+a2n−mx(t)−a1c(t)/k(t)+(1− a1 − a2) Eˆ(t)+(1− a1 − a2) χˆ (t, x (t)) (C.1)
(xˆ(t)− x(t)) (a1 + a2) = h+ a2n−mx(t)− a1c(t)/k(t)− z(t)+
(1− a1 − a2) χˆ (t, x (t)) (C.2)
(a1 + a2) rˆ (t) = h+ a2n−Or(t) + ((1− a1) θ −m)x(t) + j (1− a1)−
(1− a1 − a2) z(t) + (1− a1 − a2) χˆ (t, x (t)) (C.3)
cˆ(t)− kˆ(t) = c/k(t) + (n (v − 1) + r(t)− i) /v − r(t)/a1 (C.4)
As one would expect, increased oil allocated to production raises output growth in
output and oil demand since capital is more abundant. Stationary oil demand and interest
rates are now inﬂuenced by the preference parameters w and i through the mechanism
described above. The ratio of consumption to capital is unchanged.124
The solution to this system of equations is given at (5.5)-(5.8).
124 The assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences is critical here.
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Lemma 5.3
This insight follows by comparing the oil allocation decision of the representative house-
hold with decision of the social planner in the undistorted case (made in the absence of a
production tax on oil). The former is given by:
E(t)e−it ((1− χ∗ (x¯ (z∗)))E(t)) −w = λ(t)
(
(1− a1 − a2) Q(t)
χ (x¯) (1− Zχ(t))
)
(C.5)
By contrast the latter is given by:
E(t)e−it ((1− χ¯ (.))E(t)) −w = λ(t)
(
(1− a1 − a2) Q(t)
χ¯ (.) (1− Zχ(t))
)
(C.6)
where χ¯ represents the undistorted oil allocation. Equating these conditions and sub-
stituting for the marginal product of oil yields the stated condition.
Empirical evidence on linkages between climate change and residential energy
demand
This section summarizes currently available evidence concerning the responsiveness of
energy demand to climatic conditions.
Some 20 studies have sought to estimate the eﬀects of climate change on residential
energy demand, focussing on heating and cooling demands in the US and, to a lesser
extent, Europe. These consistently predict countervailing eﬀects from fewer cold winter
days (reducing heating related energy demand), and more frequent and intense hot summer
spells (resulting in expected increases in energy demand for air conditioning). For large
countries, it is therefore desirable to consider the latitude and geographical dispersion of
economic activities when calibrating parameters.125
125 This issue is further complicated by potential non linearities in demand responses which could result in the dominance
of heat related savings for low levels of warming being reversed with greater degrees of climate change (Hadley et al. (2006)).
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A common approach when assessing these magnitudes has been to ﬁrst infer predictions
on the likely changes in the number of Heating and Cooling Degree Days (CDDs/ HDDs) in
a given locality (deﬁned as the sum of positive/negative deviations in the average ambient
temperature from a given base comfort level over a given period of time) from meteorolog-
ical models;126 and then subsequently draw inference for household energy demand, either
by extrapolating from observed statistical relationships with existing weather conditions
(exploiting locational and/or temporal variance), or from energy systems models (with
assumptions drawn from engineering assessments).
The later class of studies have tended to predict high degrees of demand sensitivity.
Scott et al. (1994) and Rosenthal et al. (1995), for example, estimate changes in energy
demand associated with maintaining existing internal building temperatures across diﬀer-
ent US cities under altered climatic conditions. They ﬁnd that, on average, a one degree C
temperature rise reduces residential heating demand by around 5-15 percent and increases
cooling by 10-25 percent. These early studies are based on simplistic functional relation-
ships between demand and HDD/ CDD, and assume that population size and building
characteristics remain static.127
A further branch of the literature employs statistical and econometric techniques to
analyse the inﬂuence of temperature changes on sectoral energy demand.128 In general,
126 HDD and SDD measures avoid the need for separate analyses of summer and winter seasons, but are sensitive to
assumptions on the comfort threshold, which may vary from region to region (Rosenthal et al. (1995), Sailor and Munoz
(1997)). Although mean temperatures have been the principle research focus, a limited number of studies have identiﬁed
wider climatic eﬀects including wind speed, precipitation and humidity on heating and cooling demand (Howden and Crimp
(2001), Sailor and Munoz (1997), Sailor (2001), Sailor and Pavlova (2003) and Mansur et al. (2008)). However, these aspects
of climate change are subject to higher forecast uncertainty.
127 Huang et al. (2006) and Scott et al. (2008) undertake more complex simulations of energy usage aggregated across diﬀer-
ent buildings types, vintages of heating, cooling and lighting technologies (together with associated costs), and incorporating
the eﬀects of expected demographic shifts. However, their ﬁndings are quantitatively similar.
128 See, for example, Amato et al. (2005), Belzer et al. (1996), De Cian et al. (2007), Eskeland and Mideksa (2010),
Franco and Sanstad (2008), Howden and Crimp (2001), Mansur et al. (2008), Mendelsohn (2001), Olonscheck et al.
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these studies aﬃrm the qualitative trends identiﬁed in resource based studies above, but
the eﬀects are (on balance) quantitatively smaller. Mendelsohn (2001), for example, ex-
ploits cross sectional variance in energy demand identiﬁed by Morrison and Mendelsohn
(1999) to estimate the potential eﬀects of future climate change. He ﬁnds that a 1.5
degree C average temperature increase is likely to have negligible eﬀects on residential
energy expenditures in 2060, although energy demand is predicted to fall modestly. Some
time series studies are weakened by the failure to include socioeconomic variables such as
incomes and prices. 129
Amato et al. (2005) and Ruth and Lin (2006) undertake more sophisticated econometric
analyses for the states of Massachusetts and Maryland respectively using very similar ﬁxed
eﬀects regression models (and data sources: monthly state level electricity and fuels sales
and price data from 1977- 2001 taken from the Energy Information Administration) to
estimate fuel speciﬁc commodity demands in the residential and commercial sectors as a
function of HDD and CDDs, energy prices, daylight hours (aﬀecting lighting), and trend
variables (such as technology and incomes). The ﬁndings suggest a high degree of weather
sensitivity: demand for residential heating fuels, by contrast, is predicted to fall by 15-33
percent in Massachusetts and around 2.5 percent in Maryland by the same period.130
(2011), Ruth and Lin (2006), Sailor (2001), Sailor and Munoz (1997), Sailor and Pavlova (2003), and Summerﬁeld et al.
(2010). These studies obviate the need for detailed assumptions regarding technological performance and cost, and have the
potential to capture the eﬀects of behavioural change such as market penetration of air conditioners (which have uncertain
but potentially powerful eﬀects (Olonscheck et al. (2011), Sailor and Pavlova (2003)). However, they have a number of
important disadvantages including their potential sensitivity to model misspeciﬁcations, and their reliance on estimating
the partial eﬀects of observed weather changes (whereas climate change may imply conditions which lie outside current
experiences).
129 For example, Franco and Sanstad (2008), Howden and Crimp (2001), Sailor and Munoz (1997), Sailor (2001), Sailor
and Pavlova (2003), Summerﬁeld et al. (2010), model 1). Although such determinants are not universally found to be
signiﬁcant in more robust structural analyses (Ruth and Lin (2006))  the potential for false inference is clear (climate is
strongly correlated with average income through geography (Horowitz (2009)).
130 Such eﬀects may nevertheless be small relative to the inﬂuence of price, technology, and income changes (see, also
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D APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 6
Data and descriptive trends
The underlying data source, collection methodologies, and descriptive trends found therein
are discussed below (drawing on Jones (2012)).
Data source and collection issues
Data are drawn from the UK FES between 1986 and 2009. The principal purpose of the
survey is to inform the calculation of general price indices, such as the Retail Price Index.
However, it is also a useful resource for micro econometric studies of this type. The nature
of this data resource is outlined further below.
Cooperating households provide a detailed record of expenditures of more than 50 diﬀer-
ent categories of goods, including various food products, fuels, and other regular domestic
outlays. The survey also records information on, for example: household composition,
ages, income, region, and patterns of ownership for certain consumer durables.
For most items, expenditure details are recorded in a two week diary by adult household
members. Household spending on energy products made through direct debit is recorded
on the basis of average expenditure in the past year. Other energy expenditures, including
on coal and coin operated meters, are recorded through the diary.
This approach is likely to provide a reasonably accurate record of total spending: Banks
Eskeland and Mideksa (2010) in a rigourous panel analysis of electricity demand in 30 European countries). Mansur et al.
(2008) is a further study of note. The authors estimate a Dubin-McFadden type discrete choice model in which conditional
energy demands are a function of incomes, prices and building related variables, with fuel choice following a multi logit
probability distribution determined by climatic, demographic as well as building and ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics. This
model identiﬁes variation in the sensitivity of heating demand to climate conditions across fuels (low for natural gas, but
broadly comparable with Amato et al. (2005) and Ruth and Lin (2006) for fuel oil).
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and Johnson (1998), for example, compare aggregated FES expenditure data with the na-
tional accounts and ﬁnd a reasonably stable relationship across time, thus concluding that
the data for these individual commodities are likely to be reasonably robust. Nevertheless,
there are a number of issues worth highlighting.
First, is the known under-reporting of socially undesirable goods such as such as alcohol
and tobacco (Kemsley et al. (1980)).131 Second, certain groups including students in
university accommodation, residents of elderly care homes, members of the armed forces
and homeless are underrepresented (Banks and Johnson (1998)).132 Third, expenditure on
infrequently purchased goods, such as consumer durables are only captured if the survey
coincides with the timing of these payments (econometric issues arising are discussed
below).
Descriptive trends in income and expenditure
Total expenditure on goods for which demand is analysed averaged ¿271 per week in
2007. Average net household income equalled ¿531 in the same year. The distribution of
expenditures by commodity type are discussed in Table 12.
Turning to distributional aspects of energy related expenditures, Table 13 ranks house-
holds according to total non-housing related expenditures and income (i.e. adjusting for
rent, rates mortgage and other housing related costs). It shows that average energy outlays
rise rapidly across both expenditure and, particularly income, distributions.
131 A recent literature highlights under reporting of social security and other sources of transfer income in US household
survey data, emphasising the potential for bias given disproportionate increases in non response rates among low income
groups. See, for example, Meyer et al. (2015, 2009).
132 This may be relevant when attempting to draw market wide inferences from sample data, particularly where there are
systematic diﬀerence in behaviour across social groups.
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These patterns are not uniform across individual fuels; in particular, higher spending
households  although observing larger outlays in absolute terms for all fuels  have a
signiﬁcantly greater propensity to purchase gasoline for private transportation, compared
to domestic fuels (shown in Table 14). This raises the potential for more serious welfare
issues associated with changing prices of, and demand for, electricity and natural gas.
Systematic diﬀerences across socio-demographic groups are also apparent. Table 15, for
example, summarises the diﬀerences in average budgets shares. It suggests that a range of
characteristics, including the size and composition of the family, employment status and
patterns of vehicle ownership potentially inﬂuence energy demand.133
Estimation issues using household survey data
The key issues aﬀecting the empirical analysis are here discussed in more detail (drawing
on Jones (2012)); in particular relating to the aggregation of goods; measurement error
or simultaneity bias, the incorporation of demographic controls; and the treatment of
censored data are here discussed (see also Bopape (2006)).
Commodity grouping and separability
Aggregation of goods is necessary due both to limitations in computational capacity and
available degrees of freedom. From a theoretical perspective, the literature proposes two
broad approaches to this.
The ﬁrst suggests grouping commodities based on the behaviour of their relative prices.
In particular, the composite commodity theorem of Hicks (1946) and Leontief (1936)
asserts that, if prices of individual goods move in parallel, then the expenditure function
133 Other factors aﬀecting energy demand which are likely to be less transparent in the data include access to supply
infrastructure and the diﬀusion of energy eﬃciency technologies; see, for example, Brechling and Smith (1991), Crawford et
al. (1993), Johnson et al. (1990).
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deﬁned over bundles of commodities grouped in this way will satisfy the usual properties
(increasing in prices and utility, concave in prices and linearly homogeneous). However,
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) argue that this approach is limited in its usefulness at
least in part because relative prices change over time in practice (for example, due to
exchange rate ﬂuctuations aﬀecting traded goods such as oil products).134
The second (and more common) approach employed here assumes that preferences
are "weakly separable", such that the utility from one commodity is independent of con-
sumption over others. This implies the existence of sub utility functions over subsets of
commodities, which allows consumers to break down consumption decisions into multiple
stages (Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b)). This assumption, while analytically convenient
(since it permits behaviour to be explained through estimation of a smaller number of
variables), raises a number of issues.
First, it imposes strong restrictions on the relationship between goods within diﬀerent
commodity groups: direct cross price eﬀects between individual commodities comprising
diﬀerent commodity bundles are precluded, with interactions limited solely to the second
order eﬀects of price changes on real incomes. The structure and composition of commodity
groups thus becomes key.135 Conceptually, this would generally favour grouping of close
substitutes goods.
Second, it raises questions about the empirical relationship between consumption and
leisure. The assumption that leisure is independent of demand may be broadly plausible
for total expenditure, but is unlikely to hold for individual goods which may, for example,
134 Lewbel (1996) develops a version of the theorem which permits a weakening of assumptions over the co-movement of
prices. Speciﬁcally, he assumes that the distribution of an individual commodity's price is independent of the commodity
bundle, and then conducts cointegration tests between each of the individual prices and those of the bundle to which they
belong. Reed et al. (2005) extend this generalized theorem in a nonlinear modelling context for food demand.
135 Moschini (1992) and Moschini et al. (1994), for example, attempt to derive functional relationships that must hold
between goods belonging to the same group and those belonging to other groups, and then test whether these hold empirically.
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have close functional relationships with labour (for example, commuting) or leisure (such
as sporting goods).136
For the purposes of this study, the traditional assumption of weak separability is simply
maintained (its relaxation is a potential area for extension in future work).
Endogeneity
Expenditure endogeneity (correlated with the error terms in the commodity equations) is
a common issue in empirical demand side analysis. Data limitations and computational
constraints require estimation on a subset of household expenditures. This may generate
simultaneity bias in the event that total expenditure is jointly determined with outlays
for the individual commodities under analysis, making it endogenous to the budget share
equations.
Such a risk is clearly present in the context of this study. Even a comprehensive survey
such as the FES is inevitably incomplete (approximately 90 percent of the consumption
data covered by the national accounts (Banks and Johnson (1998)). Moreover, the de-
mand system estimated in this study excludes housing related expenditures (such as rent,
mortgage payments, and furniture and furnishing outlays).137
Endogeneity issues may also arise if the share equation is misspeciﬁed, or the data
are subject to measurement error. These problems are ubiquitous in empirical studies.
The range of explanatory variables considered is large (including detailed treatment of
demographic controls) and has been subjected to a proper robustness testing. Moreover,
136 Browning and Meghir (1991) analyze the eﬀects of labour supply on commodity demands in the UK and found the
independence assumption to be rejected empirically.
137 This is for two reasons. First, non housing expenditures may be a better measure of disposable income over which
consumption choices are formed. Second, these data are "dirty" in the sense that they include a number of (sometimes
large) negative expenditures, for example as a result of government or housing agency related rebate programmes.
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the diary system underpinning the FES methodology is considered best practice among
statisticians (OECD (2013b), page 150).
Nevertheless it is vulnerable to various form of measurement error. Beyond the fact
of simple human error, two examples are worthy of particular mention. First, diﬀerences
in the quality of products are not recorded. Second, and relatedly, prices are assumed to
be homogeneous across households within any given quarter (in the case of electricity, for
example, we know that low income households have a greater propensity to use pre pay
meters, or lack access to direct debit facilities, and therefore pay higher unit charges).138
This study adopts the standard practice in the literature of instrumenting expenditure
for income following Keen (1986) (see, for example, Banks et al. (1997), Blundell and
Robin (1999), Blundell et al. (1993)), paying careful attention to potential eﬃciency
losses from weakness in the informativeness of non linear instrumental variables. The
validity of this approach is veriﬁed using a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions.
Zero expenditures
Recording of zero expenditures is a common issue in demand analysis. Keen (1986), for
example, reports three possible causes of such patterns including: preference variation
(some households are unlikely to buy goods such as tobacco, regardless of the price), mis-
reporting of expenditures (reﬂecting, for example, social stigmas over certain goods such
as alcohol), and infrequent purchases (including, by deﬁnition, most consumer durables
but also certain storable energy goods such as coal and fuel oil). In cross sectional studies
138 In practice even the prices of homogeneous goods such as, say, regulated grades of gasoline, may vary across ﬁlling
stations and regions. A number of possible means of redress have been considered. Cox and Wohlgenant (1986), for example,
suggest that unit costs should be adjusted for quality variation before substituting unit costs for prices in estimated share
equations. Demographic, regional, and seasonal variables have often been used to proxy for quality and quality-adjusted
prices (Gao et al. (1995)).
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such as this, it is almost inevitable that surveyed households will consume zero quantities
of certain goods, particularly if the demand system is quite disaggregated.
The econometric treatment of zero consumption has received considerable attention
from econometricians. If a large proportion of expenditure values for a given commodity
is zero, then the dependent variable is censored. Basic regression techniques which fail
to account for this factor will therefore tend to be biased. However, dealing with such
issues is likely to be somewhat challenging. Simply removing zero observations would
introduce selection bias into the estimation of the parameters of the demand system (al-
though analysing conditional distributional may be interesting of itself), and could reduce
estimation freedom.
This problem is tractable in a single equation context through the use of a Tobit model,
but becomes considerably harder to deal with in the context of a system of equations
given the resulting computational complexity arising from the need to compute multiple
integrals on non consumption realizations (see, for example, Lee and Pitt (1986), Wales
and Woodland (1983)). Such one step approaches are thus inappropriate in this context.139
A number of two-step procedures have subsequently been developed, drawing on Heckman-
type sample selection correction factor (see, for example, Heien and Wessells (1990), Yen
et al. (2003)). For the purposes of this study, I have sought to balance these risks through
my choice of commodity aggregation.
Demographic controls
Demographic variables have a potentially important bearing on demand. There are two
broad ways of incorporating such controls into this type of analysis (see Pollak and Wales
139 Moreover, they are unsuitable for censoring due to infrequent purchases since observed demand and the consumption
decision are assumed to be governed by the same process.
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(1992) for a helpful review). The unpooled approach involves estimating individual de-
mand systems on sub-samples of households with the same demographic proﬁles. It pre-
cludes the need to specify the functional relationship between demographic variables and
demand system parameters. However, the failure to pool data results in a loss of eﬃciency.
In addition, it is not possible to draw inferences about households from the behaviour of
those with diﬀerent demographic proﬁles.
Pooled approaches involve specifying a class of demand parameters common to all
households (such as prices and incomes), and a further set which depend on demographic
variables (together with the functional relationship). Pollak and Wales (1992) review 5
approaches which have been applied to various demand systems, including (i) demographic
scaling (Barten (1964)); (ii) Gorman's (1976) speciﬁcation; (iii) the reverse-Gorman spec-
iﬁcation; (iv) the Prais-Houthakker (1955) procedure; and (iv) demographic translation
(Pollak and Wales (1981)).
Demographic translators are the most common approach in the literature and typically
allow subsistence budget shares to depend on demographic controls (through the intercept
term). By contrast, scaling functions, reﬂecting the number of `equivalent adults in the
household, can be applied to prices and quantities such that preferences are deﬁned over
the quantity of goods per equivalent adult. Although intuitive, Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980b) point out that theoretically consistent scaling imposes undesirable behavioral
assumptions including the absence of substitution possibilities. 140
No single method is universally preferable (and our capacity to comprehensively rank
140 The Gorman (and closely related reverse Gorman) form incorporate both demographic translating and scaling, but
suﬀer the identiﬁed weakness aﬀecting scaling functions. The Prais-Houthakker approach combines a single income scale
with speciﬁc modiﬁcations for each commodity grouping. However, while permitting additional ﬂexibility by capturing both
common and commodity speciﬁc scale factors, it yields theoretically consistent demand systems only in the presence of
additive utility functions (Pollak and Wales (1981)). This restriction implies that new commodity groups can always be
creating through combinations of others, preventing any good occupying a particular position in the utility function (Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980b)).
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them is restricted by the fact that a number of these approaches are not nested). Any
assessment also naturally depends on the particular functional form adopted in demand
estimation. Chapter 6 adopts the most common approach in the literature of demographic
translation.
Estimation results
209
Table 12
Average expenditure by commodity groups
This table shows the distribution of average expenditures on each commodity group analysed above in
2007: UK households spent, for example, an average each week around ¿70 on food and ¿34 on energy
products.
Commodity Food (non VAT) Food (VAT) Electricity Gas Petrol Consumer Leisure
Mean Weekly
40.88 30.20 8.51 7.09 18.78 87.90 78.51
Outlay (¿2007)
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Table 13
Distribution of energy expenditures
This table shows average weekly total spending, income and outlays on energy products, by (non housing)
expenditure and income decile (panel a) and b) respectively). Average energy outlays rise rapidly across
the expenditure distribution: from around ¿9 per week for the lowest decile, for example, to roughly ¿63
per week for the highest (a seven fold diﬀerence). However, energy expenditures comprise a much larger
share of the budget among poorer households: 19 percent for the lowest decile compared to an average of
9 percent for the uppermost. When households are ranked according to income, this pattern is still more
marked: energy expenditures account for, on average, almost one third of outlays among the lowest decile
(although this statistic is susceptible to outliers), but just 4 percent of the top ten percent of households
by income.∗
Decile Average weekly % Non housing Total Non Net income
energy exp. exp. housing exp.
1 9.27 19.15 48.54 179.52
2 15.45 17.22 89.82 257.26
3 21.11 16.92 124.95 306.23
4 26.36 16.51 159.81 374.40
5 30.10 15.40 195.99 457.48
6 35.44 14.89 238.19 537.69
7 42.69 14.82 288.33 621.77
8 46.47 13.08 355.49 685.22
9 53.46 11.81 454.95 782.83
10 63.37 8.95 763.19 1108.34
All households 34.37 14.88 271.87 531.00
(a) Average weekly total spending, income and outlays on energy products, by (non
housing) expenditure decile, 2007 (¿2007)
Decile Average weekly % Net income Total Non Net income
energy exp. housing exp.
1 15.82 32.77 102.39 101.19
2 18.01 9.93 131.22 181.70
3 21.67 8.85 153.73 245.79
4 27.44 8.70 197.02 315.37
5 31.27 8.01 229.19 390.66
6 36.16 7.62 256.82 475.02
7 40.91 7.19 309.45 569.80
8 45.83 6.63 370.00 692.59
9 49.09 5.66 395.97 871.21
10 57.52 4.31 573.37 1468.02
All households 34.37 9.94 271.87 531.00
(b) Average weekly total spending, income and outlays on energy products, by net
income decile, 2007 (¿2007)
∗Arguably, the expenditure distribution is a better measure of overall welfare (income being more sensitive to
transient employment shocks, for example).
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Table 14
Percentage of total energy expenditure by fuel
This table shows the distribution of average expenditure on individual fuels by expenditure decile in 2007:
outlays on natural gas and electricity rise less rapidly through the distribution than gasoline: outlays on
domestic fuels, for example, are around 2.5 times higher for the top 10 percent of households compared
to the lowest decile, but rise more than thirty fold for transportation. Expressed as a proportion of total
energy expenditures, poorer households are much more dependent on electricity, which accounts for nearly
60 percent of total energy outlays among those in the lowest spending decile (compared to one-quarter
among the top 10 percent). By contrast, more than one half of energy outlays go to transport among the
richest 25 percent of households.
Decile Electricity Gas Gasoline
1 59.5 33.9 6.7
2 46.0 34.9 19.1
3 38.5 30.5 31.0
4 34.4 28.6 37.0
5 31.8 24.9 43.3
6 29.3 24.6 46.1
7 26.8 22.1 51.2
8 26.7 20.2 53.1
9 25.7 19.5 54.8
10 24.9 19.9 55.1
All households 33.8 25.7 40.6
212
Table 15
Average energy expenditure share by demographic variable
This table summarises the diﬀerences in average budgets shares as compared to the sample mean in 2007
according to certain demographic and labour market variables. It highlights signiﬁcant variation across
diﬀerent household types: families with children, for example, allocate roughly 1.5 percent less resource
to electricity and gas relative to the sample as a whole, but slightly more to gasoline (perhaps due to the
need for school runs and additional entertainment). By contrast households whose head is retired typically
allocate a smaller share (around 0.7 percent) of their budget to gasoline, relative to the sample average,
but around 1.5 percent additionally to electricity (reﬂecting the absence of commuting and potentially
more time spent at home).
electricity gas gasoline
average budget share 0.114 0.035 0.039
children -0.014 -0.013 0.009
number of adults (minus one) 0.011 -0.007 -0.003
multiple adult earners 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
number of children in the household 0.000 0.002 0.002
dummy for single adult household -0.010 0.006 0.011
dummy for retired head of household -0.015 0.003 0.007
dummy for unemployed head of household 0.005 -0.004 -0.005
dummy for head of household aged 34-49 0.016 -0.004 -0.003
dummy for head of household aged 49-65 0.009 -0.002 -0.004
dummy for head of household aged 65-80 -0.006 0.000 -0.001
number of adult females -0.001 0.000 0.000
dummy if rented housing -0.001 0.004 0.005
dummy for car ownership -0.002 0.000 -0.001
number of cars in household 0.010 0.004 0.002
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Table 16
Comparing key parameter estimates: GMM vs ILLE
This table compares a sample of parameter results using both the GMM and ILLE estimators, on a simple model
variant.∗ It shows that the parameter estimates and conﬁdence intervals are very similar. This supports the ﬁndings
of Blundell and Robin (1999) and Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) that the ILLE achieves consistent, precise and
computationally tractable parameter estimates for large disaggregated demand systems observing the conditional
linearity property.
Food (non VAT) Food (VAT)
ILLE ILLE GMM GMM ILLE ILLE GMM GMM
(mean) (se) (mean) (se) (mean) (se) (mean) (se)
Constant 0.215 0.007 0.213 0.007 0.097 0.005 0.098 0.005
Expenditure -0.067 0.018 -0.074 0.014 -0.007 0.011 -0.004 0.008
Expenditure squared 0.012 0.011 0.006 0.009 -0.012 0.007 -0.009 0.005
Log price food (non VAT) 0.077 0.074 0.104 0.070 -0.052 0.049 -0.074 0.050
Log price food (VAT) -0.052 0.049 -0.074 0.050 0.086 0.079 0.125 0.076
Log price electricity 0.053 0.047 0.055 0.050 -0.059 0.046 -0.067 0.044
Log price gas -0.039 0.031 -0.045 0.032 -0.009 0.029 -0.014 0.027
Log price gasoline 0.037 0.025 0.047 0.025 -0.029 0.025 -0.036 0.024
Log price clothing -0.017 0.023 -0.030 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.031 0.021
Log price consumer goods 0.040 0.019 0.036 0.019 -0.007 0.014 -0.009 0.014
Log price leisure services -0.061 0.063 -0.036 0.060 0.039 0.061 0.030 0.061
Log price leisure services 0.004 0.032 -0.011 0.029 0.014 0.022 0.022 0.022
∗
In this case a 10 commodity demand system, excluding demographic and deterministic time controls), with assumptions of symme-
try, homogeneity and adding up maintained. For ease of reference, point estimates and standard errors for the ﬁrst two commodity
groups, food (non VAT) and food (VAT) only are reported.
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Table 17
OLS regression results
Food (non VAT) Food (VAT) Electricity Natural gas Gasoline Consumer goods
Log expenditure -0.1104∗∗∗ -0.0209∗∗∗ -0.0316∗∗∗ -0.0248∗∗∗ -0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0416∗∗∗
(-90.31) (-21.68) (-56.80) (-44.91) (-37.44) (24.89)
Log expenditure squared -0.0075∗∗∗ -0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0054∗∗∗ -0.0038∗∗∗
(-18.43) (-14.67) (6.97) (-1.13) (-22.66) (-6.86)
Child dummy aged 0-2 0.0060∗∗ -0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.0020∗ 0.0002 0.0417∗∗∗
(2.90) (-9.00) (0.44) (2.10) (0.15) (14.64)
Child dummy aged 2-5 -0.0069∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ 0.0010 0.0033∗∗∗ -0.0004 0.0085∗∗
(-3.23) (-7.15) (1.04) (3.42) (-0.34) (2.94)
Number of children in household 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ -0.0025∗∗ -0.0273∗∗∗
(19.74) (8.36) (6.26) (3.63) (-3.11) (-14.70)
Number of children squared in household -0.0010∗∗ -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0003∗ -0.0004∗∗ 0.0005∗ 0.0026∗∗∗
(-2.91) (-3.36) (-2.08) (-2.58) (2.47) (5.62)
Number of adults in household(-1) 0.0414∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗ -0.0016 -0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ -0.0456∗∗∗
(18.50) (12.92) (-1.55) (-5.14) (5.15) (-14.90)
Number of adult earners in household(-1) -0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ -0.0021∗∗∗ -0.0008∗ 0.0000 0.0007
(-10.03) (15.08) (-5.34) (-2.02) (0.08) (0.56)
Number of adult females in household -0.0063∗∗∗ -0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0011∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ -0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0500∗∗∗
(-5.48) (-16.12) (2.05) (4.12) (-12.49) (31.74)
Number of adults in household(-1), squared -0.0043∗∗∗ -0.0009∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0034∗∗∗
(-7.86) (-2.17) (3.67) (4.69) (0.17) (4.47)
Dummy for single adult household -0.0453∗∗∗ 0.0042∗ -0.0013 -0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0021 0.0201∗∗∗
(-21.69) (2.53) (-1.31) (-4.40) (1.72) (7.04)
Dummy for retired head of household 0.0019 0.0002 -0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0004 -0.0047∗∗∗ -0.0039
(1.15) (0.18) (-6.25) (0.50) (-4.70) (-1.68)
Dummy for unemployed head of household -0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0011 -0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.0043∗∗∗ -0.0023
(-5.13) (1.13) (-5.85) (0.96) (5.99) (-1.40)
Dummy for white collar head of household -0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0098∗∗∗ -0.0027∗∗∗ -0.0018∗∗ -0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0035
(-5.30) (8.13) (-3.80) (-2.65) (-6.64) (1.69)
Dummy for professional head of household -0.0051∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ -0.0020∗ -0.0007 -0.0095∗∗∗ -0.0064∗∗
(-2.84) (8.98) (-2.44) (-0.82) (-9.02) (-2.60)
Dummy for head of household aged 34-49 0.0328∗∗∗ -0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0041∗∗∗ -0.0188∗∗∗
(24.36) (-15.80) (4.31) (3.93) (-5.17) (-10.21)
Dummy for head of household aged 49-65 0.0614∗∗∗ -0.0319∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ -0.0041∗∗∗ -0.0271∗∗∗
(40.30) (-26.60) (7.79) (6.06) (-4.58) (-13.02)
Dummy for head of household aged 65-80 0.0609∗∗∗ -0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗∗
(28.89) (-21.92) (7.23) (5.68) (-8.88) (-6.79)
Dummy for head of household aged 80-99 0.0522∗∗∗ -0.0357∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ -0.0147∗∗∗ -0.0126∗∗
(16.73) (-14.55) (8.83) (3.39) (-8.05) (-2.95)
Dummy for central heating -0.0073∗∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0090∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ -0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗
(-5.46) (-0.39) (-14.85) (24.01) (-4.43) (3.31)
Number of rooms in household 0.0004 -0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0031∗∗∗
(1.24) (-5.14) (7.01) (19.33) (-4.25) (-6.49)
Dummy for rented accomodation -0.0004 0.0045∗∗∗ -0.0012∗ -0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0003
(-0.38) (5.04) (-2.31) (-9.79) (5.16) (0.21)
Dummy for car ownerships -0.0457∗∗∗ -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0144∗∗∗ -0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0675∗∗∗ 0.0401∗∗∗
(-29.27) (-10.13) (-20.25) (-12.50) (73.61) (18.76)
Number of cars in household -0.0028∗∗ -0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗∗
(-3.12) (-5.12) (9.79) (0.03) (26.23) (5.43)
Minimum temperature in sample month 0.0003 -0.0013∗∗ 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0016∗
(0.54) (-3.09) (0.42) (-1.35) (-0.62) (2.26)
Max temperature in sample month -0.0005 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0018∗∗
(-1.08) (5.14) (0.92) (1.60) (0.81) (-3.05)
Year dummy 1987 -0.0026 0.0035 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0021 -0.0112∗∗
(-0.85) (1.39) (0.45) (-0.24) (-1.22) (-2.70)
Year dummy 1988 -0.0111∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗ 0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0041
(-3.37) (2.90) (0.69) (-1.01) (-0.56) (-0.90)
Year dummy 1989 -0.0075∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0009 -0.0056∗∗∗ -0.0021 -0.0044
(-2.25) (3.31) (0.54) (-3.48) (-1.07) (-0.95)
Year dummy 1990 -0.0106∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ -0.0017 -0.0086∗∗∗ -0.0033 -0.0025
(-3.12) (3.53) (-0.97) (-5.18) (-1.70) (-0.53)
Year dummy 1991 -0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗ 0.0054∗ -0.0026 -0.0056∗∗ -0.0077
(-5.27) (2.67) (2.57) (-1.33) (-2.62) (-1.38)
Year dummy 1992 -0.0303∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗ 0.0068∗ -0.0022 -0.0032 -0.0149∗
(-6.22) (2.70) (2.57) (-0.94) (-1.31) (-2.30)
Year dummy 1993 -0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0091∗∗ -0.0046 -0.0026 -0.0137
(-4.68) (3.36) (3.13) (-1.77) (-0.99) (-1.91)
Year dummy 1994 -0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0037 -0.0043 -0.0026 -0.0096
(-5.12) (3.42) (1.22) (-1.60) (-0.97) (-1.28)
Year dummy 1995 -0.0349∗∗∗ 0.0273∗∗∗ 0.0017 -0.0081∗∗ -0.0020 -0.0064
(-6.14) (4.00) (0.54) (-3.01) (-0.74) (-0.84)
Year dummy 1996 -0.0340∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0028 -0.0070∗ -0.0014 -0.0029
(-5.50) (4.09) (0.82) (-2.37) (-0.47) (-0.34)
Year dummy 1997 -0.0395∗∗∗ 0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0002 -0.0064 -0.0048 0.0000
(-5.60) (3.97) (0.04) (-1.94) (-1.51) (0.00)
Year dummy 1998 -0.0371∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗ -0.0048 -0.0106∗∗ -0.0021 -0.0004
(-4.89) (3.97) (-1.15) (-2.96) (-0.60) (-0.04)
Year dummy 1999 -0.0343∗∗∗ 0.0431∗∗∗ -0.0054 -0.0139∗∗∗ -0.0011 -0.0011
(-4.16) (4.14) (-1.19) (-3.62) (-0.30) (-0.10)
Year dummy 2000 -0.0388∗∗∗ 0.0468∗∗∗ -0.0056 -0.0139∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0004
(-4.19) (4.14) (-1.09) (-3.25) (-0.03) (-0.03)
Year dummy 2001 -0.0463∗∗∗ 0.0467∗∗∗ -0.0065 -0.0145∗∗ -0.0086∗ 0.0037
(-4.93) (3.94) (-1.21) (-3.24) (-2.01) (0.29)
Year dummy 2002 -0.0449∗∗∗ 0.0453∗∗∗ -0.0074 -0.0136∗∗ -0.0105∗ 0.0047
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(-4.40) (3.48) (-1.24) (-2.79) (-2.31) (0.35)
Year dummy 2003 -0.0460∗∗∗ 0.0444∗∗∗ -0.0076 -0.0141∗∗ -0.0101∗ 0.0081
(-4.31) (3.31) (-1.24) (-2.79) (-2.12) (0.57)
Year dummy 2004 -0.0491∗∗∗ 0.0456∗∗∗ -0.0061 -0.0140∗∗ -0.0113∗ 0.0047
(-4.55) (3.40) (-1.00) (-2.79) (-2.40) (0.34)
Year dummy 2005 -0.0535∗∗∗ 0.0495∗∗∗ -0.0054 -0.0126∗ -0.0139∗∗ 0.0127
(-4.75) (3.62) (-0.86) (-2.44) (-2.89) (0.89)
Year dummy 2006 -0.0634∗∗∗ 0.0479∗∗∗ -0.0044 -0.0111∗ -0.0144∗∗ 0.0088
(-5.33) (3.52) (-0.69) (-2.09) (-2.97) (0.61)
Year dummy 2007 -0.0619∗∗∗ 0.0428∗∗ -0.0012 -0.0094 -0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0091
(-5.35) (3.28) (-0.20) (-1.83) (-3.55) (0.65)
Year dummy 2008 -0.0694∗∗∗ 0.0466∗∗∗ -0.0034 -0.0117∗ -0.0170∗∗∗ 0.0144
(-6.31) (3.85) (-0.59) (-2.36) (-3.61) (1.05)
Year dummy 2009 -0.0671∗∗∗ 0.0422∗∗∗ 0.0007 -0.0078 -0.0191∗∗∗ 0.0088
(-6.18) (3.50) (0.12) (-1.51) (-4.19) (0.64)
Season dummy 1 0.0108∗∗∗ -0.0054∗∗ 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗ -0.0115∗∗∗
(6.23) (-3.17) (6.73) (12.01) (2.69) (-4.70)
Season dummy 2 0.0061∗∗ -0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗ 0.0013 -0.0055∗
(3.22) (-5.10) (5.47) (13.02) (1.17) (-2.12)
Season dummy 3 0.0021 -0.0051∗∗ -0.0002 0.0041∗∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0017
(0.95) (-2.94) (-0.24) (4.24) (-0.04) (-0.57)
Child dummy*log expenditure 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0027 -0.0013 0.0006 0.0013 0.0137∗∗∗
(5.49) (1.49) (-1.23) (0.59) (0.99) (4.42)
Log price of food (non VAT) 0.0219 0.0314 0.0248∗ 0.0114 -0.0158 -0.0924∗∗
(0.82) (1.19) (1.97) (1.09) (-1.74) (-3.20)
Log price of food (VAT) 0.0314 -0.0371 -0.0063 0.0030 -0.0184∗ 0.0675
(1.19) (-0.76) (-0.34) (0.21) (-2.03) (1.77)
Log price of electricity 0.0248∗ -0.0063 -0.0084 0.0103 0.0070 0.0028
(1.97) (-0.34) (-0.62) (1.11) (1.41) (0.15)
Log price of natural gas 0.0114 0.0030 0.0103 0.0046 0.0093∗ -0.0248
(1.09) (0.21) (1.11) (0.56) (2.11) (-1.67)
Log price of gasoline -0.0158 -0.0184∗ 0.0070 0.0093∗ 0.0343∗∗∗ -0.0496∗∗∗
(-1.74) (-2.03) (1.41) (2.11) (4.98) (-3.73)
Log price of consumer goods -0.0924∗∗ 0.0675 0.0028 -0.0248 -0.0496∗∗∗ 0.1853∗∗
(-3.20) (1.77) (0.15) (-1.67) (-3.73) (3.23)
Constant 0.1672∗∗∗ 0.1099∗∗∗ 0.0403∗∗∗ 0.0019 -0.0160∗∗∗ 0.3570∗∗∗
(25.42) (15.89) (11.97) (0.61) (-4.93) (41.77)
Observations 49109
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 18
ILLE regression results
Food (non VAT) Food (VAT) Electricity Natural gas Gasoline Consumer goods
Log expenditure -0.0838∗∗∗ -0.0184∗∗∗ -0.0107∗∗∗ -0.0147∗∗∗ -0.0471∗∗∗ -0.0357∗∗∗
(-14.69) (-4.20) (-4.17) (-6.10) (-15.02) (-4.78)
Log expenditure squared 0.0245∗∗∗ -0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0041∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ -0.0339∗∗∗
(6.48) (-7.09) (9.03) (2.58) (-5.71) (-6.81)
Child dummy aged 0-2 0.0014 -0.0127∗∗∗ -0.0041∗∗ 0.0002 -0.0011 0.0538∗∗∗
(0.49) (-5.96) (-3.23) (0.19) (-0.69) (14.67)
Child dummy aged 2-5 -0.0076∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0015 0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0011 0.0051
(-3.31) (-5.99) (1.45) (3.82) (-0.89) (1.69)
Number of children in household 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0091∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0016∗ -0.0012 -0.0227∗∗∗
(16.54) (7.86) (3.78) (2.57) (-1.45) (-11.51)
Number of children squared in household -0.0003 -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0000 -0.0003∗ 0.0004 0.0021∗∗∗
(-0.87) (-4.42) (-0.28) (-2.03) (1.86) (4.28)
Number of adults in household(-1) 0.0460∗∗∗ 0.0175∗∗∗ -0.0008 -0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ -0.0414∗∗∗
(18.57) (9.25) (-0.75) (-5.35) (6.72) (-12.72)
Number of adult earners in household(-1) -0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗ -0.0020∗∗∗ -0.0012∗∗ 0.0015∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗
(-6.61) (9.78) (-4.77) (-2.92) (2.77) (3.46)
Number of adult females in household -0.0011 -0.0186∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ -0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0496∗∗∗
(-0.82) (-18.21) (4.31) (4.08) (-11.24) (28.32)
Number of adults in household(-1), squared -0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0004 0.0011∗∗∗ -0.0001 0.0037∗∗∗
(-9.66) (0.57) (1.38) (4.19) (-0.25) (4.62)
Dummy for single adult household -0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗ -0.0066∗∗∗ -0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0033∗ 0.0237∗∗∗
(-21.94) (7.53) (-5.08) (-4.01) (2.05) (6.24)
Dummy for retired head of household 0.0042∗ -0.0019 -0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0003 -0.0039∗∗∗ -0.0029
(2.29) (-1.39) (-5.19) (0.41) (-3.89) (-1.23)
Dummy for unemployed head of household -0.0011 -0.0029∗∗ -0.0017∗∗ 0.0007 0.0046∗∗∗ -0.0027
(-0.79) (-2.72) (-2.76) (1.13) (6.01) (-1.46)
Dummy for white collar head of household -0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗ -0.0024∗∗ -0.0021∗∗ -0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0059∗∗
(-3.55) (5.67) (-3.18) (-2.94) (-5.23) (2.69)
Dummy for professional head of household -0.0065∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ -0.0043∗∗∗ -0.0021∗ -0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0053
(-3.13) (6.36) (-4.64) (-2.42) (-5.11) (1.94)
Dummy for head of household aged 34-49 0.0317∗∗∗ -0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ -0.0035∗∗∗ -0.0183∗∗∗
(21.67) (-14.57) (3.64) (3.76) (-4.34) (-9.52)
Dummy for head of household aged 49-65 0.0589∗∗∗ -0.0302∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0041∗∗∗ -0.0038∗∗∗ -0.0271∗∗∗
(35.47) (-23.75) (6.47) (5.89) (-4.19) (-12.43)
Dummy for head of household aged 65-80 0.0560∗∗∗ -0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗ -0.0111∗∗∗ -0.0211∗∗∗
(24.14) (-18.26) (5.77) (5.63) (-8.69) (-6.94)
Dummy for head of household aged 80-99 0.0404∗∗∗ -0.0273∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗ -0.0144∗∗∗ -0.0114∗
(11.39) (-10.05) (5.80) (2.95) (-7.37) (-2.44)
Dummy for central heating -0.0032∗ -0.0043∗∗∗ -0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗ -0.0025∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗
(-2.16) (-3.78) (-12.44) (22.77) (-3.02) (4.28)
Number of rooms in household 0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0007
(3.31) (-9.27) (5.28) (16.22) (-0.31) (-1.31)
Dummy for rented accomodation -0.0030∗ 0.0067∗∗∗ -0.0018∗∗ -0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗ -0.0004
(-2.38) (7.02) (-3.13) (-9.47) (4.56) (-0.26)
Dummy for car ownerships -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0292∗∗∗ -0.0053∗∗∗ -0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0661∗∗∗ 0.0288∗∗∗
(-6.48) (-12.28) (-3.79) (-5.28) (38.71) (7.07)
Number of cars in household -0.0074∗∗∗ -0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0009 -0.0014∗∗ 0.0166∗∗∗ 0.0173∗∗∗
(-5.82) (-3.35) (1.50) (-2.60) (23.71) (10.36)
Minimum temperature in sample month 0.0004 -0.0012∗∗ 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0013
(0.79) (-2.87) (0.81) (-1.22) (-0.83) (1.71)
Max temperature in sample month -0.0004 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0015∗
(-0.87) (4.71) (0.57) (1.49) (1.19) (-2.53)
Year dummy 1987 -0.0037 0.0051 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0027 -0.0121∗∗
(-1.13) (1.90) (0.47) (-0.37) (-1.50) (-2.82)
Year dummy 1988 -0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0007 -0.0020 -0.0008 -0.0029
(-3.37) (3.33) (0.42) (-1.27) (-0.43) (-0.60)
Year dummy 1989 -0.0074∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0006 -0.0059∗∗∗ -0.0016 -0.0029
(-2.05) (3.48) (0.33) (-3.64) (-0.84) (-0.60)
Year dummy 1990 -0.0099∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ -0.0020 -0.0090∗∗∗ -0.0025 -0.0010
(-2.71) (3.60) (-1.10) (-5.33) (-1.28) (-0.21)
Year dummy 1991 -0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗ 0.0046∗ -0.0033 -0.0044∗ -0.0048
(-4.84) (2.97) (2.06) (-1.68) (-2.04) (-0.83)
Year dummy 1992 -0.0288∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗ 0.0060∗ -0.0031 -0.0018 -0.0109
(-5.50) (2.82) (2.19) (-1.33) (-0.73) (-1.61)
Year dummy 1993 -0.0239∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗ -0.0058∗ -0.0014 -0.0099
(-4.01) (3.33) (2.81) (-2.18) (-0.52) (-1.31)
Year dummy 1994 -0.0282∗∗∗ 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0033 -0.0059∗ -0.0012 -0.0052
(-4.41) (3.39) (1.02) (-2.16) (-0.42) (-0.65)
Year dummy 1995 -0.0332∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0015 -0.0098∗∗∗ -0.0008 -0.0035
(-5.35) (4.01) (0.45) (-3.56) (-0.29) (-0.44)
Year dummy 1996 -0.0319∗∗∗ 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.0027 -0.0092∗∗ 0.0003 0.0001
(-4.71) (4.07) (0.74) (-3.01) (0.10) (0.01)
Year dummy 1997 -0.0371∗∗∗ 0.0377∗∗∗ 0.0006 -0.0096∗∗ -0.0033 0.0037
(-4.73) (3.79) (0.14) (-2.77) (-0.98) (0.36)
Year dummy 1998 -0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0407∗∗∗ -0.0045 -0.0143∗∗∗ -0.0006 0.0039
(-4.20) (3.79) (-0.97) (-3.80) (-0.17) (0.36)
Year dummy 1999 -0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0447∗∗∗ -0.0047 -0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0031
(-3.51) (3.86) (-0.93) (-4.44) (0.02) (0.26)
Year dummy 2000 -0.0372∗∗∗ 0.0475∗∗∗ -0.0046 -0.0188∗∗∗ 0.0010 0.0039
(-3.53) (3.78) (-0.82) (-4.11) (0.21) (0.30)
Year dummy 2001 -0.0436∗∗∗ 0.0470∗∗∗ -0.0056 -0.0197∗∗∗ -0.0065 0.0102
(-4.11) (3.57) (-0.95) (-4.16) (-1.44) (0.75)
Year dummy 2002 -0.0419∗∗∗ 0.0457∗∗ -0.0066 -0.0195∗∗∗ -0.0075 0.0139
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(-3.66) (3.16) (-1.01) (-3.79) (-1.58) (0.95)
Year dummy 2003 -0.0427∗∗∗ 0.0446∗∗ -0.0066 -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.0074 0.0169
(-3.55) (2.99) (-0.97) (-3.76) (-1.48) (1.11)
Year dummy 2004 -0.0456∗∗∗ 0.0453∗∗ -0.0050 -0.0203∗∗∗ -0.0086 0.0140
(-3.74) (3.04) (-0.74) (-3.78) (-1.73) (0.93)
Year dummy 2005 -0.0514∗∗∗ 0.0490∗∗ -0.0053 -0.0196∗∗∗ -0.0099 0.0267
(-4.05) (3.23) (-0.78) (-3.55) (-1.96) (1.73)
Year dummy 2006 -0.0574∗∗∗ 0.0452∗∗ -0.0025 -0.0176∗∗ -0.0111∗ 0.0203
(-4.30) (2.98) (-0.36) (-3.09) (-2.19) (1.31)
Year dummy 2007 -0.0561∗∗∗ 0.0402∗∗ 0.0006 -0.0155∗∗ -0.0135∗∗ 0.0204
(-4.33) (2.77) (0.09) (-2.83) (-2.73) (1.36)
Year dummy 2008 -0.0643∗∗∗ 0.0449∗∗∗ -0.0017 -0.0171∗∗ -0.0144∗∗ 0.0224
(-5.28) (3.35) (-0.27) (-3.23) (-2.95) (1.53)
Year dummy 2009 -0.0605∗∗∗ 0.0398∗∗ 0.0028 -0.0131∗ -0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0178
(-5.06) (2.98) (0.45) (-2.41) (-3.44) (1.22)
Season dummy 1 0.0108∗∗∗ -0.0048∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0016 -0.0149∗∗∗
(5.76) (-2.62) (6.88) (12.77) (1.58) (-5.84)
Season dummy 2 0.0071∗∗∗ -0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0011 -0.0069∗∗
(3.51) (-5.15) (5.53) (13.41) (1.04) (-2.60)
Season dummy 3 0.0021 -0.0050∗∗ -0.0003 0.0042∗∗∗ -0.0000 -0.0018
(0.89) (-2.80) (-0.33) (4.29) (-0.01) (-0.60)
Child dummy*log expenditure 0.0047 0.0045 -0.0102∗∗∗ -0.0032 0.0001 0.0408∗∗∗
(1.15) (1.47) (-5.61) (-1.85) (0.05) (7.68)
Log price of food (non VAT) 0.0230 0.0321 0.0280∗ 0.0011 -0.0155 -0.0718∗
(0.76) (1.10) (2.08) (0.10) (-1.57) (-2.23)
Log price of food (VAT) 0.0321 -0.0791 -0.0162 0.0148 -0.0123 0.0911∗
(1.10) (-1.46) (-0.80) (0.98) (-1.24) (2.17)
Log price of electricity 0.0280∗ -0.0162 -0.0006 0.0029 0.0048 0.0025
(2.08) (-0.80) (-0.04) (0.30) (0.93) (0.13)
Log price of natural gas 0.0011 0.0148 0.0029 0.0092 0.0095∗ -0.0282
(0.10) (0.98) (0.30) (1.08) (2.08) (-1.80)
Log price of gasoline -0.0155 -0.0123 0.0048 0.0095∗ 0.0377∗∗∗ -0.0380∗∗
(-1.57) (-1.24) (0.93) (2.08) (5.37) (-2.68)
Log price of consumer goods -0.0718∗ 0.0911∗ 0.0025 -0.0282 -0.0380∗∗ 0.1711∗∗
(-2.23) (2.17) (0.13) (-1.80) (-2.68) (2.73)
Constant 0.1267∗∗∗ 0.1614∗∗∗ 0.0387∗∗∗ 0.0055 -0.0361∗∗∗ 0.3042∗∗∗
(15.07) (19.38) (9.41) (1.49) (-8.69) (28.19)
Observations 49109
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
218
Figure 12
Analysis of predicted errors
This ﬁgure analyses the predicted errors under the ILLE: a) summarizes the mean, standard devia-
tion (together with minimum and maximum values) of the predicted errors, which clearly indicate their
heterogeneous nature (common in cross sectional data). b) and c) respectively show histograms and stan-
dardized normal probability plots for each commodity equation, together with a continuous mapping of
the probability densities of the respective distributions. These indicate non-normality in the predicted
error distributions, particularly for the energy commodities.
(a) Summary statistics
Food (non VAT) Food (VAT) Electricity Natural gas Gasoline Consumer goods Leisiure goods
mean 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
standard deviation 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.15
min -0.77 -0.19 -0.42 -0.18 -0.17 -0.39 -0.85
max 0.75 0.81 0.75 0.72 0.75 0.88 0.82
(b) Estimated residuals: p-normal comparisons
(c) Estimated residuals: histograms
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Policy and tax reform scenario
This section provides background on the carbon tax and VAT indirect reforms analysed
above (drawing on Jones (2012)). Table 22 summarizes the overall change in price in each
scenario. Key methodological issues and assumptions are set out below.
These tax changes are modelled as proportionate increases in the prices of the aggregate
commodity bundles which, given by:141
p1i = p
0
i
(1 + t1i )
(1 + t0i )
(D.1)
where p0i , p
1
i and t
0
i , t
1
i are pre and post reform levels of prices and ad valorem taxes on
good i respectively.
Speciﬁc duties and ad valorem tax rates
Goods such as petrol, and prospective charges on carbon, are subject to speciﬁc duties
(these components also being subject to VAT).142 It is therefore desirable to calculate the
eﬀective burden of the combined taxes on good i as a proportion of price. One approach is
to estimate the speciﬁc duty as a proportion of market prices, and subsequently apply it
to the available price data. In the baseline scenario, the eﬀective ad valorem rate is given
by:
1 + Z0i =
p0i
pNi
(D.2)
141 This assumes that taxes are fully passed onto consumers (reasonable for a unilateral rate rise in the UK but a more
debatable assumption in the context of a broad international coalition).
142 Diﬀerentiated commodity taxes were initially justiﬁed on redistributive grounds. However, modern tax theory generally
suggests that such objectives should be pursued through adjustments to the income tax schedule or beneﬁts transfer system
(see, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Deaton and Stern (1986)). More recently, studies emphasize the signiﬁcance
of administration costs from non-uniform systems (Cnossen (2003)).
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Table 20
Distribution of budget elasticities by expenditure decile
This table shows the weighted (by expenditure group within decile) expenditure elasticities by decile.
Commodities such as food (VAT), gasoline as well as consumer and leisure goods are more of a luxury
at lower levels of household expenditure. Among the fuels, budget elasticities fall with average outlays,
particularly for petrol (and to a lesser extent gas).
Decile Food (non VAT) Food (VAT) Electricity Gas Petrol Consumer Leisure
1 0.40 1.54 0.44 0.76 1.00 1.43 1.78
2 0.41 1.39 0.21 0.69 0.94 1.24 1.94
3 0.42 1.29 0.19 0.65 0.87 1.18 2.08
4 0.36 1.22 0.09 0.56 0.81 1.13 1.93
5 0.35 1.15 0.14 0.52 0.76 1.10 1.86
6 0.41 1.09 0.09 0.50 0.68 1.07 1.94
7 0.33 1.02 0.21 0.46 0.64 1.04 1.82
8 0.38 0.95 0.26 0.37 0.57 1.00 1.76
9 0.31 0.88 0.31 0.31 0.45 0.96 1.66
10 0.33 0.66 0.81 0.33 0.14 0.87 1.58
Table 21
Comparing welfare losses: behavioural vs non behavioural analysis
This table compares the percentage diﬀerence in aggregate welfare losses under each policy scenario and
SWF computed using non behavioural analysis, with the results shown in Table 9. These ﬁndings are
materially diﬀerent  being commonly higher by on the order of 4-18 percent higher (although, as pointed
out by Banks et al. (1996), the sign of such a diﬀerence need not be universally positive).
v 1 2 3
Carbon Tax ¿25tCO2 3.9 4.7 5.5
Carbon Tax ¿50tCO 8.2 10.0 12.1
Carbon Tax ¿25tCO2+VAT 11.9 12.4 13.3
Carbon Tax ¿50tCO2+VAT 15.3 16.6 18.5
VAT 10.0 10.1 10.5
(a) Unweighted: SWFa
v 1 2 3
Carbon Tax ¿25tCO2 3.7 4.4 5.2
Carbon Tax ¿50tCO 7.7 9.3 11.5
Carbon Tax ¿25tCO2+VAT 11.6 12.3 13.3
Carbon Tax ¿50tCO2+VAT 14.7 16.2 18.2
VAT 9.8 10.1 10.6
(b) Weighted by household size: SWFb
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Table 22
Ad valorem tax rates by policy scenario
This table summarizes the eﬀective (in 2008) ad valorem tax rates implied under by each simulated tax
reform scenario: a ¿25 tCO2 carbon tax (implemented without VAT reform), for example, induces a tax
rate of 19.7 percent on natural gas. Since gasoline is already subject to the standard rate of VAT, only
carbon taxes have a bearing on its price in the simulations.
Commodity Baseline Tax
Tax reform scenario
Carbon Tax Carbon Tax Carbon Tax Carbon Tax VAT
¿25tCO2 ¿25tCO2+VAT ¿50tCO2 ¿50tCO2+VAT only
Food, non VAT 0 0 0.175 0 0.175 0.175
Food, VAT 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175
Electricity 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.175 0.175
Gas 0.05 0.197 0.348 0.344 0.52 0.175
Consumer 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175
Gasoline 1.62 1.81 1.81 2.01 2.01 1.62
Leisure goods 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175
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where pNi represents the price of good i exclusive of taxation. This can be viewed as the
underlying (private) resource cost, given by;
pNi =
p0i
1 + Z0,V ATi
− Zsi (D.3)
where Zsi represents the speciﬁc duty charge and Z
0,V AT
i is the pre reform rate of VAT on
good i.
Substituting equation (D.3) into (D.2) and simplifying, yields the following expression
for the eﬀective ad valorem tax rate in terms or observed tax and price variables:143
t0i =
p0iZ
0,V AT
i − Zsi (1 + v0i )
p0i − Zsi (1 + v0i )
(D.4)
It follows trivially that for goods not subject speciﬁc duties, this equation reduces to v0i
(the baseline VAT rate).
Carbon charges are imposed as a simple extension of this framework where ZTi =
Zsi + Z
c
i , where the carbon element of the duty is given by:
ZTi = C
i ∗ SCi (D.5)
where Ci represents the (or emission factor), and SCi represents the charge on each unit
of emissions.
Calibrating tax rates:
This subsection discusses the assumptions underpinning the simulated ad valorem tax
143 Speciﬁc and ad valorem charges can be equivalent under perfect competition, but diverge under a number of product
and market settings. In the case of pure monopoly, for example, an ad valorem (as opposed to speciﬁc) charge will cause the
proﬁt maximising supplier to expand output, with consequential downward pressures on price (see Keen (1998) for a helpful
discussion of these and other issues).
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rates, including energy prices, emissions factors, and the choice of levy on carbon.
Values for Ci and P
Data on energy prices in the household sector for 2007, the year for which tax reforms
are simulated, are taken from the DECC website. Emissions factors are drawn from
government guidelines, which quantify the emissions from a particular fuel type. The
methodologies for their calculation are an emerging policy area (see DECC (2011) for a
detailed discussion).
A broad deﬁnition of the carbon tax base is adopted. Emissions (weighted relative to the
global warming potential of CO2) for all GHGs are included in the calculation. Moreover,
both direct emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels, as well as those arising indirectly,
for example, from upstream processing and transportation, are included in the emissions
factor.
In the case of electricity generation, C reﬂects a weighted average of emissions from the
various generation technologies which power the national grid (and includes ineﬃciencies
arising from transmission and distribution). In the case of GHG emissions from road
transport fuels, emissions factors adjust for biodiesel and bioethanol in the fuel blend (3.3
and 1.9 percent respectively by unit energy).
Petrol and diesel are not separately recorded in the household expenditure data, and
thus a further weighting of the two coeﬃcients is applied (reﬂecting the roughly 55-45
split in expenditure on diesel and petrol respectively). Table 23 summarizes all relevant
coeﬃcients.
A value for SC
Choosing an appropriate carbon tax rate is a complex issue (see Jones et al. (2013) for
a detailed discussion), requiring long term predictions on economic development and thus
emissions, a postulated relationship between stocks of GHGs and economic damages, and
an appropriate choice of discount rate. Not surprisingly then, those studies which have
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attempted to estimate the social cost of carbon vary widely in terms of results.
In a review of the marginal social damage from carbon emissions, Tol (2007), for ex-
ample, ﬁnds a modal value of around US$6 tCO2, and a median of US$15 tCO2. The US
Government (IWG (2013)) arrives at a central value - averaged over a range of IAMs at a
discount rate of 3 percent - of around US $35 tCO2. The Stern Review (2007) estimate,
towards the upper end of the distribution, is US$85 tCO2; Nordhaus (2007), on the other
hand, suggests a starting carbon price of around US$5 tC02.144
In practice, however, a more limited notion of optimality (in the sense that it does
not maximize welfare)  which involves taking the overall policy objectives on GHGs as
given, and then choosing a tax rate which achieves this at minimum discounted cost (as
advocated, for example, by Baumol-Oates (1988)  has formed the basis for most policy in
this area (in part reﬂecting the uncertainties involved in full cost-beneﬁt analysis in this
context).
The UK government, for example, has formally shifted away from policy appraisal based
on estimated social costs of carbon, towards a framework based on evaluating the costs
of mitigation (DECC (2009)). Speciﬁcally, the government estimates that a carbon tax of
¿50 tCO2 (within a range of ¿25-¿75 tCO2) in 2008, and rising over time, is likely to be
necessary to achieve its objective of reducing emissions in the household sector (DECC
(2009)). Reﬂecting this fact, the government's mean and lower bound switching rates form
are adopted for carbon tax scenario in the present work.145
144 For comparison, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme spot price in October 2015 was around ¿6 tCO2.
145 Note that these ﬁgures are, in general, somewhat higher than those prescribed by the welfare maximizing studies
outlined above.
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Table 23
Market prices, emissions factors by fuel
This table summarizes the prices, measurement units and assumed CO2 equivalent content of each fuel.
Fuel P (pence), 2008 Unit CO2e per unit
Electricity 12 KwH 0.53
Gasoline 107 Litre 2.66
Diesel 117 Litre 3.11
Natural Gas 4 KwH 0.02
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